•'-MERJCA  SERIES 
LLEN  JOHNSON 

EDITOR 


THE  DAY  OF 

RAG 


1    •• 
i-s 


NATHANIE 


STEPHENSC^ 


^CA3_\    GA.,1 


LV\     E  T 


VERITAS 


THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 


NORTH  AND  SOUTH,  1861 

From  the  painting  by  Ferris.     In  the  Ferris  Collection  of  American 
Historical  Paintings 

Copyright,  J.  L.  G.  Ferris 


THE   DAY  OF 
THE  CONFEDERACY 

A  CHRONICLE  OF  THE 

EMBATTLED   SOUTH 
BY  NATHANIEL  W.  STEPHENSON 


NEW    HAVEN:    YALE    UNIVERSITY    PRESS 

TORONTO:    GLASGOW.    BROOK    &    CO. 

LONDON:    HUMPHREY    MILFORD 

OXFORD     UNIVERSITY    PRESS 

1920 


Copyright,  1919,  by  Yale  University  Press 


TO 
HENRY  KENNON  DUNHAM 


534S39 


CONTENTS 

I.     THE  SECESSION  MOVEMENT  Page  1 

II.    THE  DAVIS  GOVERNMENT  "  24 

III.     THE  FALL  OF  KING  COTTON  "  45 

,  IV.     THE  REACTION  AGAINST  RICHMOND  "  58 

V.    THE  CRITICAL  YEAR  "  87 

VI.     LIFE  IN  THE  CONFEDERACY  "  99 

VII.    THE  TURNING  OF  THE  TIDE  "  112 

VIII.     A  GAME  OF  CHANCE  "  130 

IX.     DESPERATE  REMEDIES  "  145 

X.     DISINTEGRATION  "  165 

XI.     AN  ATTEMPTED  REVOLUTION  "  183 

XII.     THE  LAST  WORD  "  200 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE  "  205 

INDEX  "  209 


ILLUSTRATION 

NORTH   AND   SOUTH,    1861 

From  the  painting  by  Ferris.  In  the 
Ferris  Collection  of  American  Historical 
Paintings.  Copyright,  J.  L.  G.  Ferris.  Frontispiece 


THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 
CHAPTER  I 

THE   SECESSION  MOVEMENT 

THE  secession  movement  had  three  distinct  stages. 
The  first,  beginning  with  the  news  that  Lincoln  was 
elected,  closed  with  the  news,  sent  broadcast  over 
the  South  from  Charleston,  that  Federal  troops  had 
taken  possession  of  Fort  Sumter  on  the  night  of  the 
26th  of  December.  During  this  period  the  likeli 
hood  of  secession  was  the  topic  of  discussion  in  the 
lower  South.  What  to  do  in  case  the  lower  South 
seceded  was  the  question  which  perplexed  the  up 
per  South.  In  this  period  no  State  north  of  South 
Carolina  contemplated  taking  the  initiative.  In 
the  Southeastern  and  Gulf  States  immediate  action 
of  some  sort  was  expected.  Whether  it  would  be 
secession  or  some  other  new  course  was  not  cer 
tain  on  the  day  of  Lincoln's  election. 


2         THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

Various  States  earlier  in  the  year  had  provided 
for  conventions  of  their  people  in  the  event  of  a 
Republican  victory.  The  first  to  assemble  was  the 
convention  of  South  Carolina,  which  organized 
at  Columbia,  on  December  17,  1860.  Two  weeks 
earlier  Congress  had  met.  Northerners  and  South 
erners  had  at  once  joined  issue  on  their  relation  in 
the  Union.  The  House  had  appointed  its  com 
mittee  of  thirty-three  to  consider  the  condition  of 
the  country.  So  unpromising  indeed  from  the 
Southern  point  of  view  had  been  the  early  dis 
cussions  of  this  committee  that  a  conference  of 
Southern  members  of  Congress  had  sent  out  their 
famous  address  To  Our  Constituents:  "The  argu 
ment  is  exhausted.  All  hope  of  relief  in  the  Union 
...  is  extinguished,  and  we  trust  the  South  will 
not  be  deceived  by  appearances  or  the  pretense  of 
new  guarantees.  In  our  judgment  the  Republi 
cans  are  resolute  in  the  purpose  to  grant  nothing 
that  will  or  ought  to  satisfy  the  South.  We  are 
satisfied  the  honor,  safety,  and  independence  of 
the  Southern  people  require  the  organization  of  a 
Southern  Confederacy  —  a  result  to  be  obtained 
only  by  separate  state  secession."  Among  the 
signers  of  this  address  were  the  two  statesmen  who 
had  in  native  talent  no  superiors  at  Washington  - 


THE  SECESSION  MOVEMENT  3 

Judah  P.  Benjamin  of  Louisiana  and  Jefferson 
Davis  of  Mississippi. 

The  appeal  To  Our  Constituents  was  not  the  only 
assurance  of  support  tendered  to  the  convention  of 
South  Carolina.  To  represent  them  at  this  con 
vention  the  governors  of  Alabama  and  Mississippi 
had  appointed  delegates.  Mr.  Hooker  of  Missis 
sippi  and  Mr.  Elmore  of  Alabama  made  addresses 
before  the  convention  on  the  night  of  the  17th  of 
December.  Both  reiterated  views  which  during 
two  days  of  lobbying  they  had  disseminated  in 
Columbia  "on  all  proper  occasions."  Their  argu 
ment,  summed  up  in  Elmore's  report  to  Governor 
Moore  of  Alabama,  was  "that  the  only  course  to 
unite  the  Southern  States  in  any  plan  of  coopera 
tion  which  could  promise  safety  was  for  South 
Carolina  to  take  the  lead  and  secede  at  once  with 
out  delay  or  hesitation  .  .  .  that  the  only  effec 
tive  plan  of  cooperation  must  ensue  after  one  State 
had  seceded  and  presented  the  issue  when  the 
plain  question  would  be  presented  to  the  other 
Southern  States  whether  they  would  stand  by  the 
seceding  State  engaged  in  a  common  cause  or 
abandon  her  to  the  fate  of  coercion  by  the  arms 
of  the  Government  of  the  United  States." 

Ten  years  before,  in  the  unsuccessful  secession 


4         THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

movement  of  1850  and  1851,  Andrew  Pickens 
Butler,  perhaps  the  ablest  South  Carolinian  then 
living,  strove  to  arrest  the  movement  by  exactly 
the  opposite  argument.  Though  desiring  secession , 
he  threw  all  his  weight  against  it  because  the  rest 
of  the  South  was  averse.  He  charged  his  opponents , 
whose  leader  was  Robert  Barnwell  Rhett,  with 
aiming  to  place  the  other  Southern  States  "in 
such  circumstances  that,  having  a  common  destiny, 
they  would  be  compelled  to  be  involved  in  a  com 
mon  sacrifice."  He  protested  that  "to  force  ;i 
sovereign  State  to  take  a  position  against  its  con 
sent  is  to  make  of  it  a  reluctant  associate.  .  .  . 
Both  interest  and  honor  must  require  the  Southern 
States  to  take  council  together." 

That  acute  thinker  was  now  in  his  grave.  The 
bold  enthusiast  whom  he  defeated  in  1851  had 
now  no  opponent  that  was  his  match.  No  great 
personality  resisted  the  fiery  advocates  from  Ala 
bama  and  Mississippi.  Their  advice  was  accepted. 
On  December  20,  1860,  the  cause  that  ten  years 
before  had  failed  was  successful.  The  convention, 
having  adjourned  from  Columbia  to  Charleston, 
passed  an  ordinance  of  secession. 

Meanwhile,  in  Georgia,  at  a  hundred  meetings, 
the  secession  issue  was  being  hotly  discussed.  But 


THE  SECESSION  MOVEMENT  5 

there  was  not  yet  any  certainty  which  way  the 
scale  would  turn.  An  invitation  from  South  Caro 
lina  to  join  in  a  general  Southern  convention  had 
been  declined  by  the  Governor  in  November. 
Governor  Brown  has  left  an  account  ascribing  the 
comparative  coolness  and  deliberation  of  the  hour 
to  the  prevailing  impression  that  President  Bu 
chanan  had  pledged  himself  not  to  alter  the  military 
status  at  Charleston.  In  an  interview  between 
South  Carolina  representatives  and  the  President, 
the  Carolinians  understood  that  such  a  pledge  was 
given.  "It  was  generally  understood  by  the  coun 
try,"  says  Governor  Brown,  "that  such  an  agree 
ment  .  .  .  had  been  entered  into  .  .  .  and  that 
Governor  Floyd  of  Virginia,  then  Secretary  of  War, 
had  expressed  his  determination  to  resign  his  posi 
tion  in  the  Cabinet  in  case  of  the  refusal  of  the 
President  to  carry  out  the  agreement  in  good  faith. 
The  resignation  of  Governor  Floyd  was  therefore 
naturally  looked  upon,  should  it  occur,  as  a  signal 
given  to  the  South  that  reinforcements  were  to 
be  sent  to  Charleston  and  that  the  coercive  policy 
had  been  adopted  by  the  Federal  Government." 

While  the  "canvass  in  Georgia  for  members  of 
the  State  convention  was  progressing  with  much 
interest  on  both  sides, "  there  came  suddenly  the 


6         THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

news  that  Anderson  had  transferred  his  garrison 
from  Fort  Moultrie  to  the  island  fortress  of  Sumter. 
That  same  day  commissioners  from  South  Caro 
lina,  newly  arrived  at  Washington,  sought  in  vain 
to  persuade  the  President  to  order  Anderson  bade 
to  Moultrie.  The  Secretary  of  War  made  the 
subject  an  issue  before  the  Cabinet.  Unable  to 
carry  his  point,  two  days  later  he  resigned.  x 

The  Georgia  Governor,  who  had  not  hitherto 
been  in  the  front  rank  of  the  aggressives,  now 
struck  a  great  blow.  Senator  Toombs  had  tele 
graphed  from  Washington  that  Fort  Pulaski, 
guarding  the  Savannah  River,  was  "in  danger." 
The  Governor  had  reached  the  same  conclusion. 
He  mustered  the  state  militia  and  seized  Fort 
Pulaski.  Early  in  the  morning  on  January  3, 1861 , 
the  fort  was  occupied  by  Georgia  troops.  Shortly 
afterward,  Brown  wrote  to  a  commissioner  sent 
by  the  Governor  of  Alabama  to  confer  with  him : 
"While  many  of  our  most  patriotic  and  intelligent 
citizens  in  both  States  have  doubted  the  propriety 
of  immediate  secession,  I  feel  quite  confident  that 
recent  events  have  dispelled  those  doubts  from  the 

1  The  President  had  already  asked  for  Floyd's  resignation  because 
of  financial  irregularities,  and  Floyd  was  shrewd  enough  to  use 
Anderson's  coup  as  an  excuse  for  resigning.  See  Rhodes,  History  of 
the  United  States,  vol.  II,  pp.  225,  236  (note). 


THE  SECESSION  MOVEMENT  7 

minds  of  most  men  who  have,  till  within  the  past 
few  days,  honestly  sustained  them."  The  first 
stage  of  the  secession  movement  was  at  an  end;  the 
second  had  begun. 

A  belief  that  Washington  had  entered  upon  a 
policy  of  aggression  swept  the  lower  South.  The 
state  conventions  assembling  about  this  time 
passed  ordinances  of  secession  —  Mississippi,  Jan 
uary  9;  Florida,  January  10;  Alabama,  January 
11;  Georgia,  January  19;  Louisiana,  January  26; 
Texas,  February  1.  But  this  result  was  not 
achieved  without  considerable  opposition.  In 
Georgia  the  Unionists  put  up  a  stout  fight.  The 
issue  was  not  upon  the  right  to  secede  —  virtually 
no  one  denied  the  right  —  but  upon  the  wisdom 
of  invoking  the  right.  Stephens,  gloomy  and  pessi 
mistic,  led  the  opposition.  Toombs  came  down 
from  Washington  to  take  part  with  the  secession 
ists.  From  South  Carolina  and  Alabama,  both 
ceaselessly  active  for  secession,  commissioners  ap 
peared  to  lobby  at  Milledgeville,  as  commissioners 
of  Alabama  and  Mississippi  had  lobbied  at  Colum 
bia.  Besides  the  out-and-out  Unionists,  there  were 
those  who  wanted  to  temporize,  to  threaten  the 
North,  and  to  wait  for  developments.  The  motion 
on  which  these  men  and  the  Unionists  made  their 


8         THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

last  stand  together  went  against  them  164  to  133. 
Then  at  last  came  the  square  question:  Shall  we 
secede?  Even  on  this  question,  the  minority  was 
dangerously  large.  Though  the  temporizers  came 
over  to  the  secessionists,  and  with  them  came 
Stephens,  there  was  still  a  minority  of  89  irrecon- 
cilables  against  the  majority  numbering  208. 

"My  allegiance,"  said  Stephens  afterwards, 
"was,  as  I  considered  it,  not  due  to  the  United 
States,  or  to  the  people  of  the  United  States,  but  to 
Georgia,  in  her  sovereign  capacity.  Georgia  had 
never  parted  with  her  right  to  demand  the  ultimate 
allegiance  of  her  citizens."  ^ 

The  attempt  in  Georgia  to  restrain  impetuosity 
and  advance  with  deliberation  was  paralleled  in 
Alabama,  where  also  the  aggressives  were  deter 
mined  not  to  permit  delay.  In  the  Alabama 
convention,  the  conservatives  brought  forward  a 
plan  for  a  general  Southern  convention  to  be  held 
at  Nashville  in  February.  It  was  rejected  by  a 
vote  of  54  to  45.  An  attempt  to  delay  secession 
until  after  the  4th  of  March  was  defeated  by  the 
same  vote. 

The  determination  of  the  radicals  to  precipi 
tate  the  issue  received  interesting  criticism  from 
the  Governor  of  Texas,  old  Sam  Houston.  To  a 


THE  SECESSION  MOVEMENT  9 

commissioner  from  Alabama  who  was  sent  out  to 
preach  the  cause  in  Texas  the  Governor  wrote,  in 
substance,  that  since  Alabama  would  not  wait  to 
consult  the  people  of  Texas  he  saw  nothing  to 
discuss  at  that  time,  and  he  went  on  to  say : 

Recognizing  as  I  do  the  fact  that  the  sectional  tendencies 
of  the  Black  Republican  party  call  for  determined 
constitutional  resistance  at  the  hands  of  the  united 
South,  I  also  feel  that  the  million  and  a  half  of  noble- 
hearted,  conservative  men  who  have  stood  by  the  South, 
even  to  this  hour,  deserve  some  sympathy  and  support. 
Although  we  have  lost  the  day,  we  have  to  recollect 
that  our  conservative  Northern  friends  cast  over  a 
quarter  of  a  million  more  votes  against  the  Black  Re 
publicans  than  we  of  the  entire  South.  I  cannot  declare 
myself  ready  to  desert  them  as  well  as  our  Southern 
brethren  of  the  border  (and  such,  I  believe,  will  be  the 
sentiment  of  Texas)  until  at  least  one  firm  attempt  has 
been  made  to  preserve  our  constitutional  rights  within 
the  Union. 

Nevertheless,  Houston  was  not  able  to  control 
his  State.  Delegates  from  Texas  attended  the 
later  sessions  of  a  general  Congress  of  the  seced 
ing  States  which,  on  the  invitation  of  Alabama, 
met  at  Montgomery  on  the  4th  of  February.  A 
contemporary  document  of  singular  interest  today 
is  the  series  of  resolutions  adopted  by  the  Legisla 
ture  of  North  Carolina,  setting  forth  that,  as  the 


10       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

State  was  a  member  of  the  Federal  Union,  it  could 
not  accept  the  invitation  of  Alabama  but  should 
send  delegates  for  the  purpose  of  persuading  the 
South  to  effect  a  readjustment  on  the  basis  of  the 
Crittenden  Compromise  as  modified  by  the  Legis 
lature  of  Virginia.  The  commissioners  were  sent, 
were  graciously  received,  were  accorded  seats  in 
the  Congress,  but  they  exerted  no  influence  on  the 
course  of  its  action. 

The  Congress  speedily  organized  a  provisional 
Government  for  the  Confederate  States  of  Amer 
ica.  The  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  rather 
hastily  reconsidered,  became  with  a  few  inevitable 
alterations  the  Constitution  of  the  Confederacy.1 

1  To  the  observer  of  a  later  age  this  document  appears  a  thing  of 
haste.  Like  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  of  1787,  who  omitted 
from  their  document  some  principles  which  they  took  for  granted,  the 
framers  of  1861  left  unstated  their  most  distinctive  views.  The  basal 
idea  upon  which  the  revolution  proceeded,  the  right  of  secession,  is 
not  to  be  found  in  the  new  Constitution.  Though  the  preamble 
declares  that  the  States  are  acting  in  their  sovereign  and  independent 
character,  the  new  Confederation  is  declared  "permanent."  In  the 
body  of  the  document  are  provisions  similar  to  those  in  the  Federal 
Constitution  enabling  a  majority  of  two-thirds  of  the  States  to  amend 
at  their  pleasure,  thus  imposing  their  will  upon  the  minority.  With 
three  notable  exceptions  the  new  Constitution,  subsequent  to  the 
preamble,  does  little  more  than  restate  the  Constitution  of  1787  re 
arranged  so  as  to  include  those  basal  principles  of  the  English  law 
added  to  the  earlier  Constitution  by  the  first  eight  amendments.  The 
three  exceptions  are  the  prohibitions  (1)  of  the  payment  of  bounties, 
(2)  of  the  levying  of  duties  to  promote  any  one  form  of  industry,  and 


THE  SECESSION  MOVEMENT  11 

Davis  was  unanimously  elected  President;  Ste 
phens,  Vice-President.  Provision  was  made  for 
raising  an  army.  Commissioners  were  dispatched 
to  Washington  to  negotiate  a  treaty  with  the 
United  States;  other  commissioners  were  sent  to 
Virginia  to  attempt  to  withdraw  that  great  com 
monwealth  from  the  Union. 

The  upper  South  was  thus  placed  in  a  painful 
situation.  Its  sympathies  were  with  the  seceding 
States.  Most  of  its  people  felt  also  that  if  coercion 
was  attempted,  the  issue  would  become  for  Vir 
ginia  and  North  Carolina,  no  less  than  for  South 
Carolina  and  Alabama,  simply  a  matter  of  self-/ 
preservation.  As  early  as  January,  in  the  exciting 
days  when  Floyd's  resignation  was  being  inter 
preted  as  a  call  to  arms,  the  Virginia  Legislature 
had  resolved  that  it  would  not  consent  to  the  coer 
cion  of  a  seceding  State.  In  May  the  Speaker  of 
the  North  Carolina  Legislature  assured  a  com 
missioner  from  Georgia  that  North  Carolina  would 
never  consent  to  the  movement  of  troops  "from  or 

(3)  of  appropriations  for  internal  improvements.  Here  was  a  monu 
ment  to  the  battle  over  these  matters  in  the  Federal  Congress.  As 
to  the  mechanism  of  the  new  Government  it  was  the  same  as  the  old 
except  for  a  few  changes  of  detail.  The  presidential  term  was  length 
ened  to  six  years  and  the  President  was  forbidden  to  succeed  himself. 
The  President  was  given  the  power  to  veto  items  in  appropriation 
bills.  The  African  slave-trade  was  prohibited. 


12       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

across"  the  State  to  attack  a  seceding  State.  But 
neither  Virginia  nor  North  Carolina  in  this  secord 
stage  of  the  movement  wanted  to  secede.  They 
wanted  to  preserve  the  Union,  but  along  with  the 
Union  they  wanted  the  principle  of  local  autonomy/ 
It  was  a  period  of  tense  anxiety  in  those  States  of 
the  upper  South.  The  frame  of  mind  of  the  men 
who  loved  the  Union  but  who  loved  equally  their  V 
own  States  and  were  firm  for  local  autonomy  is 
summed  up  in  a  letter  in  which  Mrs.  Robert  E. 
Lee  describes  the  anguish  of  her  husband  as  he 
confronted  the  possibility  of  a  divided  country. 

The  real  tragedy  of  the  time  lay  in  the  failure  of 
the  advocates  of  these  two  great  principles  —  each 
so  necessary  to  a  far-flung  democratic  country  in  a 
world  of  great  powers!  —  the  failure  to  coordinate 
them  so  as  to  insure  freedom  at  home  and  strength  >l 
abroad.  The  principle  for  which  Lincoln  stood  has 
saved  Americans  in  the  Great  War  from  playing 
such  a  trembling  part  as  that  of  Holland.  The 
principle  which  seemed  to  Lee  even  more  essential, 
which  did  not  perish  at  Appomattox  but  was  trans 
formed  and  not  destroyed,  is  what  has  kept  us 
from  becoming  a  western  Prussia.  And  yet  if  only 
it  had  been  possible  to  coordinate  the  two  without 
the  price  of  war!  It  was  not  possible  because  of 


THE  SECESSION  MOVEMENT  13 

the  stored  up  bitterness  of  a  quarter  century  of  \S 
recrimination.  But  Virginia  made  a  last  desperate 
attempt  to  preserve  the  Union  by  calling  the  Peace 
Convention.  It  assembled  at  Washington  the  day 
the  Confederate  Congress  met  at  Montgomery. 
Though  twenty-one  States  sent  delegates,  it  was 
no  more  able  to  effect  a  working  scheme  of  com 
promise  than  was  the  House  committee  of  thirty- 
three  or  the  Senate  committee  of  thirteen,  both  of 
which  had  striven,  had  failed,  and  had  gone  their 
ways  to  a  place  in  the  great  company  of  historic 
futilities. 

And  so  the  Peace  Convention  came  and  went, 
and  there  was  no  consolation  for  the  troubled  men  tf 
of  the  upper  South  who  did  not  \vant  to  secede 
but  were  resolved  not  to  abandon  local  autonomy.  V 
Virginia  was  the  key  to  the  situation.  If  Virginia 
could  be  forced  into  secession,  the  rest  of  the  upper 
South  wrould  inevitably  follow.  Therefore  a  Vir 
ginia  hothead,  Roger  A.  Pryor,  being  in  Charleston 
in  those  wavering  days,  poured  out  his  heart  in 
fiery  words,  urging  a  Charleston  crowd  to  precipi 
tate  war,  in  the  certainty  that  Virginia  would  then 
have  to  come  to  their  aid.  When  at  last  Sumter 
was  fired  upon  and  Lincoln  called  for  volunteers, 
the  second  stage  of  the  secession  movement  ended 


14       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

in  a  thunderclap.    The  third  period  was  occupied^. 
by  the  second  group  of  secessions:  Virginia  on  the 
17th  of  April,  North  Carolina  and  Arkansas  during 
May,  Tennessee  early  in  June. 

Sumter  was  the  turning-point.  The  boom  of  the 
first  cannon  trained  on  the  island  fortress  deserves 
all  the  rhetoric  it  has  inspired.  Who  was  imme 
diately  responsible  for  that  firing  which  was  des 
tiny?  Ultimate  responsibility  is  not  upon  any 
person.  War  had  to  be.  If  Sumter  had  not  been 
the  starting-point,  some  other  would  have  been 
found.  Nevertheless  the  question  of  immediate 
responsibility,  of  whose  word  it  was  that  served 
as  the  signal  to  begin,  has  produced  an  historic 
controversy. 

When  it  was  known  at  Charleston  that  Lincoln 
would  attempt  to  provision  the  fort,  the  South 
Carolina  authorities  referred  the  matter  to  the 
Confederate  authorities.  The  Cabinet,  in  a  fateful 
session  at  Montgomery,  hesitated  —  drawn  be 
tween  the  wish  to  keep  their  hold  upon  the  moder 
ates  of  the  North,  who  were  trying  to  stave  off  war, 
and  the  desire  to  precipitate  Virginia  into  the  lists. 
Toombs,  Secretary  of  State  in  the  new  Govern 
ment,  wavered;  then  seemed  to  find  his  resolu 
tion  and  came  out  strong  against  a  demand  for 


THE  SECESSION  MOVEMENT  15 

surrender.  "It  is  suicide,  murder,  and  will  Jose 
us  every  friend  at  the  North.  ...  It  is  unneces 
sary;  it  puts  us  in  the  wrong;  it  is  fatal, "  said  he. 
But  the  Cabinet  and  the  President  decided  to 
take  the  risk.  To  General  Pierre  Beauregard, 
recently  placed  in  command  of  the  militia  as 
sembled  at  Charleston,  word  was  sent  to  demand 
the  surrender  of  Fort  Sumter. 

On  Thursday,  the  7th  of  April,  besides  his  in 
structions  from  Montgomery,  Beauregard  was  in 
receipt  of  a  telegram  from  the  Confederate  com 
missioners  at  Washington,  repeating  newspaper 
statements  that  the  Federal  relief  expedition  in 
tended  to  land  a  force  "which  will  overcome  all 
opposition."  There  seems  no  doubt  that  Beaure 
gard  did  not  believe  that  the  expedition  was 
intended  merely  to  provision  Sumter.  Probably 
every  one  in  Charleston  thought  that  the  Federal 
authorities  were  trying  to  deceive  them,  that  Lin-*' 
coin's  promise  not  to  do  more  than  provision 
Sumter  was  a  mere  blind.  Tearfulness  that  delay 
might  render  Sumter  impregnable  lay  back  of 
Beauregard's  formal  demand,  on  the  llth  of  April, 
for  the  surrender  of  the  fort.  Anderson  refused 
but  "made  some  verbal  observations  "  to  the  aides 
who  brought  him  the  demand.  In  effect  he  said 


16       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

that  lack  of  supplies  would  compel  him  to.  surren 
der  by  the  fifteenth.  When  this  information  was 
taken  back  to  the  city,  eager  crowds  were  in  the 
streets  of  Charleston  discussing  the  report  that  a 
bombardment  would  soon  begin.  But  the  after 
noon  passed;  night  fell;  and  nothing  was  done;. 
On  the  beautiful  terrace  along  the  sea  known  as 
East  Battery,  people  congregated,  watching  the 
silent  fortress  whose  brick  walls  rose  sheer  from  the 
midst  of  the  harbor.  The  early  hours  of  the  nigl  t 
went  by  and  as  midnight  approached  and  still  there 
was  no  flash  from  either  the  fortress  or  the  shore 
batteries  which  threatened  it,  the  crowds  broke  up. 
Meanwhile  there  was  anxious  consultation  at 
the  hotel  where  Beauregard  had  fixed  his  head 
quarters.  Pilots  came  in  from  the  sea  to  report  to 
the  General  that  a  Federal  vessel  had  appeared  off 
the  mouth  of  the  harbor.  This  news  may  well 
explain  the  hasty  dispatch  of  a  second  expedition 
to  Sumter  in  the  middle  of  the  night.  At  half  after 
one,  Friday  morning,  four  young  men,  aides  of 
Beauregard,  entered  the  fort.  Anderson  repeated 
his  refusal  to  surrender  at  once  but  admitted  that 
he  would  have  to  surrender  within  three  days. 
Thereupon  the  aides  held  a  council  of  war.  They 
decided  that  the  reply  was  unsatisfactory  and 


THE  SECESSION  MOVEMENT  17 

wrote  out  a  brief  note  which  they  handed  to  Ander 
son  informing  him  that  the  Confederates  would 
open  "fire  upon  Fort  Sumter  in  one  hour  from  this 
time."  The  note  was  dated  3:20  A.M.  The  aides 
then  proceeded  to  Fort  Johnston  on  the  south  side 
of  the  harbor  and  gave  the  order  to  fire. 

The  council  of  the  aides  at  Sumter  is  the  dra 
matic  detail  that  has  caught  the  imagination  of 
historians  and  has  led  them,  at  least  in  some  cases, 
to  yield  to  a  literary  temptation.  It  is  so  dramatic 
—  that  scene  of  the  four  young  men  holding  in 
their  hands,  during  a  moment  of  absolute  destiny, 
the  fate  of  a  people;  four  young  men,  in  the  irre 
sponsible  ardor  of  youth,  refusing  to  wait  three 
days  and  forcing  war  at  the  instant!  It  is  so 
dramatic  that  one  cannot  judge  harshly  the  artis 
tic  temper  which  is  unable  to  reject  it.  But  is  the 
incident  historic?  Did  the  four  young  men  come 
to  Sumter  without  definite  instructions  ?  Was  their 
conference  really  anything  more  than  a  careful  com 
paring  of  notes  to  make  sure  they  were  doing  what 
they  were  intended  to  do?  Is  not  the  real  clue  to 
the  event  a  message  from  Beauregard  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  War  telling  of  his  interview  with  the  pilots? x 

1  A  chief  authority  for  the  dramatic  version  of  the  council  of  the 
aides  is  that  fiery  Virginian,  Roger  A.  Pryor.  He  and  another  accom- 


18       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

Dawn  was  breaking  gray,  with  a  faint  rain  in  the 
air,  when  the  first  boom  of  the  cannon  awakened 
the  city.  Other  detonations  followed  in  quick 
succession.  Shells  rose  into  the  night  from  both 
sides  of  the  harbor  and  from  floating  batteries. 
How  lightly  Charleston  slept  that  night  may  be 
inferred  from  the  accounts  in  the  newspapers. 
"At  the  report  of  the  first  gun, "  says  the  Courier, 
"the  city  was  nearly  emptied  of  its  inhabitants 
who  crowded  the  Battery  and  the  wharves  to 
witness  the  conflict." 

The  East  Battery  and  the  lower  harbor  of  the 
lovely  city  of  Charleston  have  been  preserved 
almost  without  alteration.  What  they  are  today 
they  were  in  the  breaking  dawn  on  April  12,  1861. 
Business  has  gone  up  the  rivers  between  which 
Charleston  lies  and  has  left  the  point  of  the  city's 
peninsula,  where  East  Battery  looks  outward  to  the 
Atlantic,  in  its  perfect  charm.  There  large  houses, 
pillared,  with  high  piazzas,  stand  apart  one  from 
another  among  gardens.  With  few  exceptions  they 

panied  the  official  messengers,  the  signers  of  the  note  to  Anderson, 
James  Chestnut  and  Stephen  Lee.  Years  afterwards  Pryor  told  the 
story  of  the  council  in  a  way  to  establish  its  dramatic  significance. 
But  would  there  be  anything  strange  if  a  veteran  survivor,  looking 
back  to  his  youth,  as  all  of  us  do  through  more  or  less  of  mirage, 
yielded  to  the  unconscious  artist  that  is  in  us  all  and  dramatized  this 
event  unaware? 


THE  SECESSION  MOVEMENT  19 

were  built  before  the  middle  of  the  century  and  all, 
with  one  exception,  show  the  classical  taste  of 
those  days.  The  mariner,  entering  the  spacious 
inner  sea  that  is  Charleston  Harbor,  sights  this  row 
of  stately  mansions  even  before  he  crosses  the 
bar  seven  miles  distant.  Holding  straight  onward 
up  into  the  land  he  heads  first  for  the  famous  little 
island  where,  nowadays,  in  their  halo  of  thrilling 
recollection,  the  walls  of  Sumter,  rising  sheer  from 
the  bosom  of  the  water,  drowse  idle.  Close  undei 
the  lee  of  Sumter,  the  incoming  steersman  brings 
his  ship  about  and  chooses,  probably,  the  eastward 
of  two  huge  tentacles  of  the  sea  between  which  lies 
the  city's  long  but  narrow  peninsula.  To  the 
steersman  it  shows  a  skyline  serrated  by  steeples, 
fronted  by  sea,  flanked  southward  by  sea,  back 
grounded  by  an  estuary,  and  looped  about  by  a 
sickle  of  wooded  islands. 

This  same  scene,  so  far  as  city  and  nature  go, 
was  beheld  by  the  crowds  that  swarmed  East 
Battery,  a  flagstone  marine  parade  along  the  sea 
ward  side  of  the  boulevard  that  faces  Sumter;  that 
filled  the  windows  and  even  the  housetops;  that 
watched  the  bombardment  with  the  eagerness  of 
an  audience  in  an  amphitheater;  that  applauded 
every  telling  shot  with  clapping  of  hands  and 


20       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

waving  of  shawls  and  handkerchiefs.  The  fort  lay 
distant  from  them  about  three  miles,  but  only  some- 
fifteen  hundred  yards  from  Fort  Johnston  on  one 
side  and  about  a  mile  from  Fort  Moultrie  on  the; 
other.  From  both  of  these  latter,  the  cannon  of 
those  days  were  equal  to  the  task  of  harassing 
Sumter.  Early  in  the  morning  of  the  12th  of  April, 
though  not  until  broad  day  had  come,  did  Ander 
son  make  reply.  All  that  day,  at  first  under 
heavily  rolling  cloud  and  later  through  curiously 
misty  sunshine,  the  fire  and  counterfire  continued. 
"The  enthusiasm  and  fearlessness  of  the  specta 
tors,"  says  the  Charleston  Mercury,  "knew  no 
bounds."  Reckless  observers  even  put  out  in  small 
boats  and  roamed  about  the  harbor  almost  under 
the  guns  of  the  fort.  Outside  the  bar,  vessels  of 
the  relieving  squadron  were  now  visible,  and  to 
these  Anderson  signaled  for  aid.  They  made  an 
attempt  to  reach  the  fort,  but  only  part  of  the 
squadron  had  arrived,  and  the  vessels  necessary 
to  raise  the  siege  were  not  there.  The  attempt 
ended  in  failure.  When  night  came,  a  string  of 
rowboats  each  carrying  a  huge  torch  kept  watch 
along  the  bar  to  guard  against  surprise  from  the 
sea. 

On  that  Friday  night  the  harbor  was  swept  by 


THE  SECESSION  MOVEMENT  21 

storm.  But  in  spite  of  torrents  of  rain  East  Bat 
tery  and  the  rooftops  were  thronged.  "The  wind 
was  inshore  and  the  booming  was  startlingly  dis 
tinct."  At  the  height  of  the  bombardment,  the 
sky  above  Sumter  seemed  to  be  filled  with  the 
flashes  of  bursting  shells.  But  during  this  wild 
night  Sumter  itself  was  both  dark  and  silent.  Its 
casements  did  not  have  adequate  lamps  and  the 
guns  could  not  be  used  except  by  day.  When 
morning  broke,  clear  and  bright  after  the  night's 
storm,  the  duel  was  resumed. 

The  walls  of  Sumter  were  now  crumbling.  At 
eight  o'clock  Saturday  morning  the  barracks  took 
fire.  Soon  after  it  was  perceived  from  the  shore 
that  the  flag  was  down.  Beauregard  at  once  sent 
offers  of  assistance.  With  Sumter  in  flames  above 
his  head,  Anderson  replied  that  he  had  not  sur 
rendered;  he  declined  assistance;  and  he  hauled 
up  his  flag.  Later  in  the  day  the  flagstaff  was  shot 
in  two  and  again  the  flag  fell,  and  again  it  was 
raised.  Flames  had  been  kindled  anew  by  red-hot 
shot,  and  now  the  magazine  was  in  danger.  Quan 
tities  of  powder  were  thrown  into  the  sea.  Still 
the  rain  of  red-hot  shot  continued.  About  noon, 
Saturday,  says  the  Courier,  "flames  burst  out  from 
every  quarter  of  Sumter  and  poured  from  many 


22       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

of  its  portholes  .  .  .  the  wind  was  from  the  west 
driving  the  smoke  across  the  fort  into  the  em 
brasures  where  the  gu nners  were  at  work . ' '  Never- 
theless,  "as  if  served  with  a  new  impulse,"  the 
guns  of  Sumter  redoubled  their  fire.  But  it  was 
not  in  human  endurance  to  keep  on  in  the  midst 
of  the  burning  fort.  This  splendid  last  effort  was 
short.  At  a  quarter  after  one,  Anderson  ceased 
firing  and  raised  a  white  flag.  Negotiations  fol 
lowed  ending  in  terms  of  surrender  —  Anderson  to 
be  allowed  to  remove  his  garrison  to  the  fleet  lying 
idle  beyond  the  bar  and  to  salute  the  flag  of  the 
United  States  before  taking  it  down.  The  bom 
bardment  had  lasted  thirty-two  hours  without  a 
death  on  either  side.  The  evacuation  of  the  fort 
was  to  take  place  next  day. 

The  afternoon  of  Sunday,  the  14th  of  April,  was 
a  gala  day  in  the  harbor  of  Charleston.  The  sun 
light  slanted  across  the  roofs  of  the  city,  sparkled 
upon  the  sea.  Deep  and  rich  the  harbor  always 
looks  in  the  spring  sunshine  on  bright  afternoons. 
The  filmy  atmosphere  of  these  latitudes,  at  that 
time  of  year,  makes  the  sky  above  the  darkling, 
afternoon  sea  a  pale  but  luminous  turquoise. 
There  is  a  wonderful  soft  strength  in  the  peaceful 
brightness  of  the  sun.  In  such  an  atmosphere  the 


THE  SECESSION  MOVEMENT  23 

harbor  was  flecked  with  brilliantly  decked  craft 
of  every  description,  all  in  a  flutter  of  flags  and 
carrying  a  host  of  passengers  in  gala  dress.  The 
city  swarmed  across  the  water  to  witness  the  cere 
mony  of  evacuation.  Wherry  men  did  a  thriving 
business  carrying  passengers  to  the  fort. 

Anderson  withdrew  from  Sumter  shortly  after 
two  o'clock  amid  a  salute  of  fifty  guns.  The  Con 
federates  took  possession.  At  half  after  four  a 
new  flag  was  raised  above  the  battered  and  fire- 
swept  walls. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE   DAVIS   GOVERNMENT 

IT  has  never  been  explained  why  Jefferson  Davis 
was  chosen  President  of  the  Confederacy.  He  did 
not  seek  the  office  and  did  not  wish  it.  He 
dreamed  of  high  military  command.  As  a  study 
in  the  irony  of  fate,  Davis's  career  is  made  to  the 
hand  of  the  dramatist.  An  instinctive  soldier,  he 
was  driven  by  circumstances  three  times  to  re 
nounce  the  profession  of  arms  for  a  less  congenial 
civilian  life.  His  final  renunciation,  which  proved 
to  be  of  the  nature  of  tragedy,  was  his  acceptance 
of  the  office  of  President.  Indeed,  why  the  office 
was  given  to  him  seems  a  mystery.  Rhett  was  a 
more  logical  candidate.  And  when  Rhett,  early  in 
the  lobbying  at  Montgomery,  was  set  aside  as  too 
much  of  a  radical,  Toombs  seemed  for  a  time  the 
certain  choice  of  the  majority.  The  change  to 
Davis  came  suddenly  at  the  last  moment.  It  was 
puzzling  at  the  t;me;  it  is  puzzling  still. 

24 


THE  DAVIS  GOVERNMENT  25 

Rhett,  though  doubtless  bitterly  disappointed, 
bore  himself  with  the  savoirfaire  of  a  great  gentle 
man.  At  the  inauguration,  it  was  on  Rhett's  arm 
that  Davis  leaned  as  he  entered  the  hall  of  the 
Confederate  Congress.  The  night  before,  in  a 
public  address,  Yancey  had  said  that  the  man  and 
the  hour  were  met.  The  story  of  the  Confederacy 
is  filled  with  dramatic  moments,  but  to  the  thought 
ful  observer  few  are  more  dramatic  than  the  con 
junction  of  these  three  men  in  the  inauguration  of 
the  Confederate  President.  Beneath  a  surface  of 
apparent  unanimity  they  carried,  like  concealed 
weapons,  points  of  view  that  were  in  deadly  an 
tagonism.  This  antagonism  had  not  revealed  itself 
hitherto.  It  was  destined  to  reveal  itself  almost 
immediately.  It  went  so  deep  and  spread  so  far 
that  unless  we  understand  it,  the  Confederate 
story  will  be  unintelligible. 

A  strange  fatality  destined  all  three  of  these 
great  men  to  despair.  Yancey,  who  was  perhaps 
most  directly  answerable  of  the  three  for  the  exist 
ence  of  the  Confederacy,  lost  influence  almost  from 
the  moment  when  his  dream  became  established. 
Davis  was  partly  responsible,  for  he  promptly 
sent  him  out  of  the  country  on  the  bootless  Eng 
lish  mission.  Thereafter,  until  his  death  in  1863, 


26       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

Yancey  was  a  waning,  overshadowed  figure,  steadily 
lapsing  into  the  background.  It  may  be  that  those 
critics  are  right  who  say  he  was  only  an  agitator. 
The  day  of  the  mere  agitator  was  gone.  Yancey 
passed  rapidly  into  futile  but  bitter  antagonism  to 
Davis.  In  this  attitude  he  was  soon  to  be  matched 
by  Rhett. 

The  discontent  of  the  Rhett  faction  because  their 
leader  was  not  given  the  portfolio  of  the  State  De 
partment  found  immediate  voice.  But  the  con 
clusion  drawn  by  some  that  Rhett's  subsequent 
course  sprang  from  personal  vindictiveness  is 
trifling.  He  was  too  large  a  personality,  too  well 
defined  an  intellect,  to  be  thus  explained.  Very 
probably  Davis  made  his  first  great  blunder  in 
failing  to  propitiate  the  Rhett  faction.  And  yet 
few  things  are  more  certain  than  that  the  two  men, 
the  two  factions  which  they  symbolized,  could  not 
have  formed  a  permanent  alliance.  Had  Rhett 
entered  the  Cabinet  he  could  not  have  remained 
in  it  consistently  for  any  considerable  time.  The 
measures  in  which,  presently,  the  .Administration 
showed  its  hand  were  measures  m  which  Rhett 
could  not  acquiesce.  From  the  start  he  was 
predestined  to  his  eventual  position  —  the  great, 
unavailing  genius  of  the  opposition. 


THE  DAVIS  GOVERNMENT  27 

As  to  the  comparative  ignoring  of  these  leaders 
of  secession  by  the  Government  which  secession 
had  created,  it  is  often  said  that  the  explanation 
is  to  be  found  in  a  generous  as  well  as  politic  desire 
to  put  in  office  the  moderates  and  even  the  con 
servatives.  Davis,  relatively,  was  a  moderate. 
Stephens  was  a  conservative.  Many  of  the  most 
pronounced  opponents  of  secession  were  given 
places  in  the  public  service.  Toombs,  who  received 
the  portfolio  of  State,  though  a  secessionist,  was 
conspicuously  a  moderate  when  compared  with 
Rhett  and  Yancey.  The  adroit  Benjamin,  who 
became  Attorney-General,  had  few  points  in  com 
mon  with  the  great  extremists  of  Alabama  and 
South  Carolina. 

However,  the  dictum  that  the  personnel  of  the 
new  Government  was  a  triumph  for  conservatism 
over  radicalism  signifies  little.  There  was  a  divi 
sion  among  Southerners  which  scarcely  any  of  them 
had  realized  except  briefly  in  the  premature  battle 
over  secession  in  1851.  It  was  the  division  between 
those  who  were  conscious  of  the  region  as  a  whole 
and  those  who  were  not.  Explain  it  as  you  will, 
there  was  a  moment  just  after  the  secession  move 
ment  succeeded  when  the  South  seemed  to  realize 
itself  as  a  whole,  when  it  turned  intuitively  to  those 


28       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

$y 

men  who,  as  time  was  to  demonstrate,  shared  this 

realization.  For  the  moment  it  turned  away  from 
those  others,  however  great  their  part  in  secession, 
who  lacked  this  sense  of  unity.  v 

At  this  point,  geography  becomes  essential. 
The  South  fell,  institutionally,  into  two  grand 
divisions:  one,  with  an  old  and  firmly  established 
social  order,  where  consciousness  of  the  locality  I 
went  back  to  remote  times;  another,  newly  settled, 
where  conditions  were  still  fluid,  where  that  sense; 
of  the  sacredness  of  local  institutions  had  not  yet 
formed. 

A  typical  community  of  the  first-named  class 
was  South  Carolina.  Her  people  had  to  a  remark 
able  degree  been  rendered  state-conscious  partly 
by  their  geographical  neighbors,  and  partly  by 
their  long  and  illustrious  history,  which  had  been 
interwoven  with  great  European  interests  during 
the  colonial  era  and  with  great  national  interests 
under  the  Republic.  It  is  possible  also  that  the 
Huguenots,  though  few  in  numbers,  had  exercised 
upon  the  State  a  subtle  and  pervasive  influence 
through  their  intellectual  power  and  their  Latin 
sense  for  institutions. 

In  South  Carolina,  too,  a  wealthy  leisure  class 
with  a  passion  for  affairs  had  cultivated  enthusi- 


THE  DAVIS  GOVERNMENT  29 

astically  that  fine  art  which  is  the  pride  of  all 
aristocratic  societies,  the  service  of  the  State  as  a 
profession  high  and  exclusive,  free  from  vulgar 
taint.  In  South  Carolina  all  things  conspired  to 
uphold  and  strengthen  the  sense  of  the  State  as  an 
object  of  veneration,  as  something  over  and  above 
the  mere  social  order,  as  the  sacred  embodiment 
of  the  ideals  of  the  community.  Thus  it  is  fair  to 
say  that  what  has  animated  the  heroic  little  coun 
tries  of  the  Old  World  —  Switzerland  and  Serbia 
and  ever-glorious  Belgium  —  with  their  passion 
to  remain  themselves,  animated  South  Carolina  i 
1861.  Just  as  Serbia  was  willing  to  fight  to  the 
death  rather  than  merge  her  identity  in  the  mosaic 
of  the  Austrian  Empire,  so  this  little  American 
community  saw  nothing  of  happiness  in  any  future 
that  did  not  secure  its  virtual  independence. 

Typical  of  the  newer  order  in  the  South  was  the 
community  that  formed  the  President  of  the  Con 
federacy.  In  the  history  of  Mississippi  previous  to 
the  war  there  are  six  great  names  —  Jacob  Thomp 
son,  John  A.  Quitman,  Henry  S.  Foote,  Robert  J. 
Walker,  Sergeant  S.  Prentiss,  and  Jefferson  Davis. 
Not  one  of  them  was  born  in  the  State.  Thomp 
son  was  born  in  North  Carolina;  Quitman  in  New 
York:  Foote  in  Virginia;  Walker  in  Pennsylvania; 


30       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

Prentiss  in  Maine;  Davis  in  Kentucky.  In  1861 
the  State  was  but  forty-four  years  old,  younger 
than  its  most  illustrious  sons  —  if  the  paradox  may 
be  permitted.  How  could  they  think  of  it  as  an 
entity  existing  in  itself,  antedating  not  only  them 
selves  but  their  traditions,  circumscribing  them 
with  its  all-embracing,  indisputable  reality?  These 
men  spoke  the  language  of  state  rights.  It  is  true 
that  in  politics,  combating  the  North,  they  used 
the  political  philosophy  taught  them  by  South 
Carolina.  But  it  was  a  mental  weapon  in  political 
debate;  it  was  not  for  them  an  emotional  fact. 

And  yet  these  men  of  the  Southwest  had  an 
ideal  of  their  own  as  vivid  and  as  binding  as  the 
state  ideal  of  the  men  of  the  eastern  coast.  Though 
half  their  leaders  were  born  in  the  North,  the  people 
themselves  were  overwhelmingly  Southern.  From 
all  the  older  States,  all  round  the  huge  crescent 
which  swung  around  from  Kentucky  coastwise  to 
Florida,  immigration  in  the  twenties  and  thirties 
had  poured  into  Mississippi.  Consequently  the 
new  community  presented  a  composite  picture  of 
the  whole  South,  and  like  all  composite  pictures 
it  emphasized  only  the  factors  common  to  all  its 
parts.  What  all  the  South  had  in  common,  what 
made  a  man  a  Southerner  in  the  general  sense  — 


THE  DAVIS  GOVERNMENT  31 

in  distinction  from  a  Northerner  on  the  one  hand, 
or  a  Virginian,  Carolinian,  Georgian,  on  the  other 
—  could  have  been  observed  with  clearness  in 
Mississippi,  just  before  the  war,  as  nowhere  else. 
Therefore,  the  fulfillment  of  the  ideal  of  South 
ern  life  in  general  terms  was  the  vision  of  things 
hoped  for  by  the  new  men  of  the  Southwest.  The 
features  of  that  vision  were  common  to  them  all  — 
country  life,  broad  acres,  generous  hospitality,  an  I/ 
aristocratic  system.  The  temperaments  of  these 
men  were  sufficiently  buoyant  to  enable  them  to 
apprehend  this  ideal  even  before  it  had  materi 
alized.  Their  romantic  minds  could  see  the  gold  at 
the  end  of  the  rainbow.  Theirs  was  not  the  pride 
of  administering  a  well-ordered,  inherited  system, 
but  the  joy  of  building  a  new  system,  in  their  minds 
wholly  elastic,  to  be  sure,  but  still  inspired  by  that 
old  system. 

What  may  be  called  the  sense  of  Southern  i+ 
nationality  as  opposed  to  the  sense  of  state  rights, 
strictly  speaking,  distinguished  this  brilliant  young 
community  of  the  Southwest.  In  that  community 
Davis  spent  the  years  that  appear  to  have  been  the 
most  impressionable  of  his  life.  Belonging  to  a 
"new"  family  just  emerging  into  wealth,  he  began 
life  as  a  West  Pointer  and  saw  gallant  service  as  a 


32       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

youth  on  the  frontier;  resigned  from  the  army  to 
pursue  a  romantic  attachment;  came  home  to  lead 
the  life  of  a  wealthy  planter  and  receive  the  im 
press  of  Mississippi;  made  his  entry  into  politics, 
still  a  soldier  at  heart,  with  the  philosophy  of  state 
rights  on  his  lips,  but  in  his  heart  that  sense  of  the 
Southern  people  as  a  new  nation,  which  needed 
only  the  occasion  to  make  it  the  relentless  enemy 
of  the  rights  of  the  individual  Southern  States. 
Add  together  the  instinctive  military  point  of 
view  and  this  Southern  nationalism  that  even  in 
1861  had  scarcely  revealed  itself;  join  with  these 
a  fearless  and  haughty  spirit,  proud  to  the  verge  of 
arrogance,  but  perfectly  devoted,  perfectly  sincere; 
and  you  have  the  main  lines  of  the  political  charac 
ter  of  Davis  when  he  became  President.  It  may 
be  that  as  he  went  forward  in  his  great  undertaking, 
as  antagonisms  developed,  as  Rhett  and  others 
turned  against  him,  Davis  hardened.  He  lost 
whatever  comprehension  he  once  had  of  the  Rhett 
type.  Seeking  to  weld  into  one  irresistible  unit  all 
the  military  power  of  the  South,  he  became  at  last 
in  the  eyes  of  his  opponents  a  monster,  while  to 
him,  more  and  more  positively,  the  others  became 
mere  dreamers. 

It   took   about   a   year   for   this   irrepressible 


THE  DAVIS  GOVERNMENT        •       33 

conflict  within  the  Confederacy  to  reveal  itself. 
During  the  twelve  months  following  Da  vis's  election 
as  provisional  President,  he  dominated  the  situa 
tion,  though  the  Charleston  Mercury,  the  Rhett 
organ,  found  opportunities  to  be  sharply  critical 
of  the  President.  He  assembled  armies;  he  initi 
ated  heroic  efforts  to  make  up  for  the  handicap 
of  the  South  in  the  manufacture  of  munitions 
and  succeeded  in  starting  a  number  of  munition 
plants;  though  powerless  to  prevent  the  establish 
ment  of  the  blockade,  he  was  able  during  that  first 
year  to  keep  in  touch  with  Europe,  to  start  out 
Confederate  privateers  upon  the  high  seas,  and 
to  import  a  considerable  quantity  of  arms  and 
supplies.  At  the  close  of  the  year  the  Confederate 
armies  were  approaching  general  efficiency,  for  all 
their  enormous  handicap,  almost  if  not  quite  as 
rapidly  as  were  the  Union  armies.  And  the  one 
great  event  of  the  year  on  land,  the  first  battle  of 
Manassas,  or  Bull  Run,  was  a  signal  Confederate 
victory. 

To  be  sure  Davis  was  severely  criticized  in  some 
quarters  for  not  adopting  an  aggressive  policy. 
The  Confederate  Government,  whether  wisely  or 
foolishly,  had  not  taken  the  people  into  its  con 
fidence  and  the  lack  of  munitions  was  not  generally 


34       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

appreciated.  The  easy  popular  cries  were  all 
sounded :  "We  are  standing  still ! "  " The  country 
is  being  invaded!"  "The  President  is  a  do-noth 
ing!"  From  the  coast  regions  especially,  where 
the  blockade  was  felt  in  all  its  severity,  the  outcry 
was  loud. 

Nevertheless,  the  South  in  the  main  was  content 
with  the  Administration  during  most  of  the  first 
year.  In  November,  when  the  general  elections 
were  held,  Davis  was  chosen  without  opposition 
as  the  first  regular  Confederate  President  for  six 
years,  and  Stephens  became  the  Vice-President. 
The  election  was  followed  by  an  important  change 
in  the  Southern  Cabinet.  Benjamin  became  Sec 
retary  of  War,  in  succession  to  the  first  War  Sec 
retary,  Leroy  P.  Walker.  Toombs  had  already 
left  the  Confederate  Cabinet.  Complaining  that 
Davis  degraded  him  to  the  level  of  a  mere  clerk, 
he  had  withdrawn  the  previous  July.  His  succes 
sor  in  the  State  Department  was  R.  M.  T.  Hunter 
of  Virginia,  who  remained  in  office  until  February, 
1862,  when  his  removal  to  the  Confederate  Senate 
opened  the  way  for  a  further  advancement  of 
Benjamin. 

Richmond,  which  had  been  designated  as  the 
capital  soon  after  the  secession  of  Virginia,  was  the 


THE  DAVIS  GOVERNMENT  35 

scene  of  the  inauguration,  on  February  22,  1862. 
Although  the  weather  proved  bleak  and  rainy,  an 
immense  crowd  gathered  around  the  Washington 
monument,  in  Capitol  Square,  to  listen  to  the 
inaugural  address.  By  this  time  the  confidence 
in  the  Government,  which  was  felt  generally  at 
the  time  of  the  election,  had  suffered  a  shock. 
Foreign  affairs  were  not  progressing  satisfactorily. 
Though  England  had  accorded  to  the  Confederacy  \ 
the  status  of  a  belligerent,  this  was  poor  consola 
tion  for  her  refusal  to  make  full  recognition  of  the 
new  Government  as  an  independent  power.  Dread 
of  internal  distress  was  increasing.  Gold  com 
manded  a  premium  of  fifty  per  cent.  Disorder  was 
a  feature  of  the  life  in  the  cities.  It  was  known 
that  several  recent  military  events  had  been  vic 
tories  for  the  Federals.  A  rumor  was  abroad  that 
some  great  disaster  had  taken  place  in  Tennessee. 
The  crowd  listened  anxiously  to  hear  the  rumor 
denied  by  the  President.  But  it  was  not  denied. 
The  tense  listeners  noted  two  sentences  which 
formed  an  admission  that  the  situation  was  grave: 
"A  million  men,  it  is  estimated,  are  now  standing 
in  hostile  array  and  waging  war  along  a  frontier 
of  thousands  of  miles.  Battles  have  been  fought, 
sieges  have  been  conducted,  and  although  the 


36       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

contest  is  not  ended,  and  the  tide  for  the  moment 
is  against  us,  the  final  result  in  our  favor  is  not 
doubtful." 

Behind  these  carefully  guarded  words  lay  serious 
alarm,  not  only  with  regard  to  the  operations  at 
the  front  but  as  to  the  composition  of  the  army. 
It  had  been  raised  under  various  laws  and  its  por 
tions  were  subject  to  conflicting  classifications;  it 
was  partly  a  group  of  state  armies,  partly  a  single 
Confederate  army.  None  of  its  members  had 
enlisted  for  long  terms.  Many  enlistments  would 
expire  early  in  1862.  The  fears  of  the  Confederate 
Administration  with  regard  to  this  matter,  to 
gether  with  its  alarm  about  the  events  at  the  front, 
were  expressed  by  Davis  in  a  frank  message  to  the 
Southern  Congress,  three  days  later.  "I  have 
hoped,"  said  he,  "for  several  days  to  receive  official 
reports  in  relation  to  our  discomfiture  at  Roanoke 
Island  and  the  fall  of  Fort  Donelson.  They  have 
not  yet  reached  me.  .  .  .  The  hope  is  still  en 
tertained  that  our  reported  losses  at  Fort  Donelson 
have  been  greatly  exaggerated.  ..."  He  went 
on  to  condemn  the  policy  of  enlistments  for  short 
terms,  "against  which,"  said  he,  "I  have  steadily 
contended  ";  and  he  enlarged  upon  the  danger  that 
even  patriotic  men,  who  intended  to  reenlist,  might 


THE  DAVIS  GOVERNMENT  37 

go  home  to  put  their  affairs  in  order  and  that  thus, 
at  a  critical  moment,  the  army  might  be  seriously 
reduced.  The  accompanying  report  of  the  Con 
federate  Secretary  of  War  showed  a  total  in  the 
army  of  340,250  men.  This  was  an  inadequate 
force  with  which  to  meet  the  great  hosts  which 
were  being  organized  against  it  in  the  North.  To 
permit  the  slightest  reduction  of  the  army  at 
that  moment  seemed  to  the  Southern  President 
suicidal. 

But  Davis  waited  some  time  longer  before  pro 
posing  to  the  Confederate  Congress  the  adoption  of 
conscription.  Meanwhile,  the  details  of  two  great 
reverses,  the  loss  of  Roanoke  Island  and  the  loss  of 
Fort  Donelson,  became  generally  known.  Appre 
hension  gathered  strength.  Newspapers  began  to 
discuss  conscription  as  something  inevitable.  At 
last,  on  March  28,  1862,  Davis  sent  a  message  to 
the  Confederate  Congress  advising  the  conscrip 
tion  of  all  white  males  between  the  ages  of  eighteen 
and  thirty-five.  For  this  suggestion  Congress  was 
ripe,  and  the  first  Conscription  Act  of  the  Con 
federacy  was  signed  by  the  President  on  the  16th 
of  April.  The  age  of  eligibility  was  fixed  as  Davis 
had  advised;  the  term  of  service  was  to  be  three 
years;  every  one  then  in  service  was  to  be  retained 


38       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

in  service  during  three  years  from  the  date  of  his 
original  enlistment. 

This  statute  may  be  thought  of  as  a  great  victory 
on  the  part  of  the  Administration.  It  was  the 
climax  of  a  policy  of  centralization  in  the  military 
establishment  to  which  Davis  had  committed 
himself  by  the  veto,  in  January,  of  "A  bill  to 
authorize  the  Secretary  of  War  to  receive  into  the 
service  of  the  Confederate  States  a  regiment  of 
volunteers  for  the  protection  of  the  frontier  of 
Texas."  This  regiment  was  to  be  under  the  con 
trol  of  the  Governor  of  the  State.  In  refusing  to 
accept  such  troops,  Davis  laid  down  the  main 
proposition  upon  which  he  stood  as  military  ex 
ecutive  to  the  end  of  the  war,  a  proposition  which 
immediately  set  debate  raging:  "Unity  and  co 
operation  by  the  troops  of  all  the  States  are  indis 
pensable  to  success,  and  I  must  view  with  regret 
this  as  well  as  all  other  indications  of  a  purpose  to 
divide  the  power  of  States  by  dividing  the  means 
to  be  employed  in  efforts  to  carry  on  separate 
operations." 

In  these  military  measures  of  the  early  months 
of  1862  Davis's  purpose  became  clear.  He  was 
bent  upon  instituting  a  strong  government,  able  to 
push  the  war  through,  and  careless  of  the  niceties 


THE  DAVIS  GOVERNMENT  39 

of  constitutional  law  or  of  the  exact  prerogatives 
of  the  States.  His  position  was  expressed  in  the 
course  of  the  year  by  a  Virginia  newspaper:  "It 
will  be  time  enough  to  distract  the  councils  of  the 
State  about  imaginary  violations  of  constitutional 
law  by  the  supreme  government  when  our  in 
dependence  is  achieved,  established,  and  acknowl 
edged.  It  will  not  be  until  then  that  the  sover 
eignty  of  the  States  will  be  a  reality."  But  there 
were  many  Southerners  who  could  not  accept  this 
point  of  view.  The  Mercury  was  sharply  critical 
of  the  veto  of  the  Texas  Regiment  Bill.  In  the 
interval  between  the  Texas  veto  and  the  passing 
of  the  Conscription  Act,  the  state  convention 
of  North  Carolina  demanded  the  return  of  North 
Carolina  volunteers  for  the  defense  of  their  own 
State.  No  sooner  was  the  Conscription  Act  passed 
than  its  constitutionality  was  attacked.  As  the 
Confederacy  had  no  Supreme  Court,  the  question 
came  up  before  state  courts.  One  after  another, 
several  state  supreme  courts  pronounced  the  act 
constitutional  and  in  most  of  the  States  the  con 
stitutional  issue  was  gradually  allowed  to  lapse. 

Nevertheless,  Davis  had  opened  Pandora's  box. 
The  clash  between  State  and  Confederate  au 
thority  had  begun.  An  opposition  party  began  to 


40       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

form.  In  this  first  stage  of  its  definite  existence, 
the  opposition  made  an  interesting  attempt  to 
control  the  Cabinet.  Secretary  Benjamin,  though 
greatly  trusted  by  the  President,  seems  never  to 
have  been  a  popular  minister.  Congress  attempted 
to  load  upon  Benjamin  the  blame  for  Roanoke 
Island  and  Fort  Donelson.  In  the  House  a  motion 
was  introduced  to  the  effect  that  Benjamin  had 
"not  the  confidence  of  the  people  of  the  Con 
federate  States  nor  of  the  army  .  .  .  and  that  we 
most  respectfully  request  his  retirement"  from  the 
office  of  Secretary  of  War.  Friends  of  the  Admin 
istration  tabled  the  motion.  Davis  extricated  his 
friend  by  taking  advantage  of  Hunter's  retirement 
and  promoting  Benjamin  to  the  State  Department. 
A  month  later  a  congressional  committee  ap 
pointed  to  investigate  the  affair  of  Roanoke  Island 
exonerated  the  officer  in  command  and  laid  the 
blame  on  his  superiors,  including  "the  late  Secre 
tary  of  War." 

With  Benjamin  safe  in  the  Department  of  State, 
with  the  majority  in  the  Confederate  Congress 
still  fairly  manageable,  with  the  Conscription  Act 
in  force,  Davis  seemed  to  be  strong  enough  in  the 
spring  of  1862  to  ignore  the  gathering  opposition. 
And  yet  there  was  another  measure,  second  only 


THE  DAVIS  GOVERNMENT  41 

in  the  President's  eyes  to  the  Conscription  Act, 
that  was  to  breed  trouble.  This  was  the  first  of 
the  series  of  acts  empowering  him  to  suspend  the 
privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus.  Under  this 
act  he  was  permitted  to  set  up  martial  law  in  any 
district  threatened  with  invasion.  The  cause  of 
this  drastic  measure  was  the  confusion  and  the 
general  demoralization  that  existed  wherever  the 
close  approach  of  the  enemy  created  a  situation 
too  complex  for  the  ordinary  civil  authorities. 
Davis  made  use  of  the  power  thus  given  to  him  and 
proclaimed  martial  law  in  Richmond,  in  Norfolk, 
in  parts  of  South  Carolina,  and  elsewhere.  It  was 
on  Richmond  that  the  hand  of  the  Administration 
fell  heaviest.  The  capital  was  the  center  of  a  great 
camp;  its  sudden  and  vast  increase  in  population 
had  been  the  signal  for  all  the  criminal  class  near 
and  far  to  hurry  thither  in  the  hope  of  a  new  field 
of  spoliation;  to  deal  with  this  immense  human 
congestion,  the  local  police  were  powerless;  every 
variety  of  abominable  contrivance  to  entrap  and 
debauch  men  for  a  price  was  in  brazen  operation. 
The  first  care  of  the  Government  under  the  new 
law  was  the  cleansing  of  the  capital.  General 
John  H.  Winder,  appointed  military  governor, 
did  the  job  with  thoroughness.  He  closed  the 


42       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

barrooms,  disarmed  the  populace,  and  for  the  time 
at  least  swept  the  city  clean  of  criminals.  The 
Administration  also  made  certain  political  arrests, 
and  even  imprisoned  some  extreme  opponents  of 
the  Government  for  "offenses  not  enumerated  and 
not  cognizable  under  the  regular  process  of  law." 
Such  arrests  gave  the  enemies  of  the  Administra 
tion  another  handle  against  it.  As  we  shall  see 
later,  the  use  that  Davis  made  of  martial  law  was 
distorted  by  a  thousand  fault-finders  and  was  made 
the  basis  of  the  charge  that  the  President  was  aim 
ing  at  absolute  power. 

At  the  moment,  however,  Davis  was  master  of 
the  situation.  The  six  months  following  April  1, 
1862,  were  doubtless,  from  his  own  point  of  view, 
the  most  satisfactory  part  of  his  career  as  Con 
federate  President.  These  months  were  indeed 
filled  with  peril.  There  was  a  time  when  McClel- 
lan's  advance  up  the  Peninsula  appeared  so 
threatening  that  the  archives  of  the  Government 
were  packed  on  railway  cars  prepared  for  imme 
diate  removal  should  evacuation  be  necessary. 
There  were  the  other  great  disasters  during  that 
year,  including  the  loss  of  New  Orleans.  The 
President  himself  experienced  a  profound  personal 
sorrow  in  the  death  of  his  friend,  Albert  Sidney 


THE  DAVIS  GOVERNMENT  43 

Johnston,  in  the  bloody  fight  at  Shiloh.  It  was 
in  the  midst  of  this  time  that  tried  men's  souls  that 
the  Richmond  Examiner  achieved  an  unenvied  im 
mortality  for  one  of  its  articles  on  the  Adminis 
tration.  At  a  moment  when  nothing  should  have 
been  said  to  discredit  in  any  way  the  struggling 
Government,  it  described  Davis  as  weak  with 
fear  telling  his  beads  in  a  corner  of  St.  Paul's 
Church.  This  paper,  along  with  the  Charleston 
Mercury,  led  the  Opposition.  Throughout  Con 
federate  history  these  two,  which  were  very  ably 
edited,  did  the  thinking  for  the  enemies  of  Davis. 
We  shall  meet  them  time  and  again. 

A  true  picture  of  Davis  would  have  shown  the 
President  resolute  and  resourceful,  at  perhaps  the 
height  of  his  powers.  He  recruited  and  supplied 
the  armies;  he  fortified  Richmond;  he  sustained 
the  great  captain  whom  he  had  placed  in  com 
mand  while  McClellan  was  at  the  gates.  When  the 
tide  had  turned  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
sullenly  withdrew,  baffled,  there  occurred  the  one 
brief  space  in  Confederate  history  that  was  pure 
sunshine.  In  this  period  took  place  the  splendid 
victory  of  Second  Manassas.  The  strong  military 
policy  of  the  Administration  had  given  the  Con 
federacy  powerful  armies.  Lee  had  inspired  them 


44       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

with  victory.  This  period  of  buoyant  hope  cul 
minated  in  the  great  offensive  design  which  fol 
lowed  Second  Manassas.  It  was  known  that  the 
Northern  people,  or  a  large  part  of  them,  had 
suffered  a  reaction;  the  tide  was  setting  strong 
against  the  Lincoln  Government;  in  the  autumn, 
the  Northern  elections  would  be  held.  To  in 
fluence  those  elections  and  at  the  same  time  to 
drive  the  Northern  armies  back  into  their  own 
section;  to  draw  Maryland  and  Kentucky  into  the 
Confederate  States;  to  fall  upon  the  invaders  in 
the  Southwest  and  recover  the  lower  Mississippi  — 
to  accomplish  all  these  results  was  the  confident 
expectation  of  the  President  and  his  advisers  as 
they  planned  their  great  triple  offensive  in  August, 
1862.  Lee  was  to  invade  Maryland;  Bragg  was  to 
invade  Kentucky;  Van  Dorn  was  to  break  the 
hold  of  the  Federals  in  the  Southwest.  If  there 
is  one  moment  that  is  to  be  considered  the  climax 
of  Davis's  career,  the  high-water  mark  of  Con 
federate  hope,  it  was  the  moment  of  joyous  ex 
pectation  when  the  triple  offensive  was  launched, 
when  Lee's  army,  on  a  brilliant  autumn  day, 
crossed  the  Potomac,  singing  Maryland,  my 
Maryland. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  FALL  OF  KING  COTTON 

'VYniLE  the  Confederate  Executive  was  building 
up  its  military  establishment,  the  Treasury  was 
struggling  with  the  problem  of  paying  for  it.  The 
problem  was  destined  to  become  insoluble.  From 
the  vantage-point  of  a  later  time  we  can  now  see 
that  nothing  could  have  provided  a  solution  short 
of  appropriation  and  mobilization  of  the  whole 
industrial  power  of  the  country  along  with  the 
whole  military  power  —  a  conscription  of  wealth 
of  every  kind  together  with  conscription  of  men. 
But  in  1862  such  an  idea  was  too  advanced  for 
any  group  of  Americans.  Nor,  in  that  year, 
was  there  as  yet  any  certain  evidence  that  the 
Treasury  was  facing  an  impossible  situation.  Its 
endeavors  were  taken  lightly  —  at  first,  almost 
gaily  —  because  of  the  profound  illusion  which 
permeated  Southern  thought  that  Cotton  was 
King. 

45 


46       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

Obviously,  if  the  Southern  ports  could  be  kept 
open  and  cotton  could  continue  to  go  to  market, 
the  Confederate  financial  problem  was  not  serious. 
When  Davis,  soon  after  his  first  inauguration,  sent 
Yancey,  Rost,  and  Maim  as  commissioners  to 
Europe  to  press  the  claims  of  the  Confederacy  for 
recognition,  very  few  Southerners  had  any  doubt 
that  the  blockade  would  be  short-lived.  "Cotton 
is  King"  was  the  answer  that  silenced  all  ques 
tions.  Without  American  cotton  the  English 
mills  would  have  to  shut  down;  the  operatives 
would  starve;  famine  and  discontent  would  be 
tween  them  force  the  British  ministry  to  intervene 
in  American  affairs.  There  were,  indeed,  a  few 
far-sighted  men  who  perceived  that  this  confidence 
was  ill-based  and  that  cotton,  though  it  was  a 
power  in  the  fi^an^ial_wory,  was  not  the  commer 
cial  king.  The  majority  of  the  population,  how 
ever,  had  to  learn  this  truth  from  keen  experience. 

Several  events  of  1861  for  a  time  seemed  to 
confirm  this  illusion.  The^ueen^^roclamation 
in  the  spring,  giving  the  Confederacy  the  status  of 
a  belligerent,  and,  in  the  autumn,  the  demand  by 
the  British  Government  for  the  surrender  of  the 
commissioners,  Mason  and  Slidell,  who  had  been 
taken  from  a  British  packet  by  a  Union  cruiser  — 


THE  FALL  OF  KING  COTTON  47 

both  these  events  seemed  to  indicate  active  British 
sympathy.  In  England,  to  be  sure,  Yancey  be 
came  disillusioned.  He  saw  that  the  international 
situation  was  not  so  simple  as  it  seemed;  that  while 
the  South  had  powerful  friends  abroad,  it  also  had 
powerful  foes;  that  the  British  anti-slavery  party 
was  a  more  formidable  enemy  than  he  had  ex 
pected  it  to  be;  and  that  intervention  was  not  a 
foregone  conclusion.  The  task  of  an  unrecognized 
ambassador  being  too  annoying  for  him,  Yancey 
was  relieved  at  his  own  request  and  Mason  was 
sent  out  to  take  his  place.  A  singular  little  incident 
like  a  dismal  prophecy  occurred  as  Yancey  was  on 
his  way  home.  He  passed  through  Havana  early 
in  1862,  when  the  news  of  the  surrender  of  Fort 
Donelson  had  begun  to  stagger  the  hopes  and  im 
pair  the  prestige  of  the  Confederates.  By  the 
advice  of  the  Confederate  agent  in  Cuba,  Yancey 
did  not  call  on  the  Spanish  Governor  but  sent  him 
word  that  "delicacy  alone  prompted  his  departure 
without  the  gratification  of  a  personal  interview." 
The  Governor  expressed  himself  as  "exceedingly 
grateful  for  the  noble  sentiment  which  prevented" 
Yancey  from  causing  international  complications 
at  Havana. 

The  history  of  the  first  year  of  Confederate 


48       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

foreign  affairs  is  interwoven  with  the  history  of 
Confederate  finance.  During  that  year  the  South 
became  a  great  buyer  in  Europe.  Arms,  powder, 
cloth,  machinery,  medicines,  ships,  a  thousand 
things,  had  all  to  be  bought  abroad.  To  establish 
the  foreign  credit  of  the  new  Government  was  the 
arduous  task  of  the  Confederate  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  Christopher  GT  Mpmmingpr.  The Jirst 
great  ...campaign  of  the  war  was  not  fought  by 
armies.  It  was  a  commercial  campaign  fought  by 
agents  of  the  Federal  and  Confederate  govern 
ments  and  having  for  its  aim  the  cornering  of  the 
munitions  market  in  Europe.  In  this  campaign 
the  Federal  agents  had  decisive  advantages:  their 
credit  was  never  questioned,  and  their  enormous 
purchases  were  never  doubtful  ventures  for  the 
European  sellers.  In  some  cases  their  superior 
credit  enabled  them  to  overbid  the  Confederate 
agents  and  to  appropriate  large  contracts  which 
the  Confederates  had  negotiated  but  which  they 
could  not  hold  because  of  the  precariousness  of 
their  credit.  And  yet,  all  things  considered,  the 
Confederate  agents  made  a  good  showing.  In  the 
report  of  the  Secretary  of  War  in  February,  1862, 
the  number  of  rifles  contracted  for  abroad  was  put 
at  91,000,  of  which  IjLQflfl  had  been  delivered. 


THE  FALL  OF  KING  COTTON  49 

The  chief  reliance  of  the  Confederate  Treasury  for 
its  purchases  abroad  was  at  first  the  specie  in  the 
n  branch  o&  the  United  States  Mint  and 


in  Southern  banks.  The  former  the  Confederacy 
seized  and  converted  to  its  own  use.  Of  the  latter 
it  lured  into  its  own  hands  a  very  large  proportion 
by  what  is  commonly  called  "the  fifteen  rmlhVm 
loan"  —  an  issue  of  eight  per  cent  bonds  author 
ized  in  February,  1861.  Most  of  this  specie  seems 
to  have  been  taken  out  of  the  country  by  the  pur 
chase  of  European  commodities.  A  little,  to  be 
sure,  remained,  for  there  was  some  gold  still  at 
home  when  the  Confederacy  fell.  But  the  sum 
was  small. 

In  addition  to  this  loan  Memmingej*  also  per 
suaded  Congress  on  August  19,  1861,  to  lay  a  direct 
tax  —  the  "war  tax,"  as  it  was  called  —  of  one- 
half  of  one  per  cent  on  all  property  except  Con 
federate  bonds  and  money.  As  required  by  the 
Constitution  this  tax  was  apportioned  among  the 
States,  but  if  it  assumed  its  assessment  before 
April  1,  1862,  each  State  was  to  have  a  reduction 
of  ten  per  cent.  As  there  was  a  general  aversion 
to  the  idea  of  Confederate  taxation  and  a  general 
faith  in  loans,  what  the  States  did,  as  a  rule,  was 
to  assume  their  assessment,  agree  to  pay  it  into 


50      THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

the  Treasury,  and  then  issue  bonds  to  raise  the 
necessary  funds,  thus  converting  the  war  tax  into 
a  loan. 

The  Confederate,  like  the  Union,  Treasury  did 
not  have  the  courage  to  force  the  issue  upon  taxa 
tion  and  leaned  throughout  the  war  largely  upon 
loans.  It  also  had  recourse  to  the  perilous  device 
of  paper  money,  the  gold  value  of  which  was  not 
guaranteed.  Beginning  in  March,  1861,  it  issued 
under  successive  laws  great  quantities  of  paper 
notes,  some  of  them  interest  bearing,  some  not. 
It  used  these  notes  in  payment  of  its  domestic 
obligations.  The  purchasing  value  of  the  notes 
soon  started  on  a  disastrous  downward  course,  and 
in  1864  the  gold  dollar  was  worth  thirty  paper 
dollars.  The  Confederate  Government  thus  be 
came  involved  in  a  problem  of  self-preservation 
that  was  but  half  solved  by  the  system  of  tithes 
and  impressment  which  we  shall  encounter  later. 
The  depreciation  of  these  notes  left  governmental 
clerks  without  adequate  salaries  and  soldiers  with 
out  the  means  of  providing  for  their  families. 
During  most  of  the  war,  women  and  other  non- 
combatants  had  to  support  the  families  or  else 
rely  upon  local  charity  organized  by  state  or 
county  boards. 


THE  FALL  OF  KING  COTTON  51 

Long  before  all  the  evils  of  paper  money  were 
experienced,  the  North,  with  great  swiftness,  con 
centrated  its  naval  forces  so  as  to  dominate  the 
Southern  ports  which  had  trade  relations  with 
Europe.  The  shipping  ports  were  at  once  con 
gested  with  cotton  to  the  great  embarrassment  of 
merchants  and  planters.  Partly  to  relieve  them, 
the  Confederate  Congress  instituted  in  May,  1861, 
what  is  known  today  as  "the  hundred  million 
loan."  It  was  the  first  of  a  series  of  "produce 
loans."  The  Treasury  was  authorized  to  issue 
eight  per  cent  bonds,  to  fall  due  in  twenty  years, 
and  to  sell  them  for  specie  or  to  exchange  them  for 
produce  or  manufactured  articles.  In  the  course 
of  the  remaining  months  of  1861  there  were  ex 
changed  for  these  bonds  great  quantities  of  prod 
uce  including  some  400,000  bales  of  cotton. 

In  spite  of  the  distress  of  the  planters,  however, 
the  illusion  of  King  Cotton's  power  does  not  seem 
to  have  been  seriously  impaired  during  1861.  In 
fact,  strange  as  it  now  seems,  the  frame  of  mind  of 
the  leaders  appears  to  have  been  proof,  that  year, 
against  alarm  over  the  blockade.  For  two  reasons, 
the  Confederacy  regarded  the  blockade  at  first  as  a 
blessing  in  disguise.  It  was  counted  on  to  act  as 
a  protective  tariff  in  stimulating  manufactures; 


52       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

and  at  the  same  time  the  South  expected  inter 
ruption  of  the  flow  of  cotton  towards  Europe 
to  make  England  feel  her  dependence  upon  the 
Confederacy.  In  this  way  there  would  be  exerted 
an  economic  coercion  which  would  compel  inter 
vention.  Such  reasoning  lay  behind  a  law  passed 
in  May  forbidding  the  export  of  cotton  except 
through  the  seaports  of  the  Confederacy.  Similar 
laws  were  enacted  by  the  States.  During  the 
summer,  many  cotton  factors  joined  in  advising 
the  planters  to  hold  their  cotton  until  the  blockade 
broke  down.  In  the  autumn,  the  Governor  of 
Louisiana  forbade  the  export  of  cotton  from  New 
Orleans.  So  unshakeable  was  the  illusion  in  1861, 
that  King  Cotton  had  England  in  his  grip!  The 
illusion  died  hard.  Throughout  1862,  and  even 
in  1863,  the  newspapers  published  appeals  to  the 
planters  to  give  up  growing  cotton  for  a  time,  and 
even  to  destroy  what  they  had,  so  as  to  coerce  the 
obdurate  Englishmen. 

Meanwhile,  Mason  had  been  accorded  by  the 
British  upper  classes  that  generous  welcome  which 
they  have  always  extended  to  the  representative  of 
a  people  fighting  gallantly  against  odds.  During 
the  hopeful  days  of  1862  —  that  Golden  Age  of 
Confederacy  —  Mason,  though  not  recognized  by 


THE  FALL  OF  KING  COTTON  53 

the  English  Government,  was  shown  every  kind 
ness  by  leading  members  of  the  aristocracy,  who 
visited  him  in  London  and  received  him  at  their 
houses  in  the  country.  It  was  during  this  period 
of  buoyant  hope  that  the  Alabama  was  allowed  to 
go  to  sea  from  Liverpool  in  July,  1862.  At  the 
same  time  Mason  heard  his  hosts  express  undis 
guised  admiration  for  the  valor  of  the  soldiers 
serving  under  Jackson  and  Lee.  Whether  he 
formed  any  true  impression  of  the  other  side  of 
British  idealism,  its  resolute  opposition  to  slavery, 
may  be  questioned.  There  seems  little  doubt  that 
he  did  not  perceive  the  turning  of  the  tide  of  Eng 
lish  public  opinion,  in  the  autumn  of  1862,  follow 
ing  the  Emancipation  Proclamation  and  the  great 
reverses  of  September  and  October  —  Antietam- 
Sharpsburg,  Perry  ville,  Corinth  —  the  backflow  of 
all  three  of  the  Confederate  offensives. 

The  cotton  famine  in  England,  where  perhaps  a 
million  people  were  in  actual  want  through  the 
shutting  down  of  cotton  mills,  seemed  to  Mason 
to  be  "looming  up  in  fearful  proportions."  "The 
public  mind,"  he  wrote  home  in  November,  1862, 
"is  very  much  disturbed  by  the  prospect  for  the 
winter;  and  I  am  not  without  hope  that  it  will  pro 
duce  its  effects  on  the  councils  of  the  government." 


54       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

Yet  it  was  the  uprising  of  the  British  working 
people  in  favor  of  the  North  that  contributed  to 
defeat  the  one  important  attempt  to  intervene  in 
American  affairs.  Napoleon  III  had  made  an 
offer  of  mediation  which  was  rejected  by  the 
Washington  Government  early  the  next  year. 
England  and  Russia  had  both  declined  to  partici 
pate  in  Napoleon's  scheme,  and  their  refusal  marks 
the  beginning  of  the  end  of  the  reign  of  King 
Cotton. 

At  Paris,  ,Sl*4ell  was  even  more  hopeful  than 
Mason.  He  had  won  over  Emile  Erl anger,  that 
great  banker  who  was  deep  in  the  confidence  of 
Napoleon.  So  cordial  became  the  relations  be 
tween  the  two  that  it  involved  their  families  and 
led  at  last  to  the  marriage  of  Erlangex's__son  with 
Slidell's  daughter.  Whether  owing  to  Slidell's 
eloquence,  or  from  secret  knowledge  of  the  Em 
peror's  designs,  or  from  his  own  audacity,  Erlanger 
toward  the  close  of  1862  made  a  proposal  that  is  one 
of  the  most  daring  schemes  of  financial  plunging 
yet  recorded.  If  the  Confederate  Government 
would  issue  to  him  bonds  secured  by  cotton, 
Erlanger  would  underwrite  the  bonds,  put  the 
proceeds  of  their  sale  to  the  credit  of  the  Con 
federate  agents,  and  wait  for  the  cotton  until  it 


THE  FALL  OF  KING  COTTON  55 

could  run  the  blockade  or  until  peace  should  be 
declared.  The  Confederate  Government  after 
some  hesitation  accepted  his  plan  and  issued 
fifteen  millions  of  "Erlanger  bonds,"  bearing  seven 
per  cent,  and  put  them  on  sale  at  Paris,  London. 
Amsterdam,  and  Frankfort. 

As  a  purchaser  of  these  bonds  was  to  be  given 
cotton  eventually  at  a  valuation  of  sixpence  a 
pound,  and  as  cotton  was  then  selling  in  England 
for  nearly  two  shillings,  the  bold  gamble  caught 
the  fancy  of  speculators.  There  was  a  rush  to  take 
up  the  bonds  and  to  pay  the  first  installment.  But 
before  the  second  installment  became  due  a  mys 
terious  change  in  the  market  took  place  and  the 
price  of  the  bonds  fell.  Holders  became  alarmed 
and  some  even  proposed  to  forfeit  their  bonds 
rather  than  pay  on  May  1,  1863,  the  next  install 
ment  of  fifteen  per  cent  of  the  purchase  money. 
Thereupon  Mason  undertook  to  "bull "  the  market. 
Agents  of  the  United  States  Government  were 
supposed  to  be  at  the  bottom  of  the  drop  in  the 
bonds.  To  defeat  their  schemes  the  Confederate 
agents  bought  back  large  amounts  in  bonds  in 
tending  to  resell.  The  result  was  the  expenditure 
of  some  six  million  dollars  with  practically  no 
effect  on  the  market.  These  "Erlanger  bonds" 


56       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

sold  slowly  through  1863  and  even  in  1864,  and 
netted  a  considerable  amount  to  the  foreign  agents 
of  the  Confederacy. 

The  comparative  failure  of  the  Erkinger  loan 
marks  the  downfall  of  King  Cotton.  He  was  an 
exploded  superstition.  He  was  unable,  despite 
the  cotton  famine,  to  coerce  the  English  working- 
men  into  siding  with  a  country  which  they  re 
garded,  because  of  its  support  of  slavery,  as  iniinj- 
cal  to  their  interests.  At  home,  the  Government 
confessed  the  powerlessness  of  King  Cotton  by  a 
change  of  its  attitude  toward  export.  During  the 
latter  part  of  the  war,  the  Government  secured 
the  meager  funds  at  its  disposal  abroad  by  rushing 
cotton  in  swift  ships  through  the  blockade.  So 
important  did  this  traffic  become  that  the  Con 
federacy  passed  stringent  laws  to  keep  the  control 
in  its  own  hands.  One  more  cause  of  friction  be 
tween  the  Confederate  and  the  State  authorities 
was  thus  developed:  the  Confederate  navigation 
laws  prevented  the  States  from  running  the  block 
ade  on  their  own  account. 

The  effects  of  the  blockade  were  felt  at  the 
ends  of  the  earth.  India  became  an  exporter  of 
cotton.  Egypt  also  entered  the  competition.  That 
singular  dreamer,  Ismail  Pasha,  whose  reign  made 


THE  FALL  OF  KING  COTTON  57 

Egypt  briefly  an  exotic  nation,  neither  eastern 
nor  western,  found  one  of  his  opportunities  in 
the  American  War  and  the  failure  of  the  cotton 
supply. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE    REACTION   AGAINST    RICHMOND 

A  POPULAR  revulsion  of  feeling  preceded  and  fol 
lowed  the  great  period  of  Confederate  history  - 
these  six  months  of  Titanic  effort  which  embraced 
between  March  and  September,  1862,  splendid 
success  along  with  catastrophes.  But  there  was  a 
marked  difference  between  the  two  tides  of  popular 
emotion.  The  wave  of  alarm  which  swept  over 
the  South  after  the  surrender  of  Fort  Donelson  was 
quickly  translated  into  such  a  high  passion  for 
battle  that  the  march  of  events  until  the  day  of 
Antietam  resounded  like  an  epic.  The  failure  of 
the  triple  offensive  which  closed  this  period  was 
followed  in  very  many  minds  by  the  appearance  of 
a  new  temper,  often  as  valiant  as  the  old  but  far 
more  grim  and  deeply  seamed  with  distrust.  And 
how  is  this  distrust,  of  which  the  Confederate  Ad 
ministration  was  the  object,  to  be  accounted  for? 
Various  answers  to  this  question  were  made  at 

58 


THE  REACTION  AGAINST  RICHMOND   59 

the  time.  The  laws  of  the  spring  of  1862  were 
attacked  as  unconstitutional.  Davis  was  held 
responsible  for  them  and  also  for  the  slow  equip 
ment  of  the  army.  Because  the  Confederate  Con 
gress  conducted  much  of  its  business  in  secret 
session,  the  President  was  charged  with  a  love  of 
mystery  and  an  unwillingness  to  take  the  people 
into  his  confidence.  Arrests  under  the  law  sus 
pending  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  were  made  the 
texts  for  harangues  on  liberty.  The  right  of 
freedom  of  speech  was  dragged  in  when  General 
Yan  Tjorn,  in  the  Southwest,  threatened  with 
suppression  any  newspaper  that  published  any 
thing  which  might  impair  confidence  in  a  com 
manding  officer.  How  could  he  have  dared  to  do 
this,  was  the  cry,  unless  the  President  was  behind 
him?  And  when  General  Bragg  assumed  a  similar 
attitude  toward  the  press,  the  same  cry  was  raised. 
Throughout  the  summer  of  victories,  even  while 
the  thrilling  stories  of  SeyenJEines,  the  Peninsula, 
Second  Manassas,  were  sounding  like  trumpets, 
these  mutterings  of  discontent  formed  an  ominous 
accompaniment . 

Yancey_>  speaking  of  the  disturbed  temper  of  the 
time,  attributed  it  to  the  general  lack  of  informa 
tion  on  the  part  of  Southern  people  as  to  what  the 


60       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

Confederate  Government  was  doing.  His  proposed 
remedy  was  an  end  of  the  censorship  which  that 
Government  was  attempting  to  maintain,  the 
abandonment  of  the  secret  sessions  of  its  Congress, 
and  the  taking  of  the  people  into  its  full  confidence. 
Now  a  Senator  from  Alabama,  he  attempted,  at 
the  opening  of  the  congressional  session  in  the 
autumn  of  1862,  to  abolish  secret  sessions,  but  in 
his  efforts  he  was  not  successful. 

There  seems  little  doubt  that  the  Confederate 
Government  had  blundered  in  being  too  secretive. 
Even  from  Congress,  much  information  was  with 
held.  A  curious  incident  has  preserved  what 
appeared  to  the  military  mind  the  justification  of 
this  reticence.  The  Secretary  of  War  refused  to 
comply  with  a  request  for  information,  holding 
that  he  could  not  do  so  "without  disclosing  the 
strength  of  our  armies  to  many  persons  of  sub 
ordinate  position  whose  secrecy  cannot  be  relied 
upon. "  "I  beg  leave  to  remind  you, "  said  he,  "of 
a  report  made  in  response  to  a  similar  one  from  the 
Federal  Congress,  communicated  to  them  in  secret 
session,  and  now  a  part  of  our  archives." 

How  much  the  country  was  in  the  dark  with 
regard  to  some  vital  matters  is  revealed  by  an 
attack  on  the  Confederate  Administration  which 


THE  REACTION  AGAINST  RICHMOND   61 

was  made  by  the  Charleston  Mercury,  in  February. 
The  Southern  Government  was  accused  of  un 
pardonable  slowness  in  sending  agents  to  Europe 
to  purchase  munitions.  In  point  of  fact,  the  Con 
federate  Government  had  been  more  prompt  than 
the  Union  Government  in  rushing  agents  abroad. 
But  the  country  was  not  permitted  to  know  this. 
Though  the  Courier  was  a  government  organ  in 
Charleston,  it  did  not  meet  the  charges  of  the 
Mercury  by  disclosing  the  facts  about  the  arduous 
attempts  of  the  Confederate  Government  to  secure 
arms  in  Europe.  The  reply  of  the  Courier  to  the 
Mercury,  though  spirited,  was  all  in  general  terms. 
"To  shake  confidence  in  Jefferson  Davis,"  said 
the  Gonrier,  "is  .  .  .to  bring  'hideous  ruin  and 
combustion'  down  upon  our  dearest  hopes  and 
interests."  It  made  "Mr.  Davis  and  his  defen 
sive  policy"  objects  of  all  admiration;  called  Davis 
"our  Moses."  It  was  deeply  indignant  because 
it  had  been  "reliably  informed  that  men  of  high 
official  position  among  us"  were  "calling  for  a 
General  Convention  of  the  Confederate  States 
to  depose  him  and  set  up  a  military  Dictator  in 
his  place."  The  Mercury  retorted  that,  as  to  the 
plot  against  "our  Moses,"  there  was  no  evidence 
of  its  existence  except  the  Courier's  assertion. 


62       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

Nevertheless,  it  considered  Davis  "an  incubu^  to 
the  cause."  The  controversy  between  the  Mer 
cury  and  the  Courier  at  Charleston  was  paralleled 
at  Richmond  by  the  constant  bickering  between 
the  government  organ,  the  Ejigmrer,  and  the 
Exammer,  which  shares  with  the  Mercury  the  first 
place  among  the  newspapers  hostile  to  Davis. z 

Associated  with  the  Examiner  was  a  vigorous 
writer  having  considerable  power  of  the  old- 
fashioned,  furious  sort,  ever  ready  to  foam  at  the 
mouth.  If  he  had  had  more  restraint  and  less 
credulity,  Edward^^  Pojlard  might  have  become 
a  master  of  the  art  of  vituperation.  Lacking  these 
qualities,  he  never  rose  far  above  mediocrity. 
But  his  fury  was  so  determined  and  his  prejudice 
so  invincible  that  his  writings  have  something  of 
the  power  of  conviction  which  fanaticism  wields. 
In  midsummer,  ISS^^-Pollard  pubJished-  a  book 
entitled  The  First  Year  of  the  War,  which  was  com- 


1  The  Confederate  Government  did  not  misapprehend  the  attitude 
of  the  intellectual  opposition.  Its  foreign  organ,  The  Index,  published 
in  London,  characterized  the  leading  Southern  papers  for  the  en 
lightenment  of  the  British  public.  While  the  Enquirer  and  the 
Courier  were  singled  out  as  the  great  champions  of  the  Confederate 
Government,  the  Examiner  and  the  Mercury  were  portrayed  as  its 
arch  enemies.  The  Examiner  was  called  the  "Ishmael  of  the  South 
ern  press."  The  Mercury  was  described  as  "almost  rabid  on  the  sub 
ject  of  state  rights." 


THE  REACTION  AGAINST  RICHMOND  63 

mended  by  his  allies  in  Charleston  as  showing  no 
"tendency  toward  unfairness  of  statement"  and 
as  expressing  views  "mainly  in  accordance  with 
popular  opinion." 

This  book,  while  affecting  to  be  an  historical 
review,  was  skillfully  designed  to  discredit  the 
Confederate  Administration.  Almost  every  dis 
aster,  every  fault  of  its  management  was  trace 
able  more  or  less  directly  to  Davis.  Kentucky  had 
been  occupied  by  the  Federal  army  because  of  the 
"dull  expectation"  in  which  the  Confederate 
Government  had  stood  aside  waiting  for  things 
somehow  to  right  themselves.  The  Southern  Con 
gress  had  been  criminally  slow  in  coming  to  con 
scription,  contenting  itself  with  an  army  of  400,000 
men  that  existed  "on  paper."  "The  most  dis 
tressing  abuses  were  visible  in  the  ill-regulated 
hygiene  of  our  camps."  According  to  this  book, 
the  Confederate  Administration  was  solely  to 
blame  for  the  loss  of  Roanoke  Island.  In  calling 
that  disaster  "deeply  humiliating,"  as  he  did  in  a 
message  to  Congress,  Davis  was  trying  to  shield 
his  favorite  Benjanain  at  the  cost  of  gallant  soldiers 
who  had  been  sacrificed  through  his  incapacity. 
Davis's  promotion  of  Benjamin  to  the  State  De 
partment  was  an  act  of  "ungracious  and  reckless 


64       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

defiance  of  popular  sentiment."  The  President 
was  "not  the  man  to  consult  the  sentiment  and 
wisdom  of  the  people;  he  desired  to  signalize  the 
infallibility  of  his  own  intellect  in  every  measure 
of  the  revolution  and  to  identify,  from  motives  of 
vanity,  his  own  personal  genius  with  every  event 
and  detail  of  the  remarkable  period  of  history  in 
which  he  had  been  called  upon  to  act.  This  im 
perious  conceit  seemed  to  swallow  up  every  other 
idea  in  his  mind."  The  generals  "fretted  under 
this  pragmatism"  of  one  whose  "vanity"  directed 
the  war  "from  his  cushioned  seat  in  Richmond" 
by  means  of  the  one  formula,  "the  defensive 
policy." 

One  of  Pollard's  chief  accusations  against  the 
Confederate  Government  was  its  failure  to  enforce 
the  conscription  law.  His  paper,  the  Examiner,  as 
well  as  the  Mercury,  supported  Davis  in  the  policy 
of  conscription,  but  both  did  their  best,  first,  to  rob 
him  of  the  credit  for  it  and,  secondly,  to  make  his 
conduct  of  the  policy  appear  inefficient.  Pollard 
claimed  for  the  Examiner  the  credit  of  having 
originated  the  policy  of  conscription;  the  Mercury 
claimed  it  for  Rhett. 

In  other  words,  an  aggressive  war  party  led  by  \ 
the  Examiner  and  the  Mercury  had  been  formed  in 


THE  REACTION  AGAINST  RICHMOND  65 

those  early  days  when  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment  appeared  to  be  standing  wholly  on  the  de 
fensive,  and  when  it  had  failed  to  confide  to  the 
people  the  extenuating  circumstance  that  lack  of 
arms  compelled  it  to  stand  still  whether  it  would  or 
no.  And  yet,  after  this  Government  had  changed 
its  policy  and  had  taken  up  in  the  summer  of  1862 
an  offensive  policy,  this  party  —  or  faction,  or 
what  you  will  —  continued  its  career  of  opposition. 
That  the  secretive  habit  of  the  Confederate  Gov 
ernment  helped  cement  the  opposition  cannot  be 
doubted.  It  is  also  likely  that  this  opposition  gave 
a  vent  to  certain  jealous  spirits  who  had  missed 
the  first  place  in  leadership. 

Furthermore,  the  issue  of  state  sovereignty  had 
been  raised.  In  Georgia  a  movement  had  begun 
which  was  distinctly  different  from  the  Virginia- 
Carolina  movement  of  opposition,  a  movement  for 
which  Rhett  «nd  poll^r^  1m H  scarcely  more  than 
disdainful  tolerance,  and  not  always  that.  This 
parallel  opposition  found  vent,  as  did  the  other, 
in  a  political  pamphlet.  On  the  subject  of  con 
scription  Davis  and  the  Governor  of  Georgia  — 
that  same  Joseph  E.  Brown  who  had  seized  Fort 
Pulaski  in  the  previous  year  —  exchanged  a  ran 
corous  correspondence.  Their  letters  were  pub- 


66       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

lished  in  a  pamphlet  of  which  Pollard  said  scorn 
fully  that  it  was  hawked  about  in  every  city  of  the 
South.  Brown,  taking  alarm  at  the  power  given 
the  Confederate  Government  by  the  Conscription 
Act,  eventually  defined  his  position,  and  that  of 
a  large  following,  in  the  extreme  words:  "No  act 
of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  prior  to 
the  secession  of  Georgia  struck  a  blow  at  constitu 
tional  liberty  so  fell  as  has  been  stricken  by  the 
conscript  acts." 

There  were  other  elements  of  discontent  which 
were  taking  form  as  early  as  the  autumn  of  1862 
but  which  were  not  yet  clearly  defined.  But  the 
two  obvious  sources  of  internal  criticism  just 
described  were  enough  to  disquiet  the  most  resolute 
administration.  When  the  triple  offensive  broke 
down,  when  the  ebb-tide  began,  there  was  already 
everything  that  was  needed  to  precipitate  a  politi 
cal  crisis.  And  now  the  question  arises  whether 
the  Confederate  Administration  had  itself  to 
blame.  Had  Davis  proved  inadequate  in  his  great 
undertaking? 

The  one  undeniable  mistake  of  the  Government 
previous  to  the  autumn  of  1862  was  its  excessive 
secrecy.  As  to  the  other  mistakes  attributed  to 
it  at  the  time,  there  is  good  reason  to  call  them 


THE  REACTION  AGAINST  RICHMOND  67 

\  misfortunes.  Today  we  can  see  that  the  financial 
situation,  the  cotton  situation,  the  relations  with 
Europe,  the  problem  of  equipping  the  armies,  were 
all  to  a  considerable  degree  beyond  the  control  of 
the  Confederate  Government.  If  there  is  anything 
to  be  added  to  its  mistaken  secrecy  as  a  definite 
cause  of  irritation,  it  must  be  found  in  the  general 
tone  given  to  its  actions  by  its  chief  directors.  And 
here  there  is  something  to  be  said. 

With  all  his  high  qualities  of  integrity,  courage, 
faithfulness,  and  zeal,  Davis  lacked  that  insight 
into  human  life  wrhich  marks  the  genius  of  the 
supreme  executive.  He  was  not  an  artist  in  the 
use  of  men.  He  had  not  that  artistic  sense  of  his 
medium  which  distinguishes  the  statesman  from 
the  bureaucrat.  In  fact,  he  had  a  dangerous  bent 
toward  bureaucracy.  As  Reuben  Davis  said  of 
him,  "  Gifted  with  some  of  the  highest  attributes  of 
a  statesman,  he  lacked  the  pliancy  which  enables 
a  man  to  adapt  his  measures  to  the  crisis."  Fur 
thermore,  he  lacked  humor;  there  was  no  safety- 
valve  to  his  intense  nature;  and  he  was  a  man  of 
delicate  health.  Mrs.  Davis,  describing  the  effects 
which  nervous  dyspepsia  and  neuralgia  had  upon 
him,  says  he  would  come  home  from  his  office 
"fasting,  a  mere  mass  of  throbbing  nerves,  and 


68       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

perfectly  exhausted."  And  it  cannot  be  denied 
that  his  mind  was  dogmatic.  Here  are  dangerous 
lines  for  the  character  of  a  leader  of  revolution  — 
the  bureaucratic  tendency,  something  of  rigidity, 
lack  of  humor,  physical  wretchedness,  dogmatism. 
Taken  together,  they  go  far  toward  explaining  his 
failure  in  judging  men,  his  irritable  confidence  in 
himself. 

It  is  no  slight  detail  of  a  man's  career  to  be  placed 
side  by  side  with  a  genius  of  the  first  rank  without 
knowing  it.  But  Davis  does  not  seem  ever  to  have 
appreciated  that  the  man  commanding  in  the 
Seven  Days'  Battles  was  one  of  the  world's  su 
preme  characters.  The  relation  between  Davis 
and  Lee  was  always  cordial,  and  it  brought  out 
Davis's  character  in  its  best  light.  Nevertheless, 
so  rooted  was  Davis's  faith  in  his  own  abilities  that 
he  was  capable  of  saying,  at  a  moment  of  acutest 
anxiety,  "If  I  could  take  one  wing  and  Lee  the 
other,  I  think  we  could  between  us  wrest  a  victory 
from  those  people."  And  yet,  his  military  experi 
ence  embraced  only  the  minor  actions  of  a  young 
officer  on  the  Indian  frontier  and  the  gallant 
conduct  of  a  subordinate  in  the  Mexican  War. 
He  had  never  executed  a  great  military  design. 
His  desire  for  the  military  life  was,  after  all,  his 


THE  REACTION  AGAINST  RICHMOND   69 

only  ground  for  ranking  himself  with  the  victor  of 
Second  Manassas.  Davis  was  also  unfortunate  in 
lacking  the  power  to  overcome  men  and  sweep 
them  along  with  him  —  the  power  Lee  showed  so 
conspicuously.  Nor  was  Davis  averse  to  sharp 
reproof  of  the  highest  officials  when  he  thought 
them  in  the  wrong.  He  once  wrote  to  Joseph  E. 
Johnston  that  a  letter  of  his  contained  "arguments 
and  statements  utterly  unfounded"  and  "insinu 
ations  as  unfounded  as  they  were  unbecoming." 

Davis  was  not  always  wise  in  his  choice  of  men. 
His  confidence  in  Bragg,  who  was  long  his  chief 
military  adviser,  is  not  sustained  by  the  military 
critics  of  a  later  age.  His  Cabinet,  though  not  the 
contemptible  body  caricatured  by  the  malice  of 
Pollard,  was  not  equal  to  the  occasion.  Of  the 
three  men  who  held  the  office  of  Secretary  of  State, 
Toombs  and  Hunter  had  little  if  any  qualification 
for  such  a  post,  while  the  third,  Benjamin,  is  the 
sphinx  of  Confederate  history. 

In  a  way,  Judah  P.  Benjamin  is  one  of  the  most 
interesting  men  in  American  politics.  By  descent 
a  Jew,  born  in  the  West  Indies,  he  spent  his  boy 
hood  mainly  at  Charleston  and  his  college  days  at 
Yale.  He  went  to  New  Orleans  to  begin  his  illus 
trious  career  as  a  lawyer,  and  from  Louisiana 


70       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

entered  politics.  The  facile  keenness  of  his  in 
tellect  is  beyond  dispute.  He  had  the  Jewish 
clarity  of  thought,  the  wonderful  Jewish  detach 
ment  in  matters  of  pure  mind.  But  he  was  also  an 
American  of  the  middle  of  the  century.  His  quick 
and  responsive  nature  —  a  nature  that  enemies 
might  call  simulative  —  caught  and  reflected  the 
characteristics  of  that  singular  and  highly  rhe 
torical  age.  He  lives  in  tradition  as  the  man  of  the 
constant  smile,  and  yet  there  is  no  one  in  history 
whose  state  papers  contain  passages  of  fiercer 
violence  in  days  of  tension.  How  much  of  his 
violence  was  genuine,  how  much  was  a  manner  of 
speaking,  his  biographers  have  not  had  the  courage 
to  determine.  Like  so  many  American  biographers 
they  have  avoided  the  awkward  questions  and 
have  glanced  over,  as  lightly  as  possible,  the  per 
sistent  attempts  of  Congress  to  drive  him  from 
office. 

Nothing  could  shake  the  resolution  of  Davis  to 
retain  Benjamin  in  the  Cabinet.  Among  Davis's 
loftiest  qualities  was  his  sense  of  personal  loyalty. 
Once  he  had  given  his  confidence,  no  amount  of 
opposition  could  shake  his  will  but  served  rather 
to  harden  him.  When  Benjamin  as  Secretary  of 
War  passed  under  a  cloud,  Davis  led  him  forth 


THE  REACTION  AGAINST  RICHMOND  71 

resplendent  as  Secretary  of  State.  Whether  he 
was  wise  in  doing  so,  whether  the  opposition  was 
not  justified  in  its  distrust  of  Benjamin,  is  still  an 
open  question.  What  is  certain  is  that  both  these 
able  men,  even  before  the  crisis  that  arose  in  the 
autumn  of  1862,  had  rendered  themselves  and 
their  Government  widely  unpopular.  It  must 
never  be  forgotten  that  Davis  entered  office  with 
out  the  backing  of  any  definite  faction.  He  was  a 
"dark  horse, "  a  compromise  candidate.  To  build 
up  a  stanch  following,  to  create  enthusiasm  for 
his  Administration,  was  a  prime  necessity  of  his 
first  year  as  President.  Yet  he  seems  not  to  have 
realized  this  necessity.  Boldly,  firmly,  dogmati 
cally,  he  gave  his  whole  thought  and  his  entire 
energy  to  organizing  the  Government  in  such  a 
way  that  it  could  do  its  work  efficiently.  And  \ 
therein  may  have  been  the  proverbial  rift  within 
the  lute.  To  Davis  statecraft  was  too  much  a 
thing  of  methods  and  measures,  too  little  a  thing 
of  men  and  passions. 

During  the  autumn  of  1862  and  the  following 
winter  the  disputes  over  the  conduct  of  the  war 
began  to  subside  and  two  other  themes  became 
prominent:  the  sovereignty  of  the  States,  which 
appeared  to  be  menaced  by  the  Government,  and 


72       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

the  personality  of  Davis,  whom  malcontents  re 
garded  as  a  possible  despot.  Contrary  to  tradition, 
the  first  note  of  alarm  over  state  rights  was  not 
struck  by  its  great  apostle  Rhett,  although  the 
note  was  sounded  in  South  Carolina  in  the  early 
autumn.  There  existed  in  this  State  at  that  time 
an  extra  assembly  called  the  "  Convention, "  which 
had  been  organized  in  1860  for  the  general  purpose 
of  seeing  the  State  through  the  "revolution."  In 
the  Convention,  in  September,  1862,  the  question 
of  a  contest  with  the  Confederate  Government  on 
the  subject  of  a  state  army  was  definitely  raised. 
It  was  proposed  to  organize  a  state  army  and  to 
instruct  the  Legislature  to  "take  effectual  measures 
to  prevent  the  agents  of  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment  from  raising  troops  in  South  Carolina  except 
by  voluntary  enlistment  or  by  applying  to  the 
Executive  of  the  State  to  call  out  the  militia  as  by 
law  organized,  or  some  part  of  it  to  be  mustered 
into  the  Confederate  service."  This  proposal 
brought  about  a  sharp  debate  upon  the  Confeder 
ate  Government  and  its  military  policy.  Rhett 
made  a  remarkable  address,  which  should  of  itself 
quiet  forever  the  old  tale  that  he  was  animated 
in.  his  opposition  solely  by  the  pique  of  a  dis 
appointed  candidate  for  the  presidency.  Though 


THE  REACTION  AGAINST  RICHMOND   73 

as  sharp  as  ever  against  the  Government  and 
though  agreeing  wholly  with  the  spirit  of  the  state 
army  plan,  he  took  the  ground  that  circumstances 
at  the  moment  rendered  the  organization  of  such 
an  army  inopportune.  A  year  earlier  he  would 
have  strongly  supported  the  plan.  In  fact,  in 
opposition  to  Davis  he  had  at  that  time,  he  said, 
urged  an  obligatory  army  which  the  States  should 
be  required  to  raise.  The  Confederate  Adminis 
tration,  however,  had  defeated  his  scheme.  Since 
then  the  situation  had  changed  and  had  become  so 
serious  that  now  there  was  no  choice  but  to  submit 
to  military  necessity.  He  regarded  the  general 
conscription  law  as  "absolutely  necessary  to  save" 
the  Confederacy  "from  utter  devastation  if  not 
final  subjugation.  Right  or  wrong,  the  policy  of 
the  Administration  had  left  us  no  other  alter 
native.  ..." 

The  dominant  attitude  in  South  Carolina  in  the 
autumn  of  1862  is  in  strong  contrast,  because  of 
its  firm  grasp  upon  fact,  with  the  attitude  of  the 
Brown  faction  in  Georgia.  An  extended  history 
of  the  Confederate  movement  —  one  of  those  vast 
histories  that  delight  the  recluse  and  scare  away 
the  man  of  the  world  —  would  labor  to  build  up 
images  of  what  might  be  called  the  personalities 


74       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

of  the  four  States  that  continued  from  the  begin 
ning  to  the  end  parts  of  the  effective  Confederate 
system  —  Virginia,  the  two  Carolinas,  and  Georgia. 
We  are  prone  to  forget  that  the  Confederacy  was 
practically  divided  into  separate  units  as  early  as 
the  capture  of  New  Orleans  by  Farragut,  but  a 
great  history  of  the  time  would  have  a  special  and 
thrilling  story  of  the  conduct  of  the  detached 
western  unit,  the  isolated  world  of  Louisiana, 
Arkansas,  and  Texas  —  the  "Department  of  the 
Trans-Mississippi"  —  cut  off  from  the  main  body 
of  the  Confederacy  and  hemmed  in  between  the 
Federal  army  and  the  deep  sea.  Another  group  of 
States  —  Tennessee,  Mississippi,  Alabama  —  be 
came  so  soon,  and  remained  so  long,  a  debatable 
land,  on  which  the  two  armies  fought,  that  they 
also  had  scant  opportunity  for  genuine  political 
life.  Florida,  small  and  exposed,  was  absorbed  in 
its  gallant  achievement  of  furnishing  to  the  armies 
a  number  of  soldiers  larger  than  its  voting  popula 
tion. 

Thus,  after  the  loss  of  New  Orleans,  one  thing 
with  another  operated  to  confine  the  area  of  full 
political  life  to  Virginia  and  her  three  neighbors  to 
the  South.  And  yet  even  among  these  States 
there  was  no  political  solidarity  or  unanimity  of 


THE  REACTION  AGAINST  RICHMOND   75 

opinion,  for  the  differences  in  their  past  experience, 
social  structure,  and  economic  conditions  made  for 
distinct  points  of  view.  In  South  Carolina,  par 
ticularly,  the  prevailing  view  was  that  of  ex 
perienced,  disillusioned  men  who  realized  from  the 
start  that  secession  had  burnt  their  bridges,  and 
that  now  they  must  win  the  fight  or  change  the 
whole  current  of  their  lives.  In  the  midst  of  the 
extraordinary  conditions  of  war,  they  never  talked 
as  if  their  problems  were  the  problems  of  peace. 
Brown,  on  the  other  hand,  had  but  one  way  of 
reasoning  —  if  we  are  to  call  it  reasoning  —  and, 
with  Hannibal  at  the  gates,  talked  as  if  the  control 
of  the  situation  were  still  in  his  own  hands. 

While  South  Carolina,  so  grimly  conscious  of  the 
reality  of  war  and  the  danger  of  internal  discord, 
held  off  from  the  issue  of  state  sovereignty,  the 
Brown  faction  in  Georgia  blithely  pressed  it  home. 
A  bill  for  extending  the  conscription  age  which  was 
heartily  advocated  by  the  Mercury  was  as  heartily 
condemned  by  Brown.  To  the  President  he  wrote 
announcing  his  continued  opposition  to  a  law 
which  he  declared  "encroaches  upon  the  reserved 
rights  of  the  State  and  strikes  down  her  sover 
eignty  at  a  single  blow."  Though  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Georgia  pronounced  the  conscription  acts 


(76       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

constitutional,  the  Governor  and  his  faction  did  not 
cease  to  condemn  them.  Linton  Stephens,  as  well 
as  his  famous  kinsman,  took  up  the  cudgels.  In  a 
speech  before  the  Georgia  Legislature,  in  Novem 
ber,  Linton  Stephens  borrowed  almost  exactly  the 
Governor's  phraseology  in  denying  the  necessity 
for  conscription,  and  this  continued  to  be  the  note 
of  their  faction  throughout  the  war.  "Conscrip 
tion  checks  enthusiasm,"  was  ever  their  cry;  "we 
are  invincible  under  a  system  of  volunteering,  we 
are  lost  with  conscription." 

Meanwhile  the  military  authorities  looked  facts 
in  the  face  and  had  a  different  tale  to  tell.  They 
complained  that  in  various  parts  of  the  country, 
especially  in  the  mountain  districts,  they  were 
unable  to  obtain  men.  Lee  reported  that  his  army 
melted  away  before  his  eye  and  asked  for  an  in 
crease  of  authority  to  compel  stragglers  to  return. 
At  the  same  time  Brown  was  quarreling  with  the 
Administration  as  to  who  should  name  the  officers 
of  the  Georgia  troops.  Zebulon  B.  Vance,  the 
newly  elected  Governor  of  North  Carolina  and 
an  anti-Davis  man,  said  to  the  Legislature:  "It  is 
mortifying  to  find  entire  brigades  of  North  Caro 
lina  soldiers  commanded  by  strangers,  and  in 
many  cases  our  own  brave  and  war-worn  colonels 


THE  REACTION  AGAINST  RICHMOND   77 

are  made  to  give  place  to  colonels  from  distant 
States."  In  addition  to  such  indications  of  dis 
content  a  vast  mass  of  evidence  makes  plain  the 
opposition  to  conscription  toward  the  close  of  1862 
and  the  looseness  of  various  parts  of  the  military 
system. 

It  was  a  moment  of  intense  excitement  and  of 
nervous  strain.  The  country  was  unhappy,  for  it 
had  lost  faith  in  the  Government  at  Richmond. 
The  blockade  was  producing  its  effect.  European 
intervention  was  receding  into  the  distance.  One 
of  the  characteristics  of  the  editorials  and  speeches 
of  this  period  is  a  rising  tide  of  bitterness  against 
England.  Napoleon's  proposal  in  November  to 
mediate,  though  it  came  to  naught,  somewhat 
revived  the  hope  of  an  eventual  recognition  of  the 
Confederacy  but  did  not  restore  buoyancy  to  the 
people  of  the  South.  The  Emancipation  Proclama 
tion,  though  scoffed  at  as  a  cry  of  impotence,  none 
the  less  increased  the  general  sense  of  crisis. 

Worst  of  all,  because  of  its  immediate  effect 
upon  the  temper  of  the  time,  food  was  very  scarce 
and  prices  had  risen  to  indefensible  heights.  The 
army  was  short  of  shoes.  In  the  newspapers,  as 
winter  came  on,  were  to  be  found  touching  de 
scriptions  of  Lee's  soldiers  standing  barefoot  in 


78       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

the  snow.  A  flippant  comment  of  Benjamin's,  that 
the  shoes  had  probably  been  traded  for  whiskey, 
did  not  tend  to  improve  matters.  Even  though 
short  of  supplies  themselves,  the  people  as  a  whole 
eagerly  subscribed  to  buy  shoes  for  the  army. 

There  was  widespread  and  heartless  speculation 
in  the  supplies.  Months  previous  the  Courier  had 
made  this  ominous  editorial  remark:  "Specula 
tors  and  monopolists  seem  determined  to  force 
the  people  everywhere  to  the  full  exercise  of  all 
the  remedies  allowed  by  law."  In  August,  1862, 
the  Governor  of  Florida  wrote  to  the  Florida  dele 
gation  at  Richmond  urging  them  to  take  steps  to 
meet  the  "nefarious  smuggling"  of  speculators 
who  charged  extortionate  prices.  In  September, 
he  wrote  again  begging  for  legislation  to  compel 
millers,  tanners,  and  saltmakers  to  offer  their 
products  at  reasonable  rates.  As  these  men  were 
exempt  from  military  duty  because  their  labor 
was  held  to  be  a  public  service,  feeling  against 
them  ran  high.  Governor  Vance  proposed  a  state 
convention  to  regulate  prices  for  North  Carolina 
and  by  proclamation  forbade  the  export  of  pro 
visions  in  order  to  prevent  the  seeking  of  exorbitant 
prices  in  other  markets.  Davis  wrote  to  various 
Governors  urging  them  to  obtain  state  legislation 


THE  REACTION  AGAINST  RICHMOND  79 

to  reduce  extortion  in  the  food  business.  In  the 
provisioning  of  the  army  the  Confederate  Gov 
ernment  had  recourse  to  impressment  and  the 
arbitrary  fixing  of  prices.  Though  the  Attorney- 
General  held  this  action  to  be  constitutional,  it  led 
to  sharp  contentions;  and  at  length  a  Virginia 
court  granted  an  injunction  to  a  speculator  who 
had  been  paid  by  the  Government  for  flour  less 
than  it  had  cost  him. 

In  an  attempt  to  straighten  out  this  tangled 
situation,  the  Confederate  Government  began,  late 
in  1862,  by  appointing  as  its  new  Secretary  of  War,  * 
James  A.  Seddon  of  Virginia  —  at  that  time  high 
in  popular  favor.  The  Mercury  hailed  his  advent 
with  transparent  relief,  for  no  appointment  could 
have  seemed  to  it  more  promising.  Indeed,  as  the 
new  year  (1863)  opened  the  Mercury  was  in  better 
humor  with  the  Administration  than  perhaps  at 
any  other  time  during  the  war.  To  the  President's 
message  it  gave  praise  that  was  almost  cordial. 
This  amicable  temper  was  short-lived,  however, 
and  three  months  later  the  heavens  had  clouded 

1  There  were  in  all  six  Secretaries  of  War:  Leroy  P.  Walker,  until 
September  16,  1861;  Judah  P.  Benjamin,  until  March  18,  1862; 
George  W.  Randolph,  until  November  17,  1862;  Gustavus  W.  Smith 
(temporarily),  until  November  21,  1862;  James  A.  Seddon,  until 
February  6,  1865;  General  John  C.  Breckinridge. 


80       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

again,  for  the  Government  had  entered  upon  a 
course  that  consolidated  the  opposition  in  anger 
and  distrust. 

Early  in  1863  the  Confederate  Government 
presented  to  the  country  a  program  in  which  the 
main  features  were  three.  Of  these  the  two  which 
did  not  rouse  immediate  hostility  in  the  party  of 
the  Examiner  and  the  Mercury  were  the  Impress 
ment  Act  of  March,  1863  (amended  by  successive 
acts),  and  the  act  known  as  the  Tax  in  Kind,  which 
was  approved  the  following  month.  Though  the 
Impressment  Act  subsequently  made  vast  trouble 
for  the  Government,  at  the  time  of  its  passage  its 
beneficial  effects  were  not  denied.  To  it  was 
attributed  by  the  Richmond  Whig  the  rapid  fall 
of  prices  in  April,  1863.  Corn  went  down  at 
Richmond  from  $12  and  $10  a  bushel  to  $4.20, 
and  flour  dropped  in  North  Carolina  from  $45  a 
barrel  to  $25.  Under  this  act  commissioners  were 
appointed  in  each  State  jointly  by  the  Confederate 
President  and  the  Governor  with  the  duty  of 
fixing  prices  for  government  transactions  and  of 
publishing  every  two  months  an  official  schedule 
of  the  prices  to  be  paid  by  the  Government  for  the 
supplies  which  it  impressed. 

The  new  Tax  Act  attempted  to  provide  revenues 


THE  REACTION  AGAINST  RICHMOND  81 

which  should  not  be  paid  in  depreciated  currency. 
With  no  bullion  to  speak  of,  the  Confederate  Con 
gress  could  not  establish  a  circulating  medium  with 
even  an  approximation  to  constant  value.  Realiz 
ing  this  situation,  Memminger  had  advised  falling 
back  on  the  ancient  system  of  tithes  and  the  sup 
port  of  the  Government  by  direct  contributions 
of  produce.  After  licensing  a  great  number  of 
occupations  and  laying  a  property  tax  and  an 
income  tax,  the  new  law  demanded  a  tenth  of  the 
produce  of  all  farmers.  On  this  law  the  Mercury 
pronounced  a  benediction  in  an  editorial  on  The 
Fall  of  Prices,  which  it  attributed  to  "the  healthy 
influence  of  the  tax  bill  which  has  just  become 
law/'1 

Had  these  two  measures  been  the  whole  pro 
gram  of  the  Government,  the  congressional  session 
of  the  spring  of  1863  would  have  had  a  different 
significance  in  Confederate  history.  But  there  was 
a  third  measure  that  provoked  a  new  attack  on  the 
Government.  The  gracious  words  of  the  Mercury 
on  the  tax  in  kind  came  as  an  interlude  in  the 

1  The  fall  of  prices  was  attributed  by  others  to  a  funding  act,  —  one 
of  several  passed  by  the  Confederate  Congress  —  which,  in  March, 
1863,  aimed  by  various  devices  to  contract  the  volume  of  the  currency. 
It  was  very  generally  condemned,  and  it  anticipated  the  yet  more  dras 
tic  measure,  the  Funding  Act  of  1864,  which  will  be  described  later. 
6 


82      THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

midst  of  a  bitter  controversy.  An  editorial  of 
the  12th  of  March  headed  A  Despotism  over  the 
Confederate  States  Proposed  in  Congress  amounted 
to  a  declaration  of  war.  From  this  time  forward 
the  opposition  and  the  Government  drew  steadily 
further  and  further  apart  and  their  antagonism 
grew  steadily  more  relentless. 

What  caused  this  irrevocable  breach  was  a  bill 
introduced  into  the  House  by  Ethelbert  Barksdale 
of  Mississippi,  an  old  friend  of  President  Davis. 
This  bill  would  have  invested  the  President  with 
authority  to  suspend  the  privilege  of  the  writ  of 
habeas  corpus  in  any  part  of  the  Confederacy, 
whenever  in  his  judgment  such  suspension  was 
desirable.  The  first  act  suspending  the  privilege 
of  habeas  corpus  had  long  since  expired  and  applied 
only  to  such  regions  as  were  threatened  with  in 
vasion.  It  had  served  usefully  under  martial  law 
in  cleansing  Richmond  of  its  rogues,  and  also  had 
been  in  force  at  Charleston.  The  Mercury  had 
approved  it  and  had  exhorted  its  readers  to  take 
the  matter  sensibly  as  an  inevitable  detail  of  war. 
Between  that  act  and  the  act  now  proposed  the 
Mercury  saw  no  similarity.  Upon  the  merits  of 
the  question  it  fought  a  furious  journalistic  duel 
with  the  Enquirer,  the  government  organ  at  Rich- 


THE  REACTION  AGAINST  RICHMOND  83 

mond,  which  insisted  that  President  Davis  would 
not  abuse  his  power.  The  Mercury  replied  that  if 
he  "were  a  second  Washington,  or  an  angel  upon 
earth,  the  degradation  such  a  surrender  of  our 
rights  implies  would  still  be  abhorrent  to  every 
freeman."  In  retort  the  Enquirer  pointed  out 
that  a  similar  law  had  been  enacted  by  another 
Congress  with  no  bad  results.  And  in  point  of  fact 
the  Enquirer  was  right,  for  in  October,  1862,  after 
the  expiration  of  the  first  act  suspending  the  priv 
ilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  Congress  passed  a 
second  giving  to  the  President  the  immense  power 
which  was  now  claimed  for  him  again.  This  second 
act  was  in  force  several  months.  Then  the  Mercury 
made  the  astounding  declaration  that  it  had  never 
heard  of  the  second  act,  and  thereupon  proceeded 
to  attack  the  secrecy  of  the  Administration  with 
renewed  vigor. 

On  this  issue  of  reviving  the  expired  second 
Habeas  Corpus  Act,  a  battle  royal  was  fought  in  the 
Confederate  Congress.  The  forces  of  the  Adminis 
tration  defended  the  new  measure  on  the  ground 
that  various  regions  were  openly  seditious  and  that 
conscription  could  not  be  enforced  without  it 
This  argument  gave  a  new  text  for  the  cry  of 
"despotism."  The  congressional  leader  of  the 


84       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

opposition  was  Henry  S.  Foote,  once  the  rival  of 
Davis  in  Mississippi  and  now  a  citizen  of  Tennessee. 
Fierce,  vindictive,  sometimes  convincing,  always 
shrewd,  he  was  a  powerful  leader  of  the  rough  and 
ready,  buccaneering  sort.  Under  his  guidance  the 
debate  was  diverted  into  a  rancorous  discussion  of 
the  conduct  of  the  generals  in  the  execution  of 
martial  law.  Foote  pulled  out  all  the  stops  in  the 
organ  of  political  rhetoric  and  went  in  for  a  chant 
royal  of  righteous  indignation.  The  main  object 
of  this  attack  was  General  Hindman  and  his  doings 
in  Arkansas.  Those  were  still  the  days  of  pam 
phleteering.  Though  General  Albert  Pike  had 
written  a  severe  pamphlet  condemning  Hindman, 
to  this  pamphlet  the  Confederate  Government  had 
shut  its  eyes.  Foote,  however,  flourished  it  in  the 
face  of  the  House.  He  thundered  forth  his  belief 
that  Hindman  was  worse  even  than  the  man  most 
detested  in  the  South,  than  "beast  Butler  himself, 
for  the  latter  is  only  charged  with  persecuting  and 
oppressing  the  avowed  enemies  of  his  Government, 
while  Hindman,  if  guilty  as  charged,  has  practised 
cruelties  unnumbered"  on  his  people.  Other  rep 
resentatives  spoke  in  the  same  vein.  Baldwin 
of  Virginia  told  harrowing  tales  of  martial  law 
in  that  State.  Barksdale  attempted  to  retaliate, 


THE  REACTION  AGAINST  RICHMOND   85 

sarcastically  reminding  him  of  a  recent  scene  of  riot 
and  disorder  which  proved  that  martial  law,  in  any 
effective  form,  did  not  exist  in  Virginia.  He  al 
luded  to  a  riot,  ostensibly  for  bread,  in  which  an 
Amazonian  woman  had  led  a  mob  to  the  pillaging 
of  the  Richmond  jewelry  shops,  a  riot  which  Davis 
himself  had  quelled  by  meeting  the  rioters  and 
threatening  to  fire  upon  them.  But  sarcasm 
proved  powerless  against  Foote.  His  climax  was 
a  lurid  tale  of  a  soldier  who  while  marching  past 
his  own  house  heard  that  his  wife  was  dying,  who 
left  the  ranks  for  a  last  word  with  her,  and  who  on 
rejoining  the  command,  "hoping  to  get  permission 
to  bury  her,"  was  shot  as  a  deserter.  And  there 
was  no  one  on  the  Government  benches  to  antici 
pate  Kipling  and  cry  out  "flat  art!"  Resolutions 
condemning  martial  law  were  passed  by  a  vote  of 
45  to  27. 

Two  weeks  later  the  Mercury  preached  a  burial 
sermon  over  the  Barksdale  Bill,  which  had  now 
been  rejected  by  the  House.  Congress  was  about 
to  adjourn,  and  before  it  reassembled  elections  for 
the  next  House  would  be  held.  "The  measure  is 
dead  for  the  present,"  said  the  Mercury,  "but 
power  is  ever  restive  and  prone  to  accumulate 
power;  and  if  the  war  continues,  other  efforts  will 


86       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

doubtless  be  made  to  make  the  President  a  Dicta 
tor.  Let  the  people  keep  their  eyes  steadily  fixed 
on  their  representatives  with  respect  to  this  vital 
matter;  and  should  the  effort  again  be  made  to 
suspend  the  Habeas  Corpus  Act,  demand  that  a 
recorded  vote  should  show  those  who  shall  strike 
down  their  liberties." 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  CRITICAL  YEAR 

THE  great  military  events  of  the  year  1863  have 
pushed  out  of  men's  memories  the  less  dramatic 
but  scarcely  less  important  civil  events.  To  begin 
with,  in  this  year  two  of  the  greatest  personalities 
in  the  South  passed  from  the  political  stage:  in  the 
summer  Yancey  died;  and  in  the  autumn,  Rhett 
went  into  retirement. 

The  ever  malicious  Pollard  insists  that  Yancey's 
death  was  due  ultimately  to  a  personal  encounter 
with  a  Senator  from  Georgia  on  the  floor  of  the 
Senate.  The  curious  may  find  the  discreditable 
story  embalmed  in  the  secret  journal  of  the  Sen 
ate,  where  are  the  various  motions  designed  to 
keep  the  incident  from  the  knowledge  of  the  world. 
Whether  it  really  caused  Yancey's  death  is  another 
question.  However,  the  moment  of  his  passing  has 
dramatic  significance.  Just  as  the  battle  over  con 
scription  was  fully  begun,  when  the  fear  that  the 

87 


88       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

Confederate  Government  had  arrayed  itself  against 
the  rights  of  the  States  had  definitely  taken  shape, 
when  this  dread  had  been  reenforced  by  the  alarm 
over  the  suspension  of  habeas  corpus,  the  great 
pioneer  of  the  secession  movement  went  to  his 
grave,  despairing  of  the  country  he  had  failed  to 
lead.  His  death  occurred  in  the  same  month  as 
the  Battle  of  Gettysburg,  at  the  very  time  when 
the  Confederacy  was  dividing  against  itself. 

The  withdrawal  of  Rhett  from  active  life  was 
an  incident  of  the  congressional  elections.  He 
had  consented  to  stand  for  Congress  in  the  Third 
District  of  South  Carolina  but  was  defeated.  The 
full  explanation  of  the  vote  is  still  to  be  made 
plain;  it  seems  clear,  however,  that  South  Carolina 
at  this  time  knew  its  own  mind  quite  positively. 
Five  of  the  six  representatives  returned  to  the 
Second  Congress,  including  Rhett's  opponent, 
Lewis  M.  Ayer,  had  sat  in  the  First  Congress. 
The  subsequent  history  of  the  South  Carolina 
delegation  and  of  the  State  Government  shows 
that  by  1863  South  Carolina  had  become,  broadly 
speaking,  on  almost  all  issues  an  anti-Davis  State. 
And  yet  the  largest  personality  and  probably  the 
ablest  mind  in  the  State  was  rejected  as  a  candi 
date  for  Congress.  No  character  in  American 


THE  CRITICAL  YEAR  89 

history  is  a  finer  challenge  to  the  biographer  than 
this  powerful  figure  of  Rhett,  who  in  1861  at  the 
supreme  crisis  of  his  life  seemed  the  master  of  his 
world  and  yet  in  every  lesser  crisis  was  a  com 
parative  failure.  As  in  Yancey,  so  in  Rhett,  there 
was  something  that  fitted  him  to  one  great  moment 
but  did  not  fit  him  to  others.  There  can  be  little 
doubt  that  his  defeat  at  the  polls  of  his  own  dis 
trict  deeply  mortified  him.  He  withdrew  from 
politics,  and  though  he  doubtless,  through  the  edi 
torship  of  one  of  his  sons,  inspired  the  continued 
opposition  of  the  Mercury  to  the  Government, 
Rhett  himself  hardly  reappears  in  Confederate 
history  except  for  a  single  occasion  during  the 
debate  a  year  later  upon  the  burning  question  of 
arming  the  slaves. 

The  year  was  marked  by  very  bitter  attacks 
upon  President  Davis  on  the  part  of  the  opposition 
press.  The  Mercury  revived  the  issue  of  the  con 
duct  of  the  war  which  had  for  some  time  been  over 
shadowed  by  other  issues.  In  the  spring,  to  be 
sure,  things  had  begun  to  look  brighter,  and  Chan- 
cell  orsville  had  raised  Lee's  reputation  to  its 
zenith.  The  disasters  of  the  summer,  Gettysburg 
and  Vicksburg,  were  for  a  time  minimized  by  the 
Government  and  do  not  appear  to  have  caused  the 


90       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

alarm  which  their  strategic  importance  might  well 
have  created.  But  when  in  the  latter  days  of  July 
the  facts  became  generally  known,  the  Mercury 
arraigned  the  President's  conduct  of  the  war  as  "a 
vast  complication  of  incompetence  and  folly"; 
it  condemned  the  whole  scheme  of  the  Northern 
invasion  and  maintained  that  Lee  should  have 
stood  on  the  defensive  while  twenty  or  thirty 
thousand  men  were  sent  to  the  relief  of  Vicksburg. 
These  two  ideas  it  bitterly  reiterated  and  in  August; 
went  so  far  as  to  quote  Macaulay's  famous  passage 
on  Parliament's  dread  of  a  decisive  victory  over 
Charles  and  to  apply  it  to  Davis  in  unrestrained 
language  that  reminds  one  of  Pollard. 

Equally  unrestrained  were  the  attacks  upon 
other  items  of  the  policy  of  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment.  The  Impressment  Law  began  to  be  a  target. 
Farmers  who  were  compelled  to  accept  the  prices 
fixed  by  the  impressment  commissioners  cried  out 
that  they  were  being  ruined.  Men  of  the  stamp  of 
Toombs  came  to  their  assistance  with  railing 
accusations  such  as  this:  "I  have  heard  it  said 
that  we  should  not  sacrifice  liberty  to  independ 
ence,  but  I  tell  you,  my  countrymen,  that  the  two 
are  inseparable.  ...  If  we  lose  our  liberty  we 
shall  lose  our  independence.  ...  I  would  rather 


THE  CRITICAL  YEAR  91 

see  the  whole  country  the  cemetery  of  freedom 
than  the  habitation  of  slaves."  Protests  which 
poured  in  upon  the  Government  insisted  that  the 
power  to  impress  supplies  did  not  carry  with  it  the 
power  to  fix  prices.  Worthy  men,  ridden  by  the 
traditional  ideas  of  political  science  and  unable  to 
modify  these  in  the  light  of  the  present  emergency, 
wailed  out  their  despair  over  the  "usurpation"  of 
Richmond. 

The  tax  in  kind  was  denounced  in  the  same  vein. 
The  licensing  provisions  of  this  law  and  its  income 
tax  did  not  satisfy  the  popular  imagination.  These 
provisions  concerned  the  classes  that  could  borrow. 
The  classes  that  could  not  borrow,  that  had  no 
resources  but  their  crops,  felt  that  they  were  being 
driven  to  the  wall.  The  bitter  saying  went  around 
that  it  was  "a  rich  man's  war  and  a  poor  man's 
fight."  As  land  and  slaves  were  not  directly  taxed, 
the  popular  discontent  appeared  to  have  ground 
for  its  anger.  Furthermore,  it  must  never  be 
forgotten  that  this  was  the  first  general  tax  that 
the  poor  people  of  the  South  were  ever  conscious 
of  paying.  To  people  who  knew  the  tax-gatherer 
as  little  more  than  a  mythical  being,  he  suddenly 
appeared  like  a  malevolent  creature  who  swept  off 
ruthlessly  the  tenth  of  their  produce.  It  is  not 


92       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

strange  that  an  intemperate  reaction  against  the 
planters  and  their  leadership  followed.  The  illu 
sion  spread  that  they  were  not  doing  their  share 
of  the  fighting;  and  as  rich  men  were  permitted  to 
hire  substitutes  to  represent  them  in  the  army,  this 
really  baseless  report  was  easily  propped  up  in  the 
public  mind  with  what  appeared  to  be  reason. 

In  North  Carolina,  where  the  peasant  farmer  was 
a  larger  political  factor  than  in  any  other  State, 
this  feeling  against  the  Confederate  Government 
because  of  the  tax  in  kind  was  most  dangerous. 
In  the  course  of  the  summer,  while  the  military 
fortunes  of  the  Confederacy  were  toppling  at 
Vicksburg  and  Gettysburg,  the  North  Carolina 
farmers  in  a  panic  of  self-preservation  held  numer 
ous  meetings  of  protest  and  denunciation.  They 
expressed  their  thoughtless  terror  in  resolutions 
asserting  that  the  action  of  Congress  "in  secret 
session,  without  consulting  with  their  constituents 
at  home,  taking  from  the  hard  laborers  of  the  Con 
federacy  one-tenth  of  the  people's  living,  instead 
of  taking  back  their  own  currency  in  tax,  is  unjust 
and  tyrannical."  Other  resolutions  called  the  tax 
"unconstitutional,  anti-republican,  and  oppres 
sive";  and  still  others!  pledged  the  farmers  "to 
resist  to  the  bitter  end  any  such  monarchical  tax." 


THE  CRITICAL  YEAR  93 

A  leader  of  the  discontented  in  North  Carolina 
was  found  in  W.  W.  Holden,  the  editor  of  the 
Raleigh  Progress,  who  before  the  war  had  attempted 
to  be  spokesman  for  the  men  of  small  property  by 
advocating  taxes  on  slaves  and  similar  measures. 
He  proposed  as  the  conclusion  of  the  whole  matter 
the  opening  of  negotiations  for  peace.  We  shall  see 
later  how  deep-seated  was  this  singular  delusion 
that  peace  could  be  had  for  the  asking.  In  1863, 
however,  many  men  in  North  Carolina  took  up  the 
suggestion  with  delight.  Jonathan  Worth  wrote 
in  his  diary,  on  hearing  that  the  influential  North 
Carolina  Standard  had  come  out  for  peace:  "I  still 
abhor,  as  I  always  did,  this  accursed  war  and  the 
wicked  men,  North  and  South,  who  inaugurated  it. 
The  whole  country  at  the  North  and  the  South  is  a 
great  military  despotism."  With  such  discontent 
in  the  air,  the  elections  in  North  Carolina  drew 
near.  The  feeling  was  intense  and  riots  occurred. 
Newspaper  offices  were  demolished  —  among  them 
Holden's,  to  destroy  which  a  detachment  of  pass 
ing  soldiers  converted  itself  into  a  mob.  In  the 
western  counties  deserters  from  the  army,  com 
bined  in  bands,  were  joined  by  other  deserters 
from  Tennessee,  and  terrorized  the  countryside. 
Governor  Vance,  alarmed  at  the  progress  which 


94       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

this  disorder  was  making,  issued  a  proclamation 
imploring  his  rebellious  countrymen  to  conduct  in 
a  peaceable  manner  their  campaign  for  the  repeal 
of  obnoxious  laws. 

The  measure  of  political  unrest  in  North  Caro 
lina  was  indicated  in  the  autumn  when  a  new 
delegation  to  Congress  was  chosen.  Of  the  ten 
who  composed  it,  eight  were  new  men.  Though 
they  did  not  stand  for  a  clearly  defined  program, 
they  represented  on  the  whole  anti-Davis  tend 
encies.  The  Confederate  Administration  had 
failed  to  carry  the  day  in  the  North  Carolina 
elections;  and  in  Georgia  there  were  even  more 
sweeping  evidences  of  unrest.  Of  the  ten  repre 
sentatives  chosen  for  the  Second  Congress  nine  had 
not  sat  in  the  First,  and  Georgia  now  was  in  the 
main  frankly  anti-Davis.  There  had  been  set  up 
at  Richmond  a  new  organ  of  the  Government 
called  the  Sentinel,  which  was  more  entirely  under 
the  presidential  shadow  than  even  the  Enquirer 
and  the  Courier.  Speaking  of  the  elections,  the 
Sentinel  deplored  the  "upheaval  of  political  ele 
ments"  revealed  by  the  defeat  of  so  many  tried 
representatives  whose  constituents  had  not  re 
turned  them  to  the  Second  Congress. 

What  was  Davis  doing  while  the  ground  was 


THE  CRITICAL  YEAR  95 

thus  being  cut  from  under  his  feet?  For  one 
thing  he  gave  his  endorsement  to  the  formation 
of  "Confederate  Societies"  whose  members  bound 
themselves  to  take  Confederate  money  as  legal 
tender.  He  wrote  a  letter  to  one  such  society  in 
Mississippi,  praising  it  for  attempting  "by  com 
mon  consent  to  bring  down  the  prices  of  all  articles 
to  the  standard  of  the  soldiers'  wages"  and  adding 
that  the  passion  of  speculation  had  "seduced 
citizens  of  all  classes  from  a  determined  prosecu 
tion  of  the  war  to  an  effort  to  amass  money."  The 
Sentinel  advocated  the  establishment  of  a  law 
fixing  maximum  prices.  The  discussion  of  this 
proposal  seems  to  make  plain  the  raison  d'etre  for 
the  existence  of  the  Sentinel.  Even  such  stanch 
government  organs  as  the  Enquirer  and  the  Courier 
shied  at  the  idea,  but  the  Mercury  denounced  it 
vigorously,  giving  long  extracts  from  Thiers,  and 
discussed  the  mistakes  of  the  French  Revolution 
with  its  "law  of  maximum." 

Davis,  however,  did  not  take  an  active  part  in 
the  political  campaign,  nor  did  the  other  members 
of  the  Government.  It  was  not  because  of  any 
notion  that  the  President  should  not  leave  the 
capital  that  Davis  did  not  visit  the  disaffected 
regions  of  North  Carolina  when  the  startled  popu- 


96       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

lace  winced  under  its  first  experience  with  taxa 
tion.  Three  times  during  his  Administration  Davis 
left  Richmond  on  extended  journeys:  late  in  1862. 
when  Vicksburg  had  become  a  chief  concern  of  the 
Government,  he  went  as  far  afield  as  Mississippi 
in  order  to  get  entirely  in  touch  with  the  military 
situation  in  those  parts;  in  the  month  of  October, 
1863,  when  there  was  another  moment  of  intense; 
military  anxiety,  Davis  again  visited  the  front;  and 
of  a  third  journey  which  he  undertook  in  1864, 
we  shall  hear  in  time.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  each 
of  these  journeys  was  prompted  by  a  military 
motive;  and  here,  possibly,  we  get  an  explanation 
of  his  inadequacy  as  a  statesman.  He  could  not 
lay  aside  his  interest  in  military  affairs  for  the 
supremely  important  concerns  of  civil  office;  and 
he  failed  to  understand  how  to  ingratiate  his 
Administration  by  personal  appeals  to  popular 
imagination. 

In  October,  1863,  —  the  very  month  in  which  his 
old  rival  Rhett  suffered  his  final  defeat,  —  Davis 
undertook  a  journey  because  Bragg,  after  his  great 
victory  at  Chickamauga,  appeared  to  be  letting 
slip  a  golden  opportunity,  and  because  there  were 
reports  of  dissension  among  Bragg's  officers  and 
of  general  confusion  in  his  army.  After  he  had,  as 


THE  CRITICAL  YEAR  97 

he  thought,  restored  harmony  in  the  camp,  Davis 
turned  southward  on  a  tour  of  appeal  and  inspira 
tion.  He  went  as  far  as  Mobile,  and  returning 
bent  his  course  through  Charleston,  where,  at  the 
beginning  of  November,  less  than  two  weeks  after 
Rhett's  defeat,  Davis  was  received  with  all  due 
formalities.  Members  of  the  Rhett  family  were 
among  those  who  formally  received  the  President 
at  the  railway  station.  There  was  a  parade  of  wel 
come,  an  official  reception,  a  speech  by  the  Presi 
dent  from  the  steps  of  the  city  hall,  and  much 
applause  by  friends  of  the  Administratioa  But 
certain  ominous  signs  were  not  lacking.  The 
Mercury,  for  example,  tucked  away  in  an  obscure 
column  its  account  of  the  event,  while  its  rival,  the 
Courier,  made  the  President's  visit  the  feature  of 
the  day. 

Davis  returned  to  Richmond,  early  in  November, 
to  throw  himself  again  with  his  whole  soul  into 
problems  that  were  chiefly  military.  He  did  not 
realize  that  the  crisis  had  come  and  gone  and  that 
he  had  failed  to  grasp  the  significance  of  the  in 
ternal  political  situation.  The  Government  had 
failed  to  carry  the  elections  and  to  secure  a  work 
ing  majority  in  Congress.  Never  again  was  it  to 
have  behind  it  a  firm  and  confident  support.  The 


98       THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

unity  of  the  secession  movement  had  passed  away. 
Thereafter  the  Government  was  always  to  be 
regarded  with  suspicion  by  the  extreme  believers 
in  state  sovereignty  and  by  those  who  were 
sullenly  convinced  that  the  burdens  of  the  war 
were  unfairly  distributed.  And  there  were  not 
wanting  men  who  were  ready  to  construe  each 
emergency  measure  as  a  step  toward  a  coup  d'etat. 


CHAPTER  VI 

LIFE   IN   THE   CONFEDERACY 

WHEN  the  fortunes  of  the  Confederacy  in  both 
camp  and  council  began  to  ebb,  the  life  of  the 
Southern  people  had  already  profoundly  changed. 
The  gallant,  delightful,  care-free  life  of  the  planter 
class  had  been  undermined  by  a  war  which  was 
eating  away  its  foundations.  Economic  no  less 
than  political  forces  were  taking  from  the  planter 
that  ideal  of  individual  liberty  as  dear  to  his  heart 
as  it  had  been,  ages  before,  to  his  feudal  prototype. 
One  of  the  most  important  details  of  the  changing 
situation  had  been  the  relation  of  "the  Government 
to  slavery.  The  history  of  the  Confederacy  had 
opened  with  a  clash  between  the  extreme  advocates 
of  slavery  —  the  slavery-at-any-price  men  —  and 
the  Administration.  The  Confederate  Congress 
had  passed  a  bill  ostensibly  to  make  effective  the 
clause  in  its  constitution  prohibiting  the  African 
slave-trade.  The  quick  eye  of  Davis  had  detected  in 

99 


100     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

it  a  mode  of  evasion,  for  cargoes  of  captured  slaves 
were  to  be  confiscated  and  sold  at  public  auction. 
The  President  had  exposed  this  adroit  subterfuge 
in  his  message  vetoing  the  bill,  and  the  slavery-at- 
any-price  men  had  not  sufficient  influence  in  Con 
gress  to  override  the  veto,  though  they  muttered 
against  it  in  the  public  press. 

The  slavery-at-any-price  men  did  not  again  con 
spicuously  show  their  hands  until  three  years  later 
when  the  Administration  included  emancipation 
in  its  policy.  The  ultimate  policy  of  emancipation 
was  forced  upon  the  Government  by  many  con 
siderations  but  more  particularly  by  the  difficulty 
of  securing  labor  for  military  purposes.  In  a 
country  where  the  supply  of  fighting  men  was 
limited  and  the  workers  were  a  class  apart,  the 
Government  had  to  employ  the  only  available 
laborers  or  confess  its  inability  to  meet  the  indus 
trial  demands  of  war.  But  the  available  laborers 
were  slaves.  How  could  their  services  be  secured? 
By  purchase?  Or  by  conscription?  Or  by  tem 
porary  impressment? 

Though  Davis  and  his  advisers  were  prepared 
to  face  all  the  hazards  involved  in  the  purchase 
or  confiscation  of  slaves,  the  traditional  Southern 
temper  instantly  recoiled  from  the  suggestion.  A 


LIFE  IN  THE  CONFEDERACY          101 

Government  possessed  of  great  numbers  of  slaves, 
whether  bought  or  appropriated,  would  have  in  its 
hands  a  gigantic  power,  perhaps  for  industrial 
competition  with  private  owners,  perhaps  even  for 
organized  military  control.  Besides,  the  Govern 
ment  might  at  any  moment  by  emancipating 
its  slaves  upset  the  labor  system  of  the  country. 
Furthermore,  the  opportunities  for  favoritism  in 
the  management  of  state-owned  slaves  were  beyond 
calculation .  Considerations  such  as  these  therefore 
explain  the  watchful  jealousy  of  the  planters  to 
ward  the  Government  whenever  it  proposed  to  ac 
quire  property  in  slaves. 

It  is  essential  not  to  attribute  this  social-political 
dread  of  government  ownership  of  slaves  merely  to 
the  clutch  of  a  wealthy  class  on  its  property.  Too 
many  observers,  strangely  enough,  see  the  latter 
motive  to  the  exclusion  of  the  former.  Davis 
himself  was  not,  it  would  seem,  free  from  this 
confusion.  He  insisted  that  neither  slaves  nor  land 
were  taxed  by  the  Confederacy,  and  between  the 
lines  he  seems  to  attribute  to  the  planter  class  the 
familiar  selfishness  of  massed  capital.  He  forgot 
that  the  tax  in  kind  was  combined  with  an  income 
tax.  In  theory,  at  least,  the  slave  and  the  land  - 
even  non-farming  land  —  were  taxed.  However, 


102     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

the  dread  o£  a  slave-owning  Government  prevented 
any  effective  plan  for  supplying  the  army  with 
labor  except  through  the  temporary  impressment 
of  slaves  who  were  eventually  to  be  returned  to 
their  owners.  The  policy  of  emancipation  had  to 
wait. 

Bound  up  in  the  labor  question  was  the  question 
of  the  control  of  slaves  during  the  war.  In  the  old 
days  when  there  were  plenty  of  white  men  in  the 
countryside,  the  roads  were  carefully  patrolled  at 
night,  and  no  slave  ventured  to  go  at  large  unless 
fully  prepared  to  prove  his  identity.  But  with  the 
coming  of  war  the  comparative  smallness  of  the 
fighting  population  made  it  likely  from  the  first 
that  the  countryside  everywhere  would  be  stripped 
of  its  white  guardians.  In  that  event,  who  would 
be  left  to  control  the  slaves?  Early  in  the  war  a 
slave  police  was  provided  for  by  exempting  from 
military  duty  overseers  in  the  ratio  approximately 
of  one  white  to  twenty  slaves.  But  the  marvelous 
faithfulness  of  the  slaves,  who  nowhere  attempted 
to  revolt,  made  these  precautions  unnecessary. 
Later  laws  exempted  one  overseer  on  every  planta 
tion  of  fifteen  slaves,  not  so  much  to  perform 
patrol  duty  as  to  increase  the  productivity  of 
plantation  labor. 


LIFE  IN  THE  CONFEDERACY          103 

This  "Fifteen  Slave"  Law  was  one  of  many  in 
stances  that  were  caught  up  by  the  men  of  small 
property  as  evidence  that  the  Government  favored 
the  rich.  A  much  less  defensible  law,  and  one 
which  was  bitterly  attacked  for  the  same  reason, 
was  the  unfortunate  measure  permitting  the  hir 
ing  of  substitutes  by  men  drafted  into  the  army. 
Eventually,  the  clamor  against  this  law  caused  its 
repeal,  but  before  that  time  it  had  worked  untold 
harm  as  apparent  evidence  of  "a  rich  man's  war 
and  a  poor  man's  fight."  Extravagant  stories  of 
the  avoidance  of  military  duty  by  the  ruling  class, 
though  in  the  main  they  were  mere  fairy  tales, 
changed  the  whole  atmosphere  of  Southern  life. 
The  old  glad  confidence  uniting  the  planter  class 
with  the  bulk  of  the  people  had  been  impaired. 
Misapprehension  appeared  on  both  sides.  Too 
much  has  been  said  lately,  however,  in  justifica 
tion  of  the  poorer  classes  who  were  thus  wakened 
suddenly  to  a  distrust  of  the  aristocracy;  and  too 
little  has  been  said  of  the  proud  recoil  of  the  aris 
tocracy  in  the  face  of  a  sudden,  credulous  perver 
sion  of  its  motives  —  a  perversion  inspired  by  the 
pinching  of  the  shoe,  and  yet  a  shoe  that  pinched 
one  class  as  hard  as  it  did  another.  It  is  as  unfair 
to  charge  the  planter  with  selfishness  in  opposing 


104     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

the  appropriation  of  slaves  as  it  is  to  make  the 
same  charge  against  the  small  farmers  for  resisting 
tithes.  In  face  of  the  record,  the  planter  comes  off 
somewhat  the  better  of  the  two;  but  it  must  be 
remembered  that  he  had  the  better  education,  the 
larger  mental  horizon. 

The  Confederacy  had  long  recognized  women 
of  all  classes  as  the  most  dauntless  defenders 
of  the  cause.  The  women  of  the  upper  classes 
passed  without  a  tremor  from  a  life  of  smiling 
ease  to  a  life  of  extreme  hardship.  One  day, 
their  horizon  was  without  a  cloud;  another  day, 
their  husbands  and  fathers  had  gone  to  the  front. 
Their  luxuries  had  disappeared,  and  they  were  re 
duced  to  plain  hard  living,  toiling  in  a  thousand 
ways  to  find  provision  and  clothing,  not  only  for 
their  own  children  but  for  the  poorer  families  of 
soldiers.  The  women  of  the  poor  throughout  the 
South  deserve  similar  honor.  Though  the  phy 
sical  shock  of  the  change  may  not  have  been  so 
great,  they  had  to  face  the  same  deep  realities  — 
hunger  and  want,  anxiety  over  the  absent  sol 
diers,  solicitude  for  children,  grief  for  the  dead. 
One  of  the  pathetic  aspects  of  Confederate  life 
was  the  household  composed  of  several  families, 
all  women  and  children,  huddled  together  with- 


LIFE  IN  THE  CONFEDERACY          105 

out  a  man  or  even  a  half-grown  lad  to  be  their 
link  with  the  mill  and  the  market.  In  those  re 
gions  where  there  were  few  slaves  and  the  exemp 
tion  of  overseers  did  not  operate,  such  households 
were  numerous. 

The  great  privations  which  people  endured 
during  the  Confederacy  have  passed  into  familiar 
tradition.  They  are  to  be  traced  mainly  to  three 
causes:  to  the  blockade,  to  the  inadequate  system 
of  transportation,  and  to  the  heartlessness  of  sjDecui. 
lators.  The  blockade  was  the  real  destroyer  of  the 
South.  Besides  ruining  the  whole  policy  based  on 
King  Cotton,  besides  impeding  to  a  vast  extent  the 
inflow  of  munitions  from  Europe,  it  also  deprived 
Southern  life  of  numerous  articles  which  were  hard 
to  relinquish  —  not  only  such  luxuries  as  tea  and 
coffee,  but  also  such  utter  necessities  as  medicines. 
And  though  the  native  herbs  were  diligently 
studied,  though  the  Government  established  medi 
cal  laboratories  with  results  that  were  not  incon 
siderable,  the  shortage  of  medicines  remained 
throughout  the  war  a  distressing  feature  of  South 
ern  life.  The  Tredegar  Iron  Works  at  Richmond 
and  a  foundry  at  Selma,  Alabama,  were  the  only 
mills  in  the  South  capable  of  casting  the  heavy 
ordnance  necessary  for  military  purposes.  And 


106     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

the  demand  for  powder  mills  and  gun  factories  to 
provide  for  the  needs  of  the  army  was  scarcely 
greater  than  the  demand  for  cotton  mills  and  com 
mercial  foundries  to  supply  the  wants  of  the  civil 
population.  The  Government  worked  without 
ceasing  to  keep  pace  with  the  requirements  of  the 
situation,  and,  in  view  of  the  immense  difficulties 
which  it  had  to  face,  it  was  fairly  successful  in 
supplying  the  needs  of  the  army.  Powder  was 
provided  by  the  Niter  and  Mining  Bureau;  lead 
for  Confederate  bullets  was  collected  from  many 
sources  —  even  from  the  window- weights  of  the 
houses;  iron  was  brought  from  the  mines  of  Ala 
bama;  guns  came  from  newly  built  factories;  and 
machines  and  tools  were  part  of  the  precious 
freight  of  the  blockade-runners.  Though  the 
poorly  equipped  mills  turned  a  portion  of  the 
cotton  crop  into  textiles,  and  though  everything 
that  was  possible  was  done  to  meet  the  needs  of 
the  people,  the  supply  of  manufactures  was  sadly 
inadequate.  The  universal  shortage  was  betrayed 
by  the  limitation  of  the  size  of  most  newspapers  to 
a  single  sheet,  and  the  desperate  situation  clearly 
and  completely  revealed  by  the  way  in  which,  as  a 
last  resort,  the  Confederates  were  compelled  to 
repair  their  railroads  by  pulling  up  the  rails  of  one 


LIFE  IN  THE  CONFEDERACY          107 

road  in  order  to  repair  another  that  the  necessities 
of  war  rendered  indispensable. 

The  rail  way  _syst£m,  if  such  it  can  be  called,  was 
one  of  the  weaknesses  of  the  Confederacy.  Before 
the  war  the  South  had  not  felt  the  need  of  elabo 
rate  interior  communication,  for  its  commerce  in 
the  main  went  seaward,  and  thence  to  New  England 
or  to  Europe.  Hitherto  the  railway  lines  had  seen 
no  reason  for  merging  their  local  character  in 
extensive  combinations.  Owners  of  short  lines 
were  inclined  by  tradition  to  resist  even  the  im 
perative  necessities  of  war  and  their  stubborn 
conservatism  was  frequently  encouraged  by  the 
short-sighted  parochialism  of  the  towns.  The 
same  pitiful  narrowness  that  led  the  peasant 
farmer  to  threaten  rebellion  against  the  tax  in  kind 
led  his  counterpart  in  the  towns  to  oppose  the  War 
Department  in  its  efforts  to  establish  through  rail 
road  lines  because  they  threatened  to  impair  local 
business  interests.  A  striking  instance  of  this  dis 
inclination  towards  cooperation  is  the  action  of 
Petersburg.  Two  railroads  terminated  at  this 
point  but  did  not  connect,  and  it  was  an  ardent 
desire  of  the  military  authorities  to  link  the  two 
and  convert  them  into  one.  The  town,  however, 
unable  to  see  beyond  its  boundaries  and  resolute  in 


108     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

its  determination  to  save  its  transfer  business, 
successfully  obstructed  the  needs  of  the  army.1 

As  a  result  of  this  lack  of  efficient  organization 
an  immense  congestion  resulted  all  along  the  rail 
roads.  Whether  this,  rather  than  a  failure  in 
supply,  explains  the  approach  of  famine  in  the 
latter  part  of  the  war,  it  is  today  very  difficult  to 
determine.  In  numerous  state  papers  of  the  time, 
the  assertion  was  reiterated  that  the  yield  of  food 
was  abundant  and  that  the  sggjrity  nf  fond  at 
many  places,  including  the  cities  and  the  battle 

fronts,  Was  Hup  tO  fMertft  l>n  transport q.fmn       rVr- 

tain  it  is  that  the  progress  of  supplies  from  one 
point  to  another  was  intolerably  slow. 

All  this  want  of  coordination  facilitated  specula 
tion.  We  shall  see  hereafter  how  merciless  this 
speculation  became  and  we  shall  even  hear  of 
profits  on  food  rising  to  more  than  four  hundred 
per  cent.  However,  the  oft-quoted  prices  of  the 
later  years  —  when,  for  instance,  a  pair  of  shoes 
cost  a  hundred  dollars  —  signify  little,  for  they 
rested  on  an  inflated  currency.  None  the  less  they 
inspired  the  witticism  that  one  should  take  money 
to  market  in  a  basket  and  bring  provisions  home 

1  See  an  article  on  The  Confederate  Government  and  the  Railroads  in 
the  American  Historical  Review,  July,  1917,  by  Charles  W.  Ramsdell. 


LIFE  IN  THE  CONFEDERACY          109 

in  one's  pocketbook.  Endless  stories  could  be  told 
of  speculators  hoarding  food  and  watching  un 
moved  the  sufferings  of  a  famished  people.  Said 
Bishop  Pierce,  in  a  sermon  before  the  General 
Assembly  of  Georgia,  on  Fast  Day,  in  March,  1863: 
"Restlessness  and  discontent  prevail.  .  .  .  Ex 
tortion,  pitiless  extortion  is  making  havoc  in  the 
land.  We  are  devouring  each  other.  Avarice  with 
full  barns  puts  the  bounties  of  Providence  under 
bolts  and  bars,  waiting  with  eager  longings  for 
higher  prices.  .  .  .  The  greed  of  gain  .  .  .  stalks 
among  us  unabashed  by  the  heroic  sacrifice  of  our 
women  or  the  gallant  deeds  of  our  soldiers.  Specu 
lation  in  salt  and  bread  and  meat  runs  riot  in 
defiance  of  the  thunders  of  the  pulpit,  and  execu 
tive  interference  and  the  horrors  of  threatened 
famine."  In  1864,  the  Government  found  that 
quantities  of  grain  paid  in  under  the  tax  as  new- 
grown  were  mildewed.  It  was  grain  of  the  previous 
year  which  speculators  had  held  too  long  and  now 
palmed  off  on  the  Government  to  supply  the  army. 
Amid  these  desperate  conditions  the  fate  of 
soldiers'  families  became  everywhere  a  tragedy. 
Unless  the  soldier  was  a  land-owner  his  family  was 
all  but  helpless.  With  a  depreciated  currency  and 
exaggerated  prices,  his  pay,  whatever  his  rank, 


110     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

was  too  little  to  count  in  providing  for  his  de 
pendents.  Local  charity,  dealt  out  by  state  and 
county  boards,  by  relief  associations,  and  by  the 
generosity  of  neighbors,  formed  the  barrier  be 
tween  his  family  and  starvation.  The  landless 
soldier,  with  a  family  at  home  in  desperate  straits, 
is  too  often  overlooked  when  unimaginative  people 
heap  up  the  statistics  of  "desertion"  in  the  latter 
half  of  the  war. 

It  was  in  this  period,  too,  that  amid  the  terrible 
shrinkage  of  the  defensive  lines  "refugeeing"  be 
came  a  feature  of  Southern  life.  From  the  dis 
tricts  over  which  the  waves  of  war  rolled  back  and 
forth  helpless  families  —  women,  children,  slaves 
—  found  precarious  safety  together  with  great 
hardship  by  withdrawing  to  remote  places  which 
invasion  was  little  likely  to  reach.  An  Odyssey 
of  hard  travel,  often  by  night  and  half  secret,  is 
part  of  the  war  tradition  of  thousands  of  Southern 
families.  And  here,  as  always,  the  heroic  women, 
smiling,  indomitable,  are  the  center  of  the  picture. 
Their  flight  to  preserve  the  children  was  no  small 
test  of  courage.  Almost  invariably  they  had  to 
traverse  desolate  country,  with  few  attendants, 
through  forests,  and  across  rivers,  where  the  arm 
of  the  law  was  now  powerless  to  protect  them. 


LIFE  IN  THE  CONFEDERACY          111 

Outlaws,  defiant  of  the  authorities  both  civil  and 
military,  —  ruthless  men  of  whom  we  shall  hear 
again,  —  roved  those  great  unoccupied  spaces  so 
characteristic  of  the  Southern  countryside.  Many 
a  family  legend  preserves  still  the  sense  of  breath 
less  caution,  of  pilgrimage  in  the  night-time  in 
tently  silent  for  fear  of  these  masterless  men. 
When  the  remote  rendezvous  had  been  reached, 
there  a  colony  of  refugees  drew  together  in  a  stead 
fast  despair,  unprotected  by  their  own  fighting  men. 
What  strange  sad  pages  in  the  history  of  Ameri 
can  valor  were  filled  by  these  women  outwardly 
calm,  their  children  romping  after  butterflies  in  a 
glory  of  sunshine,  while  horrid  tales  drifted  in  of 
deeds  done  by  the  masterless  men  in  the  forest  just 
beyond  the  horizon,  and  far  off  on  the  soul's  hori 
zon  fathers,  husbands,  brothers,  held  grimly  the 
lines  of  last  defense! 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  TURNING  OF   THE  TIDE 

THE  buoyancy  of  the  Southern  temper  withstood 
the  shock  of  Gettysburg  and  was  not  overcome  by 
the  fall  of  Vicksburg.  Of  the  far-reaching  signifi 
cance  of  the  latter  catastrophe  in  particular  there 
was  little  immediate  recognition.  Even  Seddon, 
the  Secretary  of  War,  in  November,  reported  that 
"the  communication  with  the  Trans-Mississippi, 
while  rendered  somewhat  precarious  and  insecure, 
is  found  by  no  means  cut  off  or  even  seriously 
endangered."  His  report  was  the  same  sort  of 
thing  as  those  announcements  of  "strategic  re 
treats"  with  which  the  world  has  since  become 
familiar.  He  even  went  so  far  as  to  argue  that  on 
the  whole  the  South  had  gained  rather  than  lost; 
that  the  control  of  the  river  was  of  no  real  value  to 
the  North;  that  the  loss  of  Vicksburg  "has  on  our 
side  liberated  for  general  operations  in  the  field  a 
large  army,  while  it  requires  the  enemy  to  maintain 

112 


THE  TURNING  OF  THE  TIDE          113 

cooped  up,  inactive,  in  positions  insalubrious  to 
their  soldiers,  considerable  detachments  of  their 
forces." 

Seddon  attempted  to  reverse  the  facts,  to  show 
that  the  importance  of  the  Mississippi  in  commerce 
was  a  Northern  not  a  Southern  concern.  He  threw 
light  upon  the  tactics  of  the  time  by  his  descrip 
tion  of  the  future  action  of  Confederate  sharp 
shooters  who  were  to  terrorize  such  commercial 
crews  as  might  attempt  to  navigate  the  river;  he 
also  told  how  light  batteries  might  move  swiftly 
along  the  banks  and,  at  points  commanding  the 
channel,  rain  on  the  passing  steamer  unheralded 
destruction.  He  was  silent  upon  the  really  serious 
matter,  the  patrol  of  the  river  by  Federal  gunboats 
which  rendered  commerce  with  the  Trans-Missis 
sippi  all  but  impossible. 

This  report,  dated  the  26th  of  November,  gives  a 
roseate  view  of  the  war  in  Tennessee  and  enlarges 
upon  that  dreadful  battle  of  Chickamauga  which 
"ranks  as  one  of  the  grandest  victories  of  the  war." 
But  even  as  the  report  was  signed,  Bragg  was  in 
full  retreat  after  his  great  disaster  at  Chattanooga. 
On  the  30th  of  November  the  Administration  at 
Richmond  received  from  him  a  dispatch  that 
closed  with  these  words:  "I  deem  it  due  to  the 


114     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

cause  and  to  myself  to  ask  for  relief  from  command 
and  an  investigation  into  the  causes  of  the  defeat." 
In  the  middle  of  December,  Joseph  E.  Johnston 
was  appointed  to  succeed  him. 

Whatever  had  been  the  illusions  of  the  Govern 
ment,  they  were  now  at  an  end.  There  was  no 
denying  that  the  war  had  entered  a  new  stage  and 
that  the  odds  were  grimly  against  the  South .  Davis 
recognized  the  gravity  of  the  situation,  and  in  his 
message  to  Congress  in  December,  1863,  he  ad 
mitted  that  the  Trans-Mississippi  was  practically 
isolated.  This  was  indeed  a  great  catastrophe,  for 
hereafter  neither  men  nor  supplies  could  be  drawn 
from  the  far  Southwest.  Furthermore,  the  Con 
federacy  had  now  lost  its  former  precious  advan 
tage  of  using  Mexico  as  a  means  of  secret  trade 
with  Europe. 

These  distressing  events  of  the  four  months 
between  Vicksburg  and  Chattanooga  established 
also  the  semi-isolation  of  the  middle  region  of  the 
lower  South.  The  two  States  of  Mississippi  and 
Alabama  entered  upon  the  most  desperate  chapter 
of  their  history.  Neither  in  nor  out  of  the  Con 
federacy,  neither  protected  by  the  Confederate 
lines  nor  policed  by  the  enemy,  they  were  subject 
at  once  to  the  full  rigor  of  the  financial  and  military 


THE  TURNING  OF  THE  TIDE          115 

demands  of  the  Administration  of  Richmond  and 
to  the  full  ruthlessness  of  plundering  raids  from  the 
North.  Nowhere  can  the  contrast  between  the 
warfare  of  that  day  and  the  best  methods  of  our 
own  time  be  observed  more  clearly  than  in  this 
unhappy  region.  At  the  opening  of  1864  the  effec 
tive  Confederate  lines  drew  an  irregular  zigzag 
across  the  map  from  a  point  in  northern  Georgia 
not  far  below  Chattanooga  to  Mobile.  Though 
small  Confederate  commands  still  operated  bravely 
west  of  this  line,  the  whole  of  Mississippi  and  a 
large  part  of  Alabama  were  beyond  aid  from 
Richmond.  But  the  average  man  did  not  grasp 
the  situation.  When  a  region  is  dominated  by 
mobile  armies  the  appearance  of  things  to  the  civil 
ian  is  deceptive.  Because  the  powerful  Federal 
armies  of  the  Southwest,  at  the  opening  of  1864, 
were  massed  at  strategic  points  from  Tennessee  to 
the  Gulf,  and  were  not  extended  along  an  obvious 
trench  line,  every  brave  civilian  would  still  keep 
up  his  hope  and  would  still  insist  that  the  middle 
Gulf  country  was  far  from  subjugation,  that  its 
defense  against  the  invader  had  not  become  hope 
less. 

Under  such  conditions,  when  the  Government  at 
Richmond  called  upon  the  men  of  the  Southwest 


116     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

to  regard  themselves  as  mere  sources  of  supply, 
human  and  otherwise,  mere  feeders  to  a  theater  of 
war  that  did  not  include  their  homes,  it  was  alto 
gether  natural  that  they  should  resent  the  demand. 
All  the  tragic  confusion  that  was  destined  in  the 
course  of  the  fateful  year  1864  to  paralyze  the 
Government  at  Richmond  was  already  apparent 
in  the  middle  Gulf  country  when  the  year  began. 
Chief  among  these  was  the  inability  of  the  State 
and  Confederate  Governments  to  cooperate  ade 
quately  in  the  business  of  conscription.  The  two 
powers  were  determined  rivals  struggling  each  to 
seize  the  major  part  of  the  manhood  of  the  com 
munity.  While  Richmond,  looking  on  the  situa 
tion  with  the  eye  of  pure  strategy,  wished  to  draw 
together  the  full  man-power  of  the  South  in  one 
great  unit,  the  local  authorities  were  bent  on  re 
taining  a  large  part  of  it  for  home  defense. 

In  the  Alabama  newspapers  of  the  latter  half  of 
1863  strange  incidents  are  to  be  found  throwing 
light  on  the  administrative  duel.  The  writ  of 
habeas  corpus,  as  was  so  often  the  case  in  Con 
federate  history,  was  the  bone  of  contention.  We 
have  seen  that  the  second  statute  empowering  the 
President  to  proclaim  martial  law  and  to  suspend 
the  operation  of  the  writ  had  expired  by  limitation 


THE  TURNING  OF  THE  TIDE  117 

in  February,  1863.  The  Alabama  courts  were 
theoretically  in  full  operation,  but  while  the  law 
was  in  force  the  military  authorities  had  acquired 
a  habit  of  arbitrary  control.  Though  warned  from 
Richmond  in  general  orders  that  they  must  not 
take  unto  themselves  a  power  vested  in  the  Presi 
dent  alone,  they  continued  their  previous  course 
of  action.  It  thereupon  became  necessary  to  issue 
further  general  orders  annulling  "all  proclama 
tions  of  martial  law  by  general  officers  and  others" 
not  invested  by  law  writh  adequate  authority. 

Neither  general  orders  nor  the  expiration  of  the 
statute,  however,  seemed  able  to  put  an  end  to 
the  interference  with  the  local  courts  on  the  part 
of  local  commanders.  The  evil  apparently  grew 
during  1863.  A  picturesque  instance  is  recorded 
with  extreme  fullness  by  the  Southern  Advertiser 
in  the  autumn  of  the  year.  In  the  minutely  cir 
cumstantial  account,  we  catch  glimpses  of  one 
Rhodes  moving  heaven  and  earth  to  prove  himself 
exempt  from  military  service.  After  Rhodes  is 
enrolled  by  the  officers  of  the  local  military  ren 
dezvous,  the  sheriff  attempts  to  turn  the  tables  by 
arresting  the  Colonel  in  command.  The  soldiers 
rush  to  defend  their  Colonel,  who  is  ill  in  bed  at  a 
house  some  distance  away.  The  judge  who  had 


118     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

issued  the  writ  is  hot  with  anger  at  this  military 
interference  in  civil  affairs.  Thereupon  the  sol 
diers  seize  him,  but  later,  recognizing  for  some  un 
explained  reason  the  majesty  of  the  civil  law,  they 
release  him.  And  the  hot-tempered  incident  closes 
with  the  Colonel's  determination  to  carry  the  case 
to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  State. 

The  much  harassed  people  of  Alabama  had  still 
other  causes  of  complaint  during  this  same  year. 
Again  the  newspapers  illumine  the  situation.  In 
the  troubled  autumn,  Joseph  Wheeler  swept  across 
the  northern  counties  of  Alabama  and  in  a  daring 
ride,  with  Federal  cavalry  hot  on  his  trail,  reached 
safety  beyond  the  Tennessee  River.  Here  his 
pursuers  turned  back  and,  as  their  horses  had  been 
broken  by  the  swiftness  of  the  pursuit,  returning 
slowly,  they  "gleaned  the  country  "  to  replace  their 
supplies.  Incidentally  they  pounced  upon  the 
town  of  Huntsville.  "Their  appearance  here," 
writes  a  local  correspondent,  "was  so  sudden  and 
.  .  .  the  contradictory  reports  of  their  where 
abouts"  had  been  so  baffling  that  the  townspeople 
had  found  no  time  to  secrete  things.  The  whole 
neighborhood  was  swept  clean  of  cattle  and  almost 
clean  of  provision.  "We*  have  not  enough  left," 
the  report  continues,  "to  haul  and  plow  with  .  .  . 


THE  TURNING  OF  THE  TIDE  11§ 

and  milch  cows  are  non  est."  Including  "  Stanley's 
big  raid  in  July,"  this  was  the  twenty-first  raid 
which  Hunts vflle  had  endured  that  year.  The 
report  closes  with  a  bitter  denunciation  of  the 
people  of  southern  Alabama  who  as  yet  do  not 
know  what  war  means,  who  are  accused  of  com 
plete  hardness  of  heart  towards  their  suffering 
fellowcountrymen  and  of  caring  only  to  make 
money  out  of  war  prices. 

When  Davis  sent  his  message  to  the  Southern 
Congress  at  the  opening  of  the  session  of  1864,  the 
desperate  plight  of  the  middle  Gulf  country  was 
at  once  a  warning  and  a  menace  to  the  Govern 
ment.  If  the  conditions  of  that  debatable  land 
should  extend  eastward,  there  could  be  little 
doubt  that  the  day  of  the  Confederacy  was  nearing 
its  close.  To  remedy  the  situation  west  of  the 
main  Confederate  line,  to  prevent  the  growth  of  a 
similar  condition  east  of  it,  Davis  urged  Congress 
to  revive  the  statute  permitting  martial  law  and 
the  suspension  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus.  The 
President  told  Congress  that  in  parts  of  the  Con 
federacy  "public  meetings  have  been  held,  in  some 
of  which  a  treasonable  design  is  masked  by  a  pre 
tense  of  devotion  of  state  sovereignty,  and  in 
others  is  openly  avowed  ...  a  strong  suspicion 


120     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

is  entertained  that  secret  leagues  and  associations 
are  being  formed.  In  certain  localities  men  of  no 
mean  position  do  not  hesitate  to  avow  their  dis 
loyalty  and  hostility  to  our  cause,  and  their  ad 
vocacy  of  peace  on  the  terms  of  submission  and 
the  abolition  of  slavery." 

This  suspicion  on  the  part  of  the  Confederate 
Government  that  it  was  being  opposed  by  or 
ganized  secret  societies  takes  us  back  to  debatable 
land  and  to  the  previous  year.  The  Bureau  of 
Conscription  submitted  to  the  Secretary  of  War  a 
report  from  its  Alabama  branch  relative  to  "u 
sworn  secret  organization  known  to  exist  and 
believed  to  have  for  its  object  the  encouragement 
of  desertion,  the  protection  of  deserters  from  arrest, 
resistance  to  conscription,  and  perhaps  other  de 
signs  of  a  still  more  dangerous  character."  To 
the  operations  of  this  insidious  foe  were  attributed 
the  shifting  of  the  vote  in  the  Alabama  elections, 
the  defeat  of  certain  candidates  favored  by  the 
Government,  and  the  return  in  their  stead  of  new 
men  "not  publicly  known."  The  suspicions  of  the 
Government  were  destined  to  further  verification 
in  the  course  of  1864  by  the  unearthing  of  a 
treasonable  secret  society  in  southwestern  Virginia, 
the  members  of  which  were  "bound  to  each  other 


THE  TURNING  OF  THE  TIDE          121 

for  the  prosecution  of  their  nefarious  designs  by 
the  most  solemn  oaths.  They  were  under  obliga 
tion  to  encourage  desertions  from  the  army,  and 
to  pass  and  harbor  all  deserters,  escaped  prisoners, 
or  spies;  to  give  information  to  the  enemy  of  the 
movements  of  our  troops,  of  exposed  or  weakened 
positions,  of  inviting  opportunities  of  attack,  and 
to  guide  and  assist  the  enemy  either  in  advance  or 
retreat."  This  society  bore  the  grandiloquent 
name  "Heroes  of  America"  and  had  extended  its 
operations  into  Tennessee  and  North  Carolina. 

In  the  course  of  the  year  further  evidence  was 
collected  which  satisfied  the  secret  service  of  the 
existence  of  a  mysterious  and  nameless  society 
which  had  ramifications  throughout  Tennessee, 
Alabama,  and  Georgia.  A  detective  who  joined 
this  "Peace  Society, "  as  it  was  called,  for  the  pur 
pose  of  betraying  its  secrets,  had  marvelous  tales 
to  tell  of  confidential  information  given  to  him  by 
members,  of  how  Missionary  Ridge  had  been  lost 
and  Vicksburg  had  surrendered  through  the 
machinations  of  this  society. x 

1  What  classes  were  represented  in  these  organizations  it  is  difficult 
if  not  impossible  to  determine.  They  seem  to  have  been  involved  in 
the  singular  "peace  movement"  which  is  yet  to  be  considered.  This 
fact  gives  a  possible  clue  to  the  problem  of  their  membership.  A 
suspiciously  large  number  of  the  "peace"  men  were  original  anti-y 


122     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

In  spite  of  its  repugnance  to  the  suspension  of 
the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  Congress  was  so  im 
pressed  by  the  gravity  of  the  situation  that  early 
in  1864  it  passed  another  act  "to  suspend  the 
privilege  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  in  certain 
cases."  This  was  not  quite  the  same  as  that 
sweeping  act  of  1862  which  had  set  the  Mercury 
irrevocably  in  opposition.  Though  this  act  of 
1864  gave  the  President  the  power  to  order  the 
arrest  of  any  person  suspected  of  treasonable 
practices,  and  though  it  released  military  officers 
from  all  obligation  to  obey  the  order  of  any  civil 
court  to  surrender  a  prisoner  charged  with  treason, 
the  new  legislation  carefully  defined  a  list  of  cases 
in  which  alone  this  power  could  be  lawfully  used. 
This  was  the  last  act  of  the  sort  passed  by  the 
Confederate  Congress,  and  when  it  expired  by 
limitation  ninety  days  after  the  next  meeting  of 
Congress  it  was  not  renewed. 

With  regard  to  the  administration  of  the  army, 
Congress  can  hardly  -be  said  to  have  met  the  Presi 
dent  more  than  half  way.  The  age  of  military 
service  was  lowered  to  seventeen  and  was  raised 

secessionists,  and  though  many,  perhaps  most,  of  these  who  opposed 
secession  became  loyal  servants  of  the  Confederacy,  historians  may 
have  jumped  too  quickly  to  the  assumption  that  the  sincerity  of  all 
of  these  men  was  above  reproach. 


THE  TURNING  OF  THE  TIDE  123 

to  fifty.  But  the  President  was  not  given  — 
though  he  had  asked  for  it  —  general  control  over 
exemptions.  Certain  groups,  such  as  ministers, 
editors,  physicians,  were  in  the  main  exempted; 
one  overseer  was  exempted  on  each  plantation 
where  there  were  fifteen  slaves,  provided  he  gave 
bond  to  sell  to  the  Government  at  official  prices 
each  year  one  hundred  pounds  of  either  beef  or 
bacon  for  each  slave  employed  and  provided  he 
would  sell  all  his  surplus  produce  either  to  the 
Government  or  to  the  families  of  soldiers.  Cer 
tain  civil  servants  of  the  Confederacy  were  also 
exempted  as  well  as  those  whom  the  governors 
of  States  should  "certify  to  be  necessary  for  the 
proper  administration  of  the  State  Government." 
The  President  was  authorized  to  detail  for  non- 
military  service  any  members  of  the  Confederate 
forces  "when  in  his  judgment,  justice,  equity,  and 
necessity,  require  such  details." 

This  statute  retained  two  features  that  had 
already  given  rise  to  much  friction,  and  that  were 
destined  to  be  the  cause  of  much  more.  It  was 
still  within  the  power  of  state  governors  to  impede 
conscription  very  seriously.  By  certifying  that  a 
man  was  necessary  to  the  civil  administration  of  a 
State,  a  Governor  could  place  him  beyond  the 


124     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

legal  reach  of  the  conscripting  officers.  This  pro 
vision  was  a  concession  to  those  who  looked  on 
Davis's  request  for  authority  over  exemption  as 
the  first  step  toward  absolutism.  On  the  other 
hand  the  statute  allowed  the  President  a  free  hand 
in  the  scarcely  less  important  matter  of  "details/' 
Among  the  imperative  problems  of  the  Confederacy, 
where  the  whole  male  population  was  needed  in  the 
public  service,  was  the  most  economical  separation 
of  the  two  groups,  the  fighters  and  the  producers. 
On  the  one  hand  there  was  the  constant  demand 
for  recruits  to  fill  up  the  wasted  armies;  on  the 
other,  the  need  for  workers  to  keep  the  shops  going 
and  to  secure  the  harvest.  The  two  interests  were 
never  fully  coordinated.  Under  the  act  of  1864, 
no  farmer,  mechanic,  tradesman,  between  the  ages 
of  seventeen  and  fifty,  if  fit  for  military  service, 
could  remain  at  his  work  except  as  a  "detail" 
under  orders  of  the  President:  he  might  be  called 
to  the  colors  at  a  moment's  notice.  We  shall  see, 
presently,  how  the  revoking  of  details,  toward  the 
end  of  what  may  truly  be  called  the  terrible  year, 
was  one  of  the  major  incidents  of  Confederate 
history. 

Together  with  the  new  conscription  act,   the 
President  approved  on  February  17,  1864,  a  re- 


THE  TURNING  OF  THE  TIDE  125 

enactment  of  the  tax  in  kind,  with  some  slight 
concessions  to  the  convenience  of  the  farmers.  The 
President's  appeal  for  a  law  directly  taxing  slaves 
and  land  had  been  ignored  by  Congress,  but 
another  of  his  suggestions  had  been  incorporated 
in  the  Funding  Act.  The  state  of  the  currency  was 
now  so  grave  that  Davis  attributed  to  it  all  the 
evils  growing  out  of  the  attempts  to  enforce  im 
pressment.  As  the  value  of  the  paper  dollar  had 
by  this  time  shrunk  to  six  cents  in  specie  and  the 
volume  of  Confederate  paper  was  upward  of  seven 
hundred  millions,  Congress  undertook  to  reduce 
the  volume  and  raise  the  value  by  compelling 
holders  of  notes  to  exchange  them  for  bonds.  By 
way  of  driving  the  note-holders  to  consent  to  the 
exchange,  provision  was  made  for  the  speedy  taxa 
tion  of  notes  for  one-third  their  face  value. 

Such  were  the  main  items  of  the  government 
program  for  1864.  Armed  with  this,  Davis 
braced  himself  for  the  great  task  of  making  head 
against  the  enemies  that  now  surrounded  the  Con 
federacy.  It  is  an  axiom  of  military  science  that 
when  one  combatant  possesses  the  interior  line, 
the  other  can  offset  this  advantage  only  by  exert 
ing  coincident  pressure  all  round,  thus  preventing 
him  from  shifting  his  forces  from  one  front  to 


126     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

another.  On  this  principle,  the  Northern  strate 
gists  had  at  last  completed  their  gigantic  plan  for 
a  general  envelopment  of  the  whole  Confederate 
defense  both  by  land  and  sea.  Grant  opened 
operations  by  crossing  the  Rapidan  and  telegraph 
ing  Sherman  to  advance  into  Georgia. 

The  stern  events  of  the  spring  of  1864  form  such 
a  famous  page  in  military  history  that  the  sober 
civil  story  of  those  months  appears  by  comparison 
lame  and  impotent.  Nevertheless,  the  Confed 
erate  Government  during  those  months  was  at 
least  equal  to  its  chief  obligation:  it  supplied  and 
recruited  the  armies.  With  Grant  checked  at 
Cold  Harbor,  in  June,  and  Sherman  still  unable  to 
pierce  the  western  line,  the  hopes  of  the  Con 
federates  were  high. 

In  the  North  there  was  corresponding  gloom. 
This  was  the  moment  when  all  Northern  oppo 
nents  of  the  war  drew  together  in  their  last  attempt 
to  shatter  the  Lincoln  Government  and  make 
peace  with  the  Confederacy.  The  value  to  the 
Southern  cause  of  this  Northern  movement  for 
peace  at  any  price  was  keenly  appreciated  at  Rich 
mond.  Trusted  agents  of  the  Confederacy  were 
even  then  in  Canada  working  deftly  to  influence 
Northern  sentiment.  The  negotiations  with  those 


THE  TURNING  OF  THE  TIDE          127 

Northern  secret  societies  which  befriended  the 
South  belong  properly  in  the  story  of  Northern 
politics  and  the  presidential  election  of  1864.  They 
were  skillfully  conducted  chiefly  by  Jacob  Thomp 
son  and  C.  C.  Clay.  The  reports  of  these  agents 
throughout  the  spring  and  summer  were  all  hope 
ful  and  told  of  "many  intelligent  men  from  the 
United  States"  who  sought  them  out  in  Canada 
for  political  consultations.  They  discussed  "our 
true  friends  from  the  Chicago  (Democratic)  con 
vention"  and  even  gave  names  of  those  who,  they 
were  assured,  would  have  seats  in  McClellan's 
Cabinet.  They  were  really  not  well  informed  upon 
Northern  affairs,  and  even  after  the  tide  had 
turned  against  the  Democrats  in  September,  they 
were  still  priding  themselves  on  their  diplomatic 
achievement,  still  confident  they  had  helped  or 
ganize  a  great  political  power,  had  "given  a 
stronger  impetus  to  the  peace  party  of  the  North 
than  all  other  causes  combined,  and  had  greatly 
reduced  the  strength  of  the  war  party." 

While  Clay  and  Thompson  built  their  house  of 
cards  in  Canada,  the  Richmond  Government  bent 
anxious  eyes  on  the  western  battle  front.  Sherman, 
though  repulsed  in  his  one  frontal  attack  at  Kene- 
saw  Mountain,  had  steadily  worked  his  way  by 


128     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

the  left  flank  of  the  Confederate  army,  until  in 
early  July  he  was  within  six  miles  of  Atlanta.  All 
the  lower  South  was  a-tremble  with  apprehension. 
Deputations  were  sent  to  Richmond  imploring  the 
removal  of  Johnston  from  the  western  command. 
What  had  he  done  since  his  appointment  in  Decem 
ber  but  retreat?  Such  was  the  tenor  of  public 
opinion.  "It  is  all  very  well  to  talk  of  Fabian 
policy,"  said  one  of  his  detractors  long  afterward, 
"and  now  we  can  see  we  were  rash  to  say  the  least. 
But  at  the  time,  all  of  us  went  wrong  together. 
Everybody  clamored  for  Johnston's  removal." 
Johnston  and  Davis  were  not  friends;  but  the 
President  hesitated  long  before  acting.  And  yet, 
with  each  day,  political  as  well  as  military  necessity 
grew  more  imperative.  Both  at  Washington  and 
Richmond  the  effect  that  the  fighting  in  Georgia 
had  on  Northern  opinion  was  seen  to  be  of  the 
first  importance.  Sherman  was  staking  everything 
to  break  the  Confederate  line  and  take  Atlanta. 
He  knew  that  a  great  victory  would  have  incalcul 
able  effect  on  the  Northern  election.  Davis  knew 
equally  well  that  the  defeat  of  Sherman  would 
greatly  encourage  the  peace  party  in  the  North. 
But  he  had  no  general  of  undoubted  genius  whom 
he  could  put  in  Johnston's  place.  However,  the 


THE  TURNING  OF  THE  TIDE          129 

necessity  for  a  bold  stroke  was  so  undeniable,  and 
Johnston  appeared  so  resolute  to  continue  his 
Fabian  policy,  that  Davis  reluctantly  took  a  des 
perate  chance  and  superseded  him  by  Hood. 

During  August,  though  the  Democratic  con 
vention  at  Chicago  drew  up  its  platform  favoring 
peace  at  any  price,  the  anxiety  of  the  Southern 
President  did  not  abate  his  activities.  The  safety 
of  the  western  line  was  now  his  absorbing  concern. 
And  in  mid-August  that  line  was  turned,  in  a  way, 
by  Farragut's  capture  of  Mobile  Bay.  As  the 
month  closed,  Sherman,  despite  the  furious  blows 
delivered  by  Hood,  was  plainly  getting  the  upper 
hand.  North  and  South,  men  watched  that  tre 
mendous  duel  with  the  feeling  that  the  founda 
tions  of  things  were  rocking.  At  last,  on  the  2d  of 
September,  Sherman,  victorious,  entered  Atlanta. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

A    GAME    OF   CHANCE 

WITH  dramatic  completeness  in  the  summer  and 
autumn  of  1864,  the  foundations  of  the  Confederate 
hope  one  after  another  gave  way.  Among  the 
causes  of  this  catastrophe  was  the  failure  of  the 
second  great  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Confeder 
acy  to  secure  recognition  abroad.  The  subject 
takes  us  back  to  the  latter  days  of  1862,  when  the 
center  of  gravity  in  foreign  affairs  had  shifted 
from  London  to  Paris.  Napoleon  III,  at  the 
height  of  his  strange  career,  playing  half  a  dozen 
dubious  games  at  once,  took  up  a  new  pastime  and 
played  at  intrigue  with  the  Confederacy.  In 
October  he  accorded  a  most  gracious  interview  to 
Slidell.  He  remarked  that  his  sympathies  were 
entirely  with  the  South  but  added  that,  if  he  acted 
alone,  England  might  trip  him  up.  He  spoke  of 
his  scheme  for  joint  intervention  by  England, 
France,  and  Russia.  Then  he  asked  why  we  had 

130 


A  GAME  OF  CHANCE  131 

not  created  a  navy.  Slidell  snapped  at  the  bait. 
He  said  that  the  Confederates  would  be  glad  to 
build  ships  in  France,  that  "if  the  Emperor  would 
give  only  some  kind  of  verbal  assurance  that  the 
police  would  not  observe  too  closely  when  we 
wished  to  put  on  guns  and  men  we  would  gladly 
avail  ourselves  of  it."  To  this,  the  imperial  trick 
ster  replied,  "Why  ceuld  you  not  have  them  built 
as  for  the  Italian  Government?  I  do  not  think  it 
would  be  difficult  but  will  consult  the  Minister  of 
Marine  about  it." 

Slidell  left  the  Emperor's  presence  confident 
that  things  would  happen.  And  they  did.  First 
came  Napoleon's  proposal  of  intervention,  which 
was  declined  before  the  end  of  the  year  by  England 
and  Russia.  Then  came  his  futile  overtures  to-the 
Government  at  Washington,  his  offer  of  mediation 
—  which  was  rejected  early  in  1863.  But  Slidell 
remained  confident  that  something  else  would 
happen.  And  in  this  expectation  also  he  was  not 
disappointed.  The  Emperor  was  deeply  involved 
in  Mexico  and  was  busily  intriguing  throughout 
Europe.  This  was  the  time  when  Erlanger,  stand 
ing  high  in  the  favor  of  the  Emperor,  made  hjs 
gambler's  proposal  to  the  Confederate  authorities 
about  cotton.  Another  of  the  Emperor's  friends 


THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

now  enters  the  play.  On  January  7,  1863,  M.  Ar- 
man,  of  Bordeaux,  "the  largest  shipbuilder  in 
^France,"  had  called  on  the  Confederate  com 
missioner:  M.  Arman  would  be  happy  to  build 
ironclad  ships  for  the  Confederacy,  and  as  to  pay 
ing  for  them,  cotton  bonds  might  do  the  trick. 

No  wonder  Slidell  was  elated,  so  much  so  that 
he  seems  to  have  given  little  heed  to  the  Emperor's 
sinister  intimation  that  the  whole  affair  must  be 
subterranean.  But  the  wily  Bonaparte  had  not 
forgotten  that  six  months  earlier  he  had  issued  a 
decree  of  neutrality  forbidding  Frenchmen  to  take 
commissions  from  either  belligerent  "for  the  ar 
mament  of  vessels  of  war  or  to  accept  letters  of 
marque,  or  to  cooperate  in  any  way  whatsoever  in 
the  equipment  or  arming  of  any  vessel  of  war  or  cor 
sair  of  either  belligerent."  He  did  not  intend  to 
abandon  publicly  this  cautious  attitude  —  at  least, 
not  for  the  present.  And  while  Slidell  at  Paris  was 
completely  taken  in,  the  cooler  head  of  A.  Dudley 
Mann,  Confederate  commissioner  at  Brussels,  saw 
what  an  international  quicksand  was  the  favor  of 
Napoleon.  It  was  about  this  time  that  Napoleon, 
having  dispatched  General  Forey  with  a  fresh  army 
to  Mexico,  wrote  the  famous  letter  which  gave 
notice  to  the  world  of  what  he  was  about.  Mann 


A  GAME  OF  CHANCE  133 

wrote  home  in  alarm  that  the  Emperor  might  be 
expected  to  attempt  recovering  Mexico's  ancient 
areas  including  Texas.  Slidell  saw  in  the  Forey 
letter  only  "views  .  .  .  which  will  not  be  gratify 
ing  to  the  Washington  Government." 

The  adroit  Arman,  acting  on  hints  from  high 
officers  of  the  Government,  applied  for  permission 
to  build  and  arm  ships  of  war,  alleging  that  he  in 
tended  to  send  them  to  the  Pacific  and  sell  them 
to  either  China  or  Japan.  To  such  a  laudable  ex 
pression  of  commercial  enterprise,  one  of  his  fel 
lows  in  the  imperial  ring,  equipped  with  proper 
authority  under  Bonaparte,  hastened  to  give  offi 
cial  approbation,  and  Erlanger  came  forward  by 
way  of  financial  backer.  There  were  conferences  of 
Confederate  agents;  contracts  were  signed;  plans 
were  agreed  upon;  and  the  work  was  begun. 

There  was  no  more  hopeful  man  in  the  Con 
federate  service  than  Slidell  when,  in  the  full  flush 
of  pride  after  Chancellorsville,  he  appealed  to  the 
Emperor  to  cease  waiting  on  other  powers  and 
recognize  the  Confederacy.  Napoleon  accorded 
another  gracious  interview  but  still  insisted  that  it 
was  impossible  for  him  to  act  alone.  He  said  that 
he  was  "more  fully  convinced  than  ever  of  the 
propriety  of  a  general  recognition  by  the  European 


134     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

powers  of  the  Confederate  States  but  that  the 
commerce  of  France  and  the  interests  of  the  Mexi 
can  expedition  would  be  jeopardized  by  a  rupture 
with  the  United  States"  and  unless  England  would 
stand  by  him  he  dared  not  risk  such  an  eventuality. 
In  point  of  fact,  he  was  like  a  speculator  who  is 
"hedging"  on  the  stock  exchange,  both  buying  and 
selling,  and  trying  to  make  up  his  mind  on  which 
cast  to  stake  his  fortune.  At  the  same  time  he 
threw  out  once  more  the  sinister  caution  about 
the  ships.  He  said  that  the  ships  might  be  built 
in  France  but  that  their  destination  must  be 
concealed. 

That  Napoleon's  choice  just  then,  if  England 
had  supported  him,  would  have  been  recognition 
of  the  Confederacy,  cannot  be  doubted.  The 
tangle  oi  intrigue  which  he  called  his  foreign  policy 
was  not  encouraging.  He  was  deeply  involved  in 
Italian  politics,  where  the  daring  of  Garibaldi  had 
reopened  the  struggle  between  clericals  and  liberals. 
In  France  itself  the  struggle  between  parties  was 
keen.  Here,  as  in  the  American  imbroglio,  he 
found  it  hard  to  decide  with  which  party  to  break. 
The  chimerical  scheme  of  a  Latin  empire  in  Mexico 
was  his  spectacular  device  to  catch  the  imagina 
tion,  and  incidentally  the  pocketbook,  of  every- 


A  GAME  OF  CHANCE  135 

body.  But  in  order  to  carry  out  this  enterprise 
he  must  be  able  to  avert  or  withstand  the  certain 
hostility  of  the  United  States.  Therefore,  as  he 
told  Slidell,  "no  other  power  than  England  pos 
sessed  a  sufficient  navy"  to  pull  his  chestnuts  out 
of  the  fire.  The  moment  was  auspicious,  for  there 
was  a  revival  of  the  "Southern  party  "  in  England. 
The  sailing  of  the  Alabama  from  Liverpool  during 
the  previous  summer  had  encouraged  the  Confeder 
ate  agents  and  their  British  friends  to  undertake 
further  shipbuilding. 

While  M.  Arman  was  at  work  in  France,  the 
Laird  Brothers  were  at  work  in  England  and  their 
dockyards  contained  two  ironclad  rams  supposed 
to  outclass  any  vessels  of  the  United  States  navy. 
Though  every  effort  had  been  made  to  keep  secret 
the  ultimate  destination  of  these  rams,  the  vigi 
lance  of  the  United  States  minister,  reinforced  by 
the  zeal  of  the  "Northern  party,"  detected  strong 
circumstantial  evidence  pointing  toward  a  Con 
federate  contract  with  the  Lairds.  A  popular  agi 
tation  ensued  along  with  demands  upon  the  Gov 
ernment  to  investigate.  To  mask  the  purposes  of 
the  Lairds,  Captain  James  Bullock,  the  able  special 
agent  of  the  Confederate  navy,  was  forced  to  fall 
back  upon  the  same  tactics  that  \^ere  being  used 


136     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

across  the  Channel,  and  to  sell  the  rams,  on  paper, 
to  a  firm  in  France.  Neither  he  nor  Slidell  yet 
appreciated  what  a  doubtful  refuge  was  the 
shadow  of  Napoleon's  wing. 

Nevertheless  the  British  Government,  by  this 
time  practically  alined  with  the  North,  continued 
its  search  for  the  real  owner  of  the  Laird  rams. 
The  "Southern  party,"  however,  had  not  quite 
given  up  hope,  and  the  agitation  to  prevent  the 
sailing  of  the  rams  was  a  keen  spur  to  its  flagging 
zeal.  Furthermore  the  prestige  of  Lee  never  was 
higher  than  it  was  in  June,  1863,  when  the  news  of 
Chancellorsville  was  still  fresh  and  resounding  in 
every  mind.  It  had  given  new  life  to  the  Con 
federate  hope:  Lee  would  take  Washington  before 
the  end  of  the  summer;  the  Laird  rams  would  go  to 
sea;  the  Union  would  be  driven  to  the  wall.  So 
reasoned  the  ardent  friends  of  the  South.  But  one 
thing  was  lacking  —  a  European  alliance.  What 
a  time  for  England  to  intervene! 

Whil^Slidell  was  talking  with  the  Emperor,  he 
had  in  his  pocket  a  letter  from  J.  A.  Roebuck,  an 
English  politician  who  wished  to  force  the  issue 
in  the  House  of  Commons.  As  a  preliminary  to 
moving  the  recognition  of  the  Confederacy,  he 
wanted  authority  to  deny  a  rumor  going  the 


A  GAME  OF  CHANCE  137 

rounds  in  London,  to  the  effect  that  Napoleon  had 
taken  position  against  intervention.  Napoleon, 
when  he  had  seen  the  letter,  began  a  negotiation  of 
some  sort  with  this  politician.  It  is  needless  to 
enter  into  the  complications  that  ensued,  the  sub 
sequent  recriminations,  and  the  question  as  to  just 
what  Napoleon  promised  at  this  time  and  how 
many  of  his  promises  he  broke.  He  was  a  diplomat 
of  the  old  school,  the  school  of  lying  as  a  fine  art. 
He  permitted  Roebuck  to  come  over  to  Paris  for 
an  audience,  and  Roebuck  went  away  with  the  im 
pression  that  Napoleon  could  be  relied  upon  to 
back  up  a  new  movement  for  recognition.  When, 
however,  Roebuck  brought  the  matter  before  the 
Commons  at  the  end  of  the  month  and  encountered 
an  opposition  from  the  Government  that  seemed  to 
imply  an  understanding  with  Napoleon  which  was 
different  from\his  own,  he  withdrew  his  motion  (in 
July).  Once  mdfce  the  scale  turned  against  the  Con 
federacy,  and  Gettysburg  was  supplemented  by  the 
seizure  of  the  Laird  rams  by  the  British  authorities. 
These  events  explain  the  bitter  turn  given  to  Con 
federate  feeling  toward  England  in  the  latter  part 
of  1863.  On  the  4th  of  August  Benjamin  wrote  to 
Mason  that  "the  perusal  of  the  recent  debates  in 
Parliament  satisfies  the  President"  that  Mason's 


138     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

"continued  residence  in  London  is  neither  con 
ducive  to  the  interests  nor  consistent  with  the 
dignity  of  this  government,"  andxdirected  him  to 
withdraw  to  Paris. 

Confederate  feeling,  as  it  cooled  toward  England, 
warmed  toward  France.  Napoleon's  Mexican 
scheme,  including  the  offer  of  a  ready-made  im 
perial  crown  to  Maximilian,  the  brother  of  the 
Emperor  of  Austria,  was  fully  understood  at  Rich 
mond;  and  with  Napoleon's  need  of  an  American 
ally,  Southern  hope  revived.  It  was  further 
strengthened  by  a  pamphlet  which  was  translated 
and  distributed  in  the  South  as  a  newspaper  article 
under  the  title  France,  Mexico,  and  the  Confederate 
States.  The  reputed  author,  Michel  Chevalier, 
was  an  imperial  senator,  another  member  of  the 
Napoleon  ring,  and  highly  trusted  by  his  shifty 
master.  The  pamphlet,  which  emphasized  the 
importance  of  Southern  independence  as  a  condi 
tion  of  Napoleon's  "beneficent  aims"  in  Mexico, 
was  held  to  have  been  inspired,  and  the  im 
perial  denial  was  regarded  as  a  mere  matter  of 
form. 

What  appeared  to  be  significant  of  the  temper  of 
the  Imperial  Government  was  a  decree  of  a  French 
court  in  the  case  of  certain  merchants  who  sought 


A  GAME  OF  CHANCE  139 

to  recover  insurance  on  wine  dispatched  to  America 
and  destroyed  in  a  ship  taken  by  the  Alabama. 
Their  plea  was  that  they  were  insured  against  loss 
by  "pirates."  The  court  dismissed  their  suit  and 
assessed  costs  against  them.  Further  evidence  of 
Napoleon's  favor  was  the  permission  given  to  the 
Confederate  cruiser  Florida  to  repair  at  Brest  and 
even  to  make  use  of  the  imperial  dockyard.  The 
very  general  faith  in  Napoleon's  promises  was 
expressed  by  Davis  in  his  message  to  Congress  in 
December:  "Although  preferring  our  own  govern 
ment  and  institutions  to  those  of  other  countries, 
we  can  have  no  disposition  to  contest  the  exercise 
by  them  of  the  same  right  of  self-government  which 
we  assert  for  ourselves.  If  the  Mexican  people 
prefer  a  monarchy  to  a  republic,  it  is  our  plain 
duty  cheerfully  to  acquiesce  in  their  decision  and 
to  evince  a  sincere  and  friendly  interest  in  their 
prosperity.  .  .  .  The  Emperor  of  the  French  has 
solemnly  disclaimed  any  purpose  to  impose  on 
Mexico  a  form  of  government  not  acceptable  to 
the  nation.  ..."  In  January,  1864,  hope  of 
recognition  through  support  of  Napoleon's  Mexi 
can  policy  moved  the  Confederate  Congress  to 
adopt  resolutions  providing  for  a  Minister  to  the 
Mexican  Empire  and  giving  him  instructions  with 


140     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

regard  to  a  presumptive  treaty.  To  the  new  post 
Davis  appointed  General  William  Preston. 

But  what,  while  hope  was  springing  high  in 
America,  was  taking  place  in  France?  So  far  as 
the  world  could  say,  there  was  little  if  anything  to 
disturb  the  Confederates;  and  yet,  on  the  horizon, 
a  cloud  the  size  of  a  man's  hand  had  appeared. 
M.  Arman  had  turned  to  another  member  of  the 
Legislative  Assembly,  a  sound  Bonapartist  like 
himself,  M.  Voruz,  of  Nantes,  to  whom  he  had 
sublet  a  part  of  the  Confederate  contract.  The 
truth  about  the  ships  and  their  destination  thus 
became  part  of  the  archives  of  the  Voruz  firm.  No 
phase  of  Napoleonic  intrigue  could  go  very  far 
without  encountering  dishonesty,  and  to  the  con 
fidential  clerk  of  M.  Voruz  there  occurred  the 
bright  idea  of  doing  something  for  himself  with 
this  valuable  diplomatic  information.  One  fine 
day  the  clerk  was  missing  and  with  him  certain 
papers.  Then  there  ensued  a  period  of  months 
during  which  the  firm  and  their  employers  could 
only  conjecture  the  full  extent  of  their  loss. 

In  reality,  from  the  Confederate  point  of  view, 
everything  was  lost.  Again  the  episode  becomes 
too  complex  to  be  followed  in  detail.  Suffice  it  to 
say  that  the  papers  were  sold  to  the  United  States; 


A  GAME  OF  CHANCE  141 

that  the  secret  was  exposed;  that  the  United 
States  made  a  determined  assault  upon  the  Im 
perial  Government.  In  the  midst  of  this  entangle 
ment,  Slidell  lost  his  head,  for  hope  deferred  when 
apparently  within  reach  of  its  end  is  a  dangerous 
councilor  of  state.  In  his  extreme  anxiety,  Slidell 
sent  to  the  Emperor  a  note  the  blunt  rashness  of 
which  the  writer  could  not  have  appreciated.  Say 
ing  that  he  feared  the  Emperor's  subordinates 
might  play  into  the  hands  of  Washington,  he  threw 
his  fat  in  the  fire  by  speaking  of  the  ships  as  "now 
being  constructed  at  Bordeaux  and  Nantes  for  the 
government  of  the  Confederate  States"  and  vir 
tually  claimed  of  Napoleon  a  promise  to  let  them 
go  to  sea.  Three  days  later  the  Minister  of  For 
eign  Affairs  took  him  sharply  to  task  because 
of  this  note,  reminding  him  that  "what  had 
passed  with  the  Emperor  was  confidential"  and 
dropping  the  significant  hint  that  France  could 
not  be  forced  into  war  by  "indirection."  Ac 
cording  to  Slidell's  version  of  the  interview  "the 
Minister's  tone  changed  completely"  when  Slidell 
replied  with  "a  detailed  history  of  the  affair  show 
ing  that  the  idea  originated  with  the  Emperor." 
Perhaps  the  Minister  knew  more  than  he  chose 
to  betray. 


142     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

From  this  hour  the  game  was  up.  Napoleon's 
purpose  all  along  seems  to  have  been  quite  plain. 
He  meant  to  help  the  South  to  win  by  itself,  and, 
after  it  had  won,  to  use  it  for  his  own  advantage. 
So  precarious  was  his  position  in  Europe  that  he 
dared  not  risk  an  American  war  without  England's 
aid,  and  England  had  cast  the  die.  In  this  way, 
secrecy  was  the  condition  necessary  to  continued 
building  of  the  ships.  Now  that  the  secret  was  out, 
Napoleon  began  to  shift  his  ground.  He  sounded 
the  Washington  Government  and  found  it  sus 
piciously  equivocal  as  to  Mexico.  To  silence  the 
French  republicans,  to  whom  the  American  minis 
ter  had  supplied  information  about  the  ships, 
Napoleon  tried  at  first  muzzling  the  press.  But  as 
late  as  February,  1864,  he  was  still  carrying  water 
on  both  shoulders.  His  Minister  of  Marine  notified 
the  builders  that  they  must  get  the  ships  out  of 
France,  unarmed,  under  fictitious  sale  to  some 
neutral  country.  The  next  month,  reports  which 
the  Confederate  commissioners  sent  home  became 
distinctly  alarming.  Mann  wrote  from  Brussels: 
"Napoleon  has  enjoined  upon  Maximilian  to  hold 
no  official  relations  with  our  commissioners  in 
Mexico."  Shortly  after  this  Slideil  received  a  shock 
that  was  the  beginning  of  the  end:  Maximilian, 


A  GAME  OF  CHANCE  143 

on  passing  through  Paris  on  his  way  to  Mexico, 
refused  to  receive  him. 

The  Mexican  project  was  now  being  condemned 
by  all  classes  in  France.  Nevertheless,  the  Govern 
ment  was  trying  to  float  a  Mexican  loan,  and  it  is 
hardly  fanciful  to  think  that  on  this  loan  the  last 
hope  of  the  Confederacy  turned.  Despite  the 
popular  attitude  toward  Mexico,  the  loan  was 
going  well  when  the  House  of  Representatives  of 
the  United  States  dealt  the  Confederacy  a  stagger 
ing  blow.  It  passed  unanimous  resolutions  in  the 
most  grim  terms,  denouncing  the  substitution  of 
monarchical  for  republican  government  in  Mexico 
under  European  auspices.  When  this  action  was 
reported  in  France,  the  Mexican  loan  collapsed. 

Napoleon's  Italian  policy  was  now  moving 
rapidly  toward  the  crisis  which  it  reached  during 
the  following  summer  when  he  surrendered  to  the 
opposition  and  promised  to  withdraw  the  French 
troops  from  Rome. ,  In  May,  when  the  loan  col 
lapsed,  there  was  nothing  for  it  but  to  throw  over 
his  dear  friends  of  the  Confederacy.  Presently  he 
had  summoned  Arman  before  him,  "rated  him 
severely,"  and  ordered  him  to  make  bonafide  sales 
of  the  ships  to  neutral  powers.  The  Minister  of 
Marine  professed  surprise  and  indignation  at 


144     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

Annan's  trifling  with  the  neutrality  of  the  Imperial 
Government.  And  that  practically  was  the  end 
of  the  episode. 

Equally  complete  was  the  breakdown  of  the 
Confederate  negotiations  with  Mexico.  General 
Preston  was  refused  recognition.  In  those  fierce 
days  of  July  when  the  fate  of  Atlanta  was  in  the 
balance,  the  pride  and  despair  of  the  Confederate 
Government  flared  up  in  a  haughty  letter  to  Pres 
ton  reminding  him  that  "it  had  never  been  the 
intention  of  this  Government  to  offer  any  argu 
ments  to  the  new  Government  of  Mexico  .  .  .  nor 
to  place  itself  in  any  attitude  other  than  that  of 
complete  equality, "  and  directing  him  to  make  no 
further  overtures  to  the  Mexican  Emperor. 

And  then  came  the  debacle  in  Georgia.  On  that 
same  20th  of  September  when  Benjamin  poured 
out  in  a  letter  to  Slidell  his  stored-up  bitterness 
denouncing  Napoleon,  Davis,  feeling  the  last  crisis 
was  upon  him,  left  Richmond  to  join  the  army  in 
Georgia.  His  frame  of  mind  he  had  already  ex 
pressed  when  he  said,  "We  have  no  friends 
abroad." 


CHAPTER  IX 

DESPERATE   REMEDIES 

THE  loss  of  Atlanta  was  the  signal  for  another  con 
flict  of  authority  within  the  Confederacy.  Georgia 
was  now  in  the  condition  in  which  Alabama  had 
found  herself  in  the  previous  year.  A  great  mobile 
army  of  invaders  lay  encamped  on  her  soil.  And 
yet  there  was  still  a  state  Government  established 
at  the  capital.  Inevitably  the  man  who  thought 
of  the  situation  from  the  point  of  view  of  what  we 
should  now  call  the  general  staff,  and  the  man  who 
thought  of  it  from  the  point  of  view  of  a  citizen  of 
the  invaded  State,  suffered  each  an  intensification 
of  feeling,  and  each  became  determined  to  solve  the 
problem  in  his  own  way.  The  President  of  the 
Confederacy  and  the  Governor  of  Georgia  repre 
sented  these  incompatible  points  of  view. 

The  Governor,  Joseph  E.  Brown,  is  one  of  the 
puzzling  figures  of  Confederate  history.  We  have 
already  encountered  him  as  a  dogged  opponent  of 

10  145 


146     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

the  Administration.  With  the  whole  fabric  of 
Southern  life  toppling  about  his  ears,  Brown  argued, 
quibbled,  evaded,  and  became  a  rallying-point  of 
disaffection.  That  more  eminent  Georgian,  Ho  well 
Cobb,  applied  to  him  very  severe  language,  and 
they  became  engaged  in  a  controversy  over  that 
provision  of  the  Conscription  Act  which  exempted 
state  officials  from  military  service.  While  the 
Governor  of  Virginia  was  refusing  certificates  of 
exemption  to  the  minor  civil  officers  such  as  justices 
of  the  peace,  Brown  by  proclamation  promised  his 
"protection"  to  the  most  insignificant  civil  ser 
vants.  "Will  even  your  Excellency,"  demanded 
Cobb,  "certify  that  in  any  county  of  Georgia 
twenty  justices  of  the  peace  and  an  equal  number 
of  constables  are  necessary  for  the  proper  adminis 
tration  of  the  state  government?"  The  Bureau 
of  Conscription  estimated  that  Brown  kept  out  of 
the  army  approximately  8000  eligible  men.  The 
truth  seems  to  be  that  neither  by  education  nor 
heredity  was  this  Governor  equipped  to  conceive 
large  ideas.  He  never  seemed  conscious  of  the 
war  as  a  whole,  or  of  the  Confederacy  as  a  whole. 
To  defend  Georgia  and,  if  that  could  not  be  done, 
to  make  peace  for  Georgia  —  such  in  the  mind 
of  Brown  was  the  aim  of  the  war.  His  restless 


DESPERATE  REMEDIES  147 

jealousy  of  the  Administration  finds  its  explanation 
in  his  fear  that  it  would  denude  his  State  of  men. 
The  seriousness  of  Governor  Brown's  opposition 
became  apparent  within  a  week  of  the  fall  of 
Atlanta.  Among  Hood's  forces  were  some  10,000 
Georgia  militia.  Brown  notified  Hood  that  these 
troops  had  been  called  out  solely  with  a  view  to  the 
defense  of  Atlanta,  that  since  Atlanta  had  been 
lost  they  must  now  be  permitted  "to  return  to  their 
homes  and  look  for  a  time  after  important  in 
terests,"  and  that  therefore  he  did  "withdraw  said 
organizations"  from  Hood's  command.  In  other 
words,  Brown  was  afraid  that  they  might  be  taken 
out  of  the  State.  By  proclamation  he  therefore 
gave  the  militia  a  furlough  of  thirty  days.  Pre 
vious  to  the  issue  of  this  proclamation,  Seddon  had 
written  to  Brown  making  requisition  for  his 
10,000  militia  to  assist  in  a  pending  campaign 
against  Sherman.  Two  days  after  his  proclama 
tion  had  appeared,  Brown,  in  a  voluminous  letter 
full  of  blustering  rhetoric  and  abounding  in  sneers 
at  the  President,  demanded  immediate  reinforce 
ments  by  order  of  the  President  and  threatened 
that,  if  they  were  not  sent,  he  would  recall  the 
Georgia  troops  from  the  army  of  Lee  and  would 
command  "all  the  sons  of  Georgia  to  return  to 


148     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

their  own  State  and  within  their  own  limits  to  rally 
round  her  glorious  flag." 

So  threatening  was  the  situation  in  Georgia  that 
Davis  attempted  to  take  it  into  his  own  hands. 
In  a  grim  frame  of  mind  he  left  Richmond  for  the 
front.  The  resulting  military  arrangements  do  not 
of  course  belong  strictly  to  the  subject-matter  of 
this  volume;  but  the  brief  tour  of  speechmaking 
which  Davis  made  in  Georgia  and  the  interior  of 
South  Carolina  must  be  noticed;  for  his  purpose 
seems  to  have  been  to  put  the  military  point  of 
view  squarely  before  the  people.  He  meant  them 
to  see  how  the  soldier  looked  at  the  situation,  ignor 
ing  all  demands  of  locality,  of  affiliation,  of  hard 
ship,  and  considering  only  how  to  meet  and  beat 
the  enemy.  In  his  tense  mood  he  was  not  always 
fortunate  in  his  expressions.  At  Augusta,  for 
example,  he  described  Beauregard,  whom  he  had 
recently  placed  in  general  command  over  Georgia 
and  South  Carolina,  as  one  who  would  do  whatever 
the  President  told  him  to  do.  But  this  idea  of 
military  self-effacement  was  not  happily  worded, 
and  the  enemies  of  Davis  seized  on  his  phraseology 
as  further  evidence  of  his  instinctive  autocracy. 
The  Mercury  compared  him  to  the  Emperor  of 
Russia  and  declared  the  tactless  remark  to  be  "as 


DESPERATE  REMEDIES  149 

insulting  to  General  Beauregard  as  it  is  false  and 
presumptuous  in  the  President." 

Meanwhile  Beauregard  was  negotiating  with 
Brown.  Though  they  came  to  an  understanding 
about  the  disposition  of  the  militia,  Brown  still 
tried  to  keep  control  of  the  state  troops.  When 
Sherman  was  burning  Atlanta  preparatory  to  the 
March  to  the  Sea,  Brown  addressed  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  War  another  interminable  epistle,  denounc 
ing  the  Confederate  authorities  and  asserting  his 
willingness  to  fight  both  the  South  and  the  North 
if  they  did  not  both  cease  invading  his  rights.  But 
the  people  of  Georgia  were  better  balanced  than 
their  Governor.  Under  the  leadership  of  such  men 
as  Cobb  they  rose  to  the  occasion  and  did  their 
part  in  what  proved  a  vain  attempt  to  conduct  a 
"people's  war."  Their  delegation  at  Richmond 
sent  out  a  stirring  appeal  assuring  them  that  Davis 
was  doing  for  them  all  it  was  possible  to  do.  "Let 
every  man  fly  to  arms,"  said  the  appeal.  "Re 
move  your  negroes,  horses,  cattle,  and  provisions 
from  before  Sherman's  army,  and  burn  what  you 
cannot  carry.  Burn  all  bridges  and  block  up  the 
roads  in  his  route.  Assail  the  invader  in  front, 
flank,  and  rear,  by  night  and  by  day.  Let  him 
have  no  rest." 


150     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

The  Richmond  Government  was  unable  to  de 
tach  any  considerable  force  from  the  northern 
front.  Its  contribution  to  the  forces  in  Georgia 
was  accomplished  by  such  pathetic  means  as  a 
general  order  calling  to  the  colors  all  soldiers  fur- 
loughed  or  in  hospital,  "except  those  unable  to 
travel";  by  revoking  all  exemptions  to  farmers, 
planters,  and  mechanics,  except  munitions  workers; 
and  by  placing  one-fifth  of  the  ordnance  and  mining 
bureau  in  the  battle  service. 

All  the  world  knows  how  futile  were  these  en 
deavors  to  stop  the  whirlwind  of  desolation  that 
was  Sherman's  march.  He  spent  his  Christmas 
Day  in  Savannah.  Then  the  center  of  gravity 
shifted  from  Georgia  to  South  Carolina.  Through 
out  the  two  desperate  months  that  closed  1864  the 
authorities  of  South  Carolina  had  vainly  sought  for 
help  from  Richmond.  Twice  the  Governor  made 
official  request  for  the  return  to  South  Carolina  of 
some  of  her  own  troops  who  were  at  the  front  in 
Virginia.  Davis  first  evaded  and  then  refused  the 
request.  Lee  had  informed  him  that  if  the  forces 
on  the  northern  front  were  reduced,  the  evacuation 
of  Richmond  would  become  inevitable. 

The  South  Carolina  Government,  in  December, 
1864,  seems  to  have  concluded  that  the  State  must 


DESPERATE  REMEDIES  151 

save  itself.  A  State  Conscription  Act  was  passed 
placing  all  white  males  between  the  ages  of  sixteen 
and  sixty  at  the  disposal  of  the  state  authorities 
for  emergency  duty.  An  Exemption  Act  set  forth 
a  long  list  of  persons  who  should  not  be  liable 
to  conscription  by  the  Confederate  Government. 
Still  a  third  act  regulated  the  impressment  of 
slaves  for  work  on  fortifications  so  as  to  enable  the 
state  authorities  to  hold  a  check  upon  the  Con 
federate  authorities.  The  significance  of  the  three 
statutes  was  interpreted  by  a  South  Carolina  sol 
dier,  General  John  S.  Preston,  in  a  letter  to  the 
Secretary  of  War  that  was  a  wail  of  despair.  "  This 
legislation  is  an  explicit  declaration  that  this  State 
does  not  intend  to  contribute  another  soldier  or 
slave  to  the  public  defense,  except  on  such  terms 
as  may  be  dictated  by  her  authorities.  The 
example  will  speedily  be  followed  by  North  Caro 
lina  and  Georgia,  the  Executives  of  those  States 
having  already  assumed  the  position." 

The  divisior  between  the  two  parties  in  South 
Carolina  had  now  become  bitter.  To  Preston  the 
men  behind  the  State  Exemption  Act  appeared  as 
"designing  knaves."  The  Mercury,  on  the  other 
hand,  was  never  more  relentless  toward  Davis  than 
in  the  winter  of  1864-1865.  However,  none  or 


152     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

almost  none  of  the  anti-Davis  men  in  South  Caro 
lina  made  the  least  suggestion  of  giving  up  the 
struggle.  To  fight  to  the  end  but  also  to  act  as  a 
check  upon  the  central  Government  —  as  the  new 
Governor,  Andrew  G.  Magrath,  said  in  his  in 
augural  address  in  December,  1864,  —  was  the  aim 
of  the  dominant  party  in  South  Carolina.  How 
far  the  State  Government  and  the  Confederate 
Government  had  drifted  apart  is  shown  by  two 
comments  which  were  made  in  January,  1865. 
Lee  complained  that  the  South  Carolina  regiments, 
"much  reduced  by  hard  service,"  were  not  being 
recruited  up  to  their  proper  strength  because  of  the 
measures  adopted  in  the  southeastern  States  to 
retain  conscripts  at  home.  About  the  same  date 
the  Mercury  arraigned  Davis  for  leaving  South 
Carolina  defenseless  in  the  face  of  Sherman's  com 
ing  offensive,  and  asked  whether  Davis  intended 
to  surrender  the  Confederacy. 

And  in  the  midst  of  this  critical  period,  the  labor 
problem  pushed  to  the  fore  again.  The  revocation 
of  industrial  details,  necessary  as  it  was,  had  put 
almost  the  whole  male  population  —  in  theory,  at 
least  —  in  the  general  Confederate  army.  How 
far-reaching  was  the  effect  of  this  order  may  be 
judged  from  the  experience  of  the  Columbia  and 


DESPERATE  REMEDIES  153 

Augusta  Railroad  Company.  This  road  was  build 
ing  through  the  interior  of  the  State  a  new  line 
which  was  rendered  imperatively  necessary  by 
Sherman's  seizure  of  the  lines  terminating  at 
Savannah.  The  effect  of  the  revocation  order  on 
the  work  in  progress  was  described  by  the  presi 
dent  of  the  road  in  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War: 

In  July  and  August  I  made  a  fair  beginning  and  by 
October  we  had  about  600  hands.  General  Order  No. 
77  took  off  many  of  our  contractors  and  hands.  We 
still  had  increased  the  number  of  hands  to  about  400 
when  Sherman  started  from  Atlanta.  The  military 
authorities  of  Augusta  took  about  300  of  them  to  for 
tify  that  city.  These  contractors  being  from  Georgia 
returned  with  their  slaves  to  their  homes  after  being 
discharged  at  Augusta.  We  still  have  between  500  and 
600  hands  at  work  and  are  adding  to  the  force  every 
week. 

The  great  difficulty  has  been  in  getting  contractors 
exempt  or  definitely  detailed  since  Order  No.  77.  I  have 
not  exceeded  eight  or  nine  contractors  now  detailed. 
The  rest  are  exempt  from  other  causes  or  over  age. 

It  was  against  such  a  background  of  economic 
confusion  that  Magrath  wrote  to  the  Governor  of 
North  Carolina  making  a  revolutionary  proposal. 
Virtually  admitting  that  the  Confederacy  had  been 
shattered,  and  knowing  the  disposition  of  those  in 
authority  to  see  only  the  military  aspects  of  any 


154     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

given  situation,  he  prophesied  two  things:  that 
the  generals  would  soon  attempt  to  withdraw 
Lee's  army  south  of  Virginia,  and  that  the  Virginia 
troops  in  that  army  would  refuse  to  go.  "It  is 
natural  under  the  circumstances,"  said  he,  "that 
they  would  not."  He  would  prepare  for  this  emer 
gency  by  an  agreement  among  the  Southeastern 
and  Gulf  States  to  act  together  irrespective  of 
Richmond,  and  would  thus  weld  the  military  power 
of  these  States  into  "a  compact  and  organized 


mass." 


Governor  Vance,  with  unconscious  subtlety, 
etched  a  portrait  of  his  own  mind  when  he  replied 
that  the  crisis  demanded  "particularly  the  skill  of 
the  politician  perhaps  more  than  that  of  the  great 
general."  He  adroitly  evaded  saying  what  he 
really  thought  of  the  situation  but  he  made  two 
explicit  counter-proposals.  He  suggested  that  a 
demand  should  be  made  for  the  restoration  of 
General  Johnston  and  for  the  appointment  of 
General  Lee  to  "full  and  absolute  command  of  all 
the  forces  of  the  Confederacy."  On  the  day  on 
which  Vance  wrote  to  Magrath,  the  Mercury  lifted 
up  its  voice  and  cried  out  for  a  Lee  to  take  charge 
of  the  Government  and  save  the  Confederacy. 
About  the  same  time  Cobb  wrote  to  Davis  in  the 


DESPERATE  REMEDIES  155 

most  friendly  way,  warning  him  that  he  had 
scarcely  a  supporter  left  in  Georgia  and  that,  in 
view  of  the  great  popular  reaction  in  favor  of 
Johnston,  concessions  to  the  opposition  wTere  an 
imperative  necessity.  "By  accident,"  said  he, 
"I  have  become  possessed  of  the  facts  in  connec 
tion  with  the  proposed  action  of  the  Governors  of 
certain  States."  He  disavowed  any  sympathy 
with  the  movement  but  warned  Davis  that  it  was 
a  serious  menace. 

Two  other  intrigues  added  to  the  general  politi 
cal  confusion.  One  of  these,  the  "Peace  Move 
ment,"  will  be  considered  in  the  next  chapter. 
The  other  was  closely  connected  with  the  alleged 
conspiracy  to  depose  Davis  and  set  up  Lee  as  dic 
tator.  If  the  traditional  story,  accepted  by  able 
historians,  may  be  believed,  William  C.  Rives, 
of  the  Confederate  Congress,  carried  in  January, 
1865,  to  Lee  from  a  congressional  cabal  an  invita 
tion  to  accept  the  role  of  Cromwell.  The  greatest 
difficulty  in  the  way  of  accepting  the  tradition  is 
the  extreme  improbability  that  any  one  who  knew 
anything  of  Lee  would  have  been  so  foolish  as  to 
make  such  a  proposal.  Needless  to  add,  the  tradi 
tion  includes  Lee's  refusal  to  overturn  the  Gov 
ernment. 


156     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

There  can  be  no  doubt,  however,  that  all  the 
enemies  of  Davis  in  Congress  and  out  of  it,  in  the 
opening  months  of  1865,  made  a  determined  series 
of  attacks  upon  his  Administration.  Nor  can  there 
be  any  doubt  that  the  popular  faith  in  Lee  was 
used  as  their  trump  card.  To  that  end,  a  bill  was 
introduced  to  create  the  office  of  commanding 
general  of  the  Confederate  armies.  The  bill  was 
generally  applauded,  and  every  one  assumed  that 
the  new  office  was  to  be  given  to  Lee.  On  the  day 
after  the  bill  had  passed  the  Senate  the  Virginia 
Legislature  resolved  that  the  appointment  of 
General  Lee  to  supreme  command  would  "reani 
mate  the  spirit  of  the  armies  as  well  as  the  people 
of  the  several  States  and  .  .  .  inspire  increased 
confidence  in  the  final  success  of  the  cause."  When 
the  bill  was  sent  to  the  President,  it  was  accom 
panied  by  a  resolution  asking  him  to  restore  John 
ston.  While  Davis  was  considering  this  bill,  the 
Virginia  delegation  in  the  House,  headed  by  the 
Speaker,  Thomas  S.  Bocock,  waited  upon  the  Presi 
dent,  informed  him  what  was  really  wanted  was 
a  change  of  Cabinet,  and  told  him  that  three- 
fourths  of  the  House  would  support  a  resolu 
tion  of  want  of  confidence  in  the  Cabinet.  The 
next  day  Bocock  repeated  the  demand  in  a 


DESPERATE  REMEDIES  157 

note  which  Davis  described  as  a  "warning  if  not 
a  threat." 

The  situation  of  both  President  and  country 
was  now  desperate.  The  program  with  which 
the  Government  had  entered  so  hopefully  upon 
this  fated  year  had  broken  down  at  almost  every 
point.  In  addition  to  the  military  and  administra 
tive  disasters,  the  financial  and  economic  situation 
was  as  bad  as  possible.  So  complete  was  the 
financial  breakdown  that  Secretary  Memminger, 
utterly  disheartened,  had  resigned  his  office,  and 
the  Treasury  was  now  administered  by  a  Charles 
ton  merchant,  George  A.  Trenholm.  But  the 
financial  chaos  was  wholly  beyond  his  control. 
The  government  notes  reckoned  in  gold  were  worth 
about  three  cents  on  the  dollar.  The  Government 
itself  avoided  accepting  them.  It  even  bought  up 
United  States  currency  and  used  it  in  transacting 
the  business  of  the  army.  The  extent  of  the  finan 
cial  collapse  was  to  be  measured  by  such  incidents 
as  the  following  which  is  recounted  in  a  report 
that  had  passed  under  Davis's  eye  only  a  few 
weeks  before  the  "threat"  of  Bocock  was  uttered: 
"Those  holding  the  four  per  cent  certificates  com 
plain  that  the  Government  as  far  as  possible  dis 
credits  them.  Fractions  of  hundreds  cannot  be 


158     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

paid  with  them.  I  saw  a  widow  lady,  a  few  days 
since,  offer  to  pay  her  taxes  of  $1,271.31  with  a 
certificate  of  $1,300.  The  tax-gatherer  refused  to 
give  her  the  change  of  $28.69.  She  then  offered 
the  whole  certificate  for  the  taxes.  This  was  re 
fused.  This  apparent  injustice  touched  her  far 
more  than  the  amount  of  the  taxes." 

A  letter  addressed  to  the  President  from  Griffin, 
Georgia,  contained  this  dreary  picture: 

Unless  something  is  done  and  that  speedily,  there  will 
be  thousands  of  the  best  citizens  of  the  State  and  here 
tofore  as  loyal  as  any  in  the  Confederacy,  that  will  not 
care  one  cent  which  army  is  victorious  in  Georgia.  .  .  . 
Since  August  last  there  have  been  thousands  of  cavalry 
and  wagon  trains  feeding  upon  our  cornfields  and  for 
which  our  quartermasters  and  officers  in  command  of 
trains,  regiments,  battalions,  companies,  and  squads, 
have  been  giving  the  farmers  receipts,  and  we  were  all 
told  these  receipts  would  pay  our  government  taxes  and 
tithing;  and  yet  not  one  of  them  will  be  taken  by  our 
collector.  .  .  .  And  yet  we  are  threatened  with  having 
our  lands  sold  for  taxes.  Our  scrip  for  corn  used  by  our 
generals  will  not  be  taken.  .  .  .  How  is  it  that  we 
have  certified  claims  upon  our  Government,  past  due 
ten  months,  and  when  we  enter  the  quartermaster's 
office  we  see  placed  up  conspicuously  in  large  letters 
"no  funds."  Some  of  these  said  quartermasters  [who] 
four  years  ago  were  not  worth  the  clothes  upon  their 
backs,  are  now  large  dealers  in  lands,  negroes,  and  real 
estate. 


DESPERATE  REMEDIES  159 

There  was  almost  universal  complaint  that  gov 
ernment  contractors  were  speculating  in  supplies 
and  that  the  Impressment  Law  was  used  by  officials 
to  cover  their  robbery  of  both  the  Government  and 
the  people.  Allowing  for  all  the  panic  of  the 
moment,  one  is  forced  to  conclude  that  the  smoke 
is  too  dense  not  to  cover  a  good  deal  of  fire.  In  a 
word,  at  the  very  time  when  local  patriotism  every 
where  was  drifting  into  opposition  to  the  general 
military  command  and  when  Congress  was  reflect 
ing  this  widespread  loss  of  confidence,  the  Govern 
ment  was  loudly  charged  with  inability  to  restrain 
graft.  In  all  these  accusations  there  was  much 
injustice.  Conditions  that  the  Government  was 
powerless  to  control  were  cruelly  exaggerated,  and 
the  motives  of  the  Government  were  falsified.  For 
all  this  exaggeration  and  falsification  the  press  was 
largely  to  blame.  Moreover,  the  press,  at  least  in 
dangerously  large  proportion,  was  schooling  the 
people  to  hold  Davis  personally  responsible  for  all 
their  suffering.  General  Bragg  was  informed  in  a 
letter  from  a  correspondent  in  Mobile  that  "men 
have  been  taught  to  look  upon  the  President  as  an 
inexorably  self-willed  man  who  will  see  the  country 
to  the  devil  before  giving  up  an  opinion  or  a 
purpose." 


160     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

This  deliberate  fostering  of  an  anti-Davis  spirit 
might  seem  less  malicious  if  the  fact  were  not 
known  that  many  editors  detested  Davis  because 
of  his  desire  to  abolish  the  exemption  of  editors 
from  conscription.  Their  ignoble  course  brings  to 
mind  one  of  the  few  sarcasms  recorded  of  Lee  — 
the  remark  that  the  great  mistake  of  the  South  was 
in  making  all  its  best  military  geniuses  editors  of 
newspapers.  But  it  must  be  added  in  all  fairness 
that  the  great  opposition  journals,  such  as  the  Mer 
cury,  took  up  this  new  issue  with  the  President 
because  they  professed  to  see  in  his  attitude  toward 
the  press  a  determination  to  suppress  freedom  of 
speech,  so  obsessed  was  the  opposition  with  the 
idea  that  Davis  was  a  monster!  Whatever  ex 
planations  may  be  offered  for  the  prevalence  of 
graft,  the  impotence  of  the  Government  at  Rich 
mond  contributed  to  the  general  demoralization. 
In  regions  like  Georgia  and  Alabama,  the  Con 
federacy  was  now  powerless  to  control  its  agents. 
Furthermore,  in  every  effort  to  assume  adequate 
control  of  the  food  situation  the  Government  met 
the  continuous  opposition  of  two  groups  of  oppo 
nents  —  the  unscrupulous  parasitesand  the  bigots 
of  economic  and  constitutional  theory.  Of  the 
activities  of  the  first  group,  one  incident  is  sufficient 


DESPERATE  REMEDIES  161 

to  tell  the  whole  story.  At  Richmond,  in  the  au 
tumn  of  1864,  the  grocers  were  selling  rice  at  two 
dollars  and  a  half  a  pound.  It  happened  that  the 
Governor  of  Virginia  was  William  Smith,  one  of 
the  strong  men  of  the  Confederacy  who  has  nox 
had  his  due  from  the  historians.  He  saw  that  even 
under  the  intolerable  conditions  of  the  moment  this 
price  was  shockingly  exorbitant.  To  remedy  mat 
ters,  the  Governor  took  the  State  of  Virginia  into 
business,  bought  rice  where  it  was  grown,  imported 
it,  and  sold  it  in  Richmond  at  fifty  cents  a  pound, 
with  sufficient  profit  to  cover  all  costs  of  handling. 
Nevertheless,  when  Smith  urged  the  Virginia 
Legislature  to  assume  control  of  business  as  a  tem 
porary  measure,  he  w^as  at  once  assailed  by  the 
second  group  —  those  martinets  of  constitutional 
ism  who  would  not  give  up  their  cherished  Anglo- 
Saxon  tradition  of  complete  individualism  in  gov 
ernment.  The  Administration  lost  some  of  its 
stanchest  supporters  the  moment  its  later  organ, 
the  Sentinel,  began  advocating  the  general  regula 
tion  of  prices.  With  ruin  staring  them  in  the  face, 
these  devotees  of  tradition  could  only  reiterate 
their  ancient  formulas,  nail  their  colors  to  the  mast, 
and  go  down,  satisfied  that,  if  they  failed  with  these 
principles,  they  would  have  failed  still  more 


162     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

terribly  without  them.  Confronting  the  practical 
question  how  to  prevent  speculators  from  charging 
400  per  cent  profit,  these  men  turned  grim  but 
did  not  abandon  their  theory.  In  the  latter  part 
of  1864  they  alined  themselves  with  the  opposi 
tion  when  the  government  commissioners  of  im 
pressment  fixed  an  official  schedule  that  boldly  and 
ruthlessly  cut  under  market  prices.  The  attitude 
of  many  such  people  was  expressed  by  the  Mont 
gomery  Mail  when  it  said: 

"The  tendency  of  the  age,  the  march  of  the 
American  people,  is  toward  monarchy,  and  unless 
the  tide  is  stopped  we  shall  reach  something  worse 
than  monarchy. 

"Every  step  we  have  taken  during  the  past  four 
years  has  been  in  the  direction  of  military 
despotism. 

"Half  our  laws  are  unconstitutional." 

Another  danger  of  the  hour  was  the  melting 
away  of  the  Confederate  army  under  the  very  eyes 
of  its  commanders.  The  records  showed  that  there 
were  100,000  absentees.  And  though  the  wrathful 
officials  of  the  Bureau  of  Conscription  labeled  them 
all  "deserters,"  the  term  covered  great  numbers 
who  had  gone  home  to  share  the  sufferings  of  their 
families. 


DESPERATE  REMEDIES  163 

Such  in  brief  was  the  fateful  background  of  the 
congressional  attack  upon  the  Administration  in 
January,  1865.  Secretary  Seddon,  himself  a  Vir 
ginian,  believing  that  he  was  the  main  target  of  the 
hostility  of  the  Virginia  delegation,  insisted  upon 
resigning.  Davis  met  this  determination  with 
firmness,  not  to  say  infatuation,  and  in  spite  of  the 
congressional  crisis,  exhausted  every  argument  to 
persuade  Seddon  to  remain  in  office.  He  denied 
the  right  of  Congress  to  control  his  Cabinet,  but 
he  was  finally  constrained  to  allow  Seddon  to  re 
tire.  The  bitterness  inspired  by  these  attempts  to 
coerce  the  President  may  be  gaged  by  a  remark 
attributed  to  Mrs.  Davis.  Speaking  of  the  action 
of  Congress  in  forcing  upon  him  the  new  plan  for  a 
single  commanding  general  of  all  the  armies,  she 
is  said  to  have  exclaimed,  "I  think  I  am  the  proper 
person  to  advise  Mr.  Davis  and  if  I  were  he,  I 
would  die  or  be  hung  before  I  would  submit  to  the 
humiliation." 

Nevertheless  the  President  surrendered  to  Con 
gress.  On  January  26,  1865,  he  signed  the  bill 
creating  the  office  of  commanding  general  and  at 
once  bestowed  the  office  upon  Lee.  It  must  not  be 
supposed,  however,  that  Lee  himself  had  the  slight 
est  sympathy  with  the  congressional  cabal  which 


164     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

had  forced  upon  the  President  this  reorganization 
of  the  army.  In  accepting  his  new  position  he 
pointedly  ignored  Congress  by  remarking,  "I  am 
indebted  alone  to  the  kindness  of  His  Excellency, 
the  President,  for  my  nomination  to  this  high  and 
arduous  office." 

The  popular  clamor  for  the  restoration  of  John 
ston  had  still  to  be  appeased.  Disliking  Johnston 
and  knowing  that  the  opposition  was  using  a  popu 
lar  general  as  a  club  with  w^hich  to  beat  himself, 
Davis  hesitated  long  but  in  the  end  yielded  to  the 
inevitable.  To  make  the  reappointment  himself, 
however,  was  too  humiliating.  He  left  it  to  the 
new  commander-in-chief,  who  speedily  restored 
Johnston  to  command. 


CHAPTER  X 

DISINTEGRATION 

WHILE  these  factions,  despite  their  disagreements, 
were  making  valiant  efforts  to  carry  on  the  war, 
other  factions  were  stealthily  cutting  the  ground 
from  under  them.  There  were  two  groups  of  men 
ripe  for  disaffection  —  original  Unionists  unrecon 
ciled  to  the  Confederacy  and  indifferentists  con 
scripted  against  their  will. 

History  has  been  unduly  silent  about  these  dis 
affected  men.  At  the  time  so  real  was  the  belief 
in  state  rights  that  contemporaries  were  reluctant 
to  admit  that  any  Southerner,  once  his  State  had 
seceded,  could  fail  to  be  loyal  to  its  commands. 
Nevertheless  in  considerable  areas  —  such,  for 
example,  as  East  Tennessee  —  the  majority  re 
mained  to  the  end  openly  for  the  Union,  and  there 
were  large  regions  in  the  South  to  which  until  quite 
recently  the  eye  of  the  student  had  not  been  turned. 
They  were  like  deep  shadows  under  mighty  trees 

165 


166     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

on  the  face  of  a  brilliant  landscape.  When  the 
peasant  Unionist  who  had  been  forced  into  the 
army  deserted,  however,  he  found  in  these  shadows 
a  nucleus  of  desperate  men  ready  to  combine  with 
him  in  opposition  to  the  local  authorities. 

Thus  were  formed  local  bands  of  free  compan 
ions  who  pillaged  the  civilian  population.  The 
desperadoes  whom  the  deserters  joined  have  been 
described  by  Professor  Dodd  as  the  "neglected  by 
products"  of  the  old  regime.  They  were  broken 
white  men,  or  the  children  of  such,  of  the  sort  that 
under  other  circumstances  have  congregated  in  the 
slums  of  great  cities.  Though  the  South  lacked 
great  cities,  nevertheless  it  had  its  slum  —  a  wide 
spread  slum,  scattered  among  its  swamps  and 
forests.  In  these  fastnesses  were  the  lowest  of  the 
poor  whites,  in  whom  hatred  of  the  dominant 
whites  and  vengeful  malice  against  the  negro 
burned  like  slow  fires.  When  almost  everywhere 
the  countryside  was  stripped  of  its  fighting  men, 
these  wretches  emerged  from  their  swamps  and 
forests,  like  the  Paris  rabble  emerging  from  its  dens 
at  the  opening  of  the  Revolution.  But  unlike  the 
Frenchmen,  they  were  too  sodden  to  be  capable  of 
ideas.  Like  predatory  wild  beasts  they  revenged 
themselves  upon  the  society  that  had  cast  them 


DISINTEGRATION  167 

off,  and  with  utter  heartlessness  they  smote  the 
now  defenseless  negro.  In  the  old  days,  with  the 
country  well  policed,  the  slaves  had  been  protected 
against  their  fury,  but  war  now  changed  all.  The 
negro  villages  —  or  "streets,"  as  the  term  was  — 
were  without  arms  and  without  white  police  within 
call.  They  were  ravaged  by  these  marauders 
night  after  night,  and  negroes  were  not  the  only 
victims,  for  in  remote  districts  even  murder  of  the 
whites  became  a  familiar  horror. 

The  antiwar  factions  were  not  necessarily,  how 
ever,  users  of  violence.  There  were  some  men 
who  cherished  a  dream  which  they  labeled  "re 
construction";  and  there  were  certain  others  who 
believed  in  separate  state  action,  still  clinging  to 
the  illusion  that  any  State  had  it  in  its  power  to 
escape  from  war  by  concluding  a  separate  peace 
with  the  United  States. 

Yet  neither  of  these  illusions  made  much  head 
way  in  the  States  that  had  borne  the  strain  of 
intellectual  leadership.  Virginia  and  South  Caro 
lina,  though  seldom  seeing  things  eye  to  eye  and 
finally  drifting  in  opposite  directions,  put  but  little 
faith  in  either  "reconstruction "  or  separate  peace. 
Their  leaders  had  learned  the  truth  about  men  and 
nations;  they  knew  that  life  is  a  grim  business;  they 


168     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

knew  that  war  had  unloosed  passions  that  had  to 
spend  themselves  and  that  could  not  be  talked 
away. 

But  there  was  scattered  over  the  Confederacy  a 
population  which  lacked  experience  of  the  world 
and  which  included  in  the  main  those  small  farmers 
and  semipeasants  who  under  the  old  regime  were 
released  from  the  burden  of  taxation  and  at  the 
same  time  excluded  from  the  benefits  of  education. 
Among  these  people  the  illusions  of  the  higher 
classes  were  reflected  without  the  ballast  of  men 
tality.  Ready  to  fight  on  any  provocation,  yet 
circumscribed  by  their  own  natures,  not  under 
standing  life,  unable  to  picture  to  themselves 
different  types  and  conditions,  these  people  were 
as  prone  as  children  to  confuse  the  world  of  their 
own  desire  with  the  world  of  fact.  When  hardship 
came,  when  taxation  fell  upon  them  with  a  great 
blow,  when^the  war  took  a  turn  that  necessitated 
imagination  for  its  understanding  and  faith  for  its 
pursuit,  these  people  with  childlike  simplicity  im 
mediately  became  panic-stricken.  Like  the  simi 
lar  class  in  the  North,  they  had  measureless  faith 
in  talk.  Hence  for  them,  as  for  Horace  Gree- 
ley  and  many  another,  sprang  up  the  notion  that 
if  only  all  their  sort  could  be  brought  together 


DISINTEGRATION  169 

for  talk  and  talk  and  yet  more  talk,  the  Union 
could  be  "reconstructed"  just  as  it  used  to  be,  and 
the  cruel  war  would  end.  Before  their  eyes,  as 
before  Greeley  in  1864,  danced  the  fata  morgana 
of  a  convention  of  all  the  States,  talking,  talking, 
talking. 

The  peace  illusion  centered  in  North  Carolina, 
where  the  people  were  as  enthusiastic  for  state 
sovereignty  as  were  any  Southerners.  They  had 
seceded  mainly  because  they  felt  that  this  prin 
ciple  had  been  attacked.  Having  themselves  little 
if  any  intention  to  promote  slavery,  they  neverthe 
less  were  prompt  to  resent  interference  with  the 
system  or  with  any  other  Southern  institution. 
Jonathan  Worth  said  that  they  looked  on  both 
abolition  and  secession  as  children  of  the  devil, 
and  he  put  the  responsibility  for  the  secession  of 
his  State  wholly  upon  Lincoln  and  his  attempt  to 
coerce  the  lower  South.  This  attitude  was  prob 
ably  characteristic  of  all  classes  in  North  Carolina. 
There  also  an  unusually  large  percentage  of  men 
lacked  education  and  knowledge  of  the  world. 
We  have  seen  how  the  first  experience  with  taxa 
tion  produced  instant  and  violent  reaction.  The 
peasant  farmers  of  the  western  counties  and  the 
general  mass  of  the  people  began  to  distrust  the 


170     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

planter  class.  They  began  asking  if  their  allies, 
the  other  States,  were  controlled  by  that  same 
class  which  seemed  to  be  crushing  them  by  the 
exaction  of  tithes.  And  then  the  popular  cry  was 
raised:  Was  there  after  all  anything  in  the  war 
for  the  masses  in  North  Carolina?  Had  they  left 
the  frying-pan  for  the  fire?  Could  they  better 
things  by  withdrawing  from  association  with  their 
present  allies  and  going  back  alone  into  the  Union? 
The  delusion  that  they  could  do  so  whenever  they 
pleased  and  on  the  old  footing  seems  to  have  been 
widespread.  One  of  their  catch  phrases  was  "the 
Constitution  as  it  is  and  the  Union  as  it  was." 
Throughout  1863,  when  the  agitation  against 
tithes  was  growing  every  day,  the  "conservatives" 
of  North  Carolina,  as  their  leaders  named  them, 
were  drawing  together  in  a  definite  movement  for 
peace.  This  project  came  to  a  head  during  the 
next  year  in  those  grim  days  when  Sherman  was 
before  Atlanta.  Holden,  that  champion  of  the  op 
position  to  tithes,  became  a  candidate  for  Governor 
against  Vance,  who  was  standing  for  reelection. 
Holden  stated  his  platform  in  the  organ  of  his  party : 
"If  the  people  of  North  Carolina  are  for  perpetual 
conscriptions,  impressments  and  seizures  to  keep 
up  a  perpetual,  devastating  and  exhausting  war, 


DISINTEGRATION 

let  them  vote  for  Governor  Vance,  for  he  is  for 
4 fighting  it  out  now';  but  if  they  believe,  from  the 
bitter  experience  of  the  last  three  years,  that  the 
sword  can  never  end  it,  and  are  in  favor  of  steps 
being  taken  by  the  State  to  urge  negotiations  by 
the  general  government  for  an  honorable  and 
speedy  peace,  they  must  vote  for  Mr.  Holden." 

As  Holden,  however,  was  beaten  by  a  vote  that 
stood  about  three  to  one,  Governor  Vance  con 
tinued  in  power,  but  just  what  he  stood  for  and 
just  what  his  supporters  understood  to  be  his  policy 
would  be  hard  to  say.  A  year  earlier  he  was  for 
attempting  to  negotiate  peace,  but  though  pro 
fessing  to  have  come  over  to  the  war  party  he  was 
never  a  cordial  supporter  of  the  Confederacy.  In 
a  hundred  ways  he  played  upon  the  strong  local 
distrust  of  Richmond,  and  upon  the  feeling  that 
North  Carolina  was  being  exploited  in  the  interests 
of  the  remainder  of  the  South.  To  cripple  the 
efficiency  of  Confederate  conscription  was  one  of 
his  constant  aims.  Whatever  his  views  of  the 
struggle  in  which  he  was  engaged,  they  did  not  in 
clude  either  an  appreciation  of  Southern  national 
ism  or  the  strategist's  conception  of  war.  Granted 
that  the  other  States  were  merely  his  allies,  Vance 
pursued  a  course  that  might  justly  have  aroused 


172     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

their  suspicion,  for  so  far  as  he  was  able  he  devoted 
the  resources  of  the  State  wholly  to  the  use  of  its 
own  citizens.  The  food  and  the  manufactures  of 
North  Carolina  were  to  be  used  solely  by  its  own 
troops,  not  by  troops  of  the  Confederacy  raised  in 
other  States.  And  yet,  subsequent  to  his  reelec 
tion,  he  was  not  a  figure  in  the  movement  to  nego 
tiate  peace. 

Meanwhile  in  Georgia,  where  secession  had  met 
with  powerful  opposition,  the  policies  of  the  Gov 
ernment  had  produced  discontent  not  only  with 
the  management  of  the  war  but  with  the  war 
itself.  And  now  Alexander  H.  Stephens  becomes, 
for  a  season,  very  nearly  the  central  figure  of  Con 
federate  history.  Early  in  1864  the  new  act  sus 
pending  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  had  aroused  the 
wrath  of  Georgia,  and  Stephens  had  become  the 
mouthpiece  of  the  opposition.  In  an  address  to 
the  Legislature,  he  condemned  in  most  exaggerated 
language  not  only  the  Habeas  Corpus  Act  but  also 
the  new  Conscription  Act.  Soon  afterward  he 
wrote  a  long  letter  to  Herschel  V.  Johnson,  who, 
like  himself,  had  been  an  enemy  of  secession  in 
1861.  He  said  that  if  Johnson  doubted  that  the 
Habeas  Corpus  Act  was  a  blow  struck  at  the  very 
"vitals  of  liberty,"  then  he  "would  not  believe 


DISINTEGRATION  173 

though  one  were  to  rise  from  the  dead."  In  this 
extraordinary  letter  Stephens  went  on  "most  con 
fidentially  "  to  state  his  attitude  toward  Davis  thus : 
"While  I  do  not  and  never  have  regarded  him  as  a 
great  man  or  statesman  on  a  large  scale,  or  a  man 
of  any  marked  genius,  yet  I  have  regarded  him  as 
a  man  of  good  intentions,  weak  and  vacillating, 
timid,  petulant,  peevish,  obstinate,  but  not  firm. 
Am  now  beginning  to  doubt  his  good  intentions. 
.  .  .  His  whole  policy  on  the  organization  and 
discipline  of  the  army  is  perfectly  consistent  with 
the  hypothesis  that  he  is  aiming  at  absolute 
power." 

That  a  man  of  Stephens's  ability  should  have 
dealt  in  fustian  like  this  in  the  most  dreadful 
moment  of  Confederate  history  is  a  psychological 
problem  that  is  not  easily  solved.  To  be  sure, 
Stephens  was  an  extreme  instance  of  the  martinet 
of  constitutionalism.  He  reminds  us  of  those  old- 
fashioned  generals  of  whom  Macaulay  said  that 
they  preferred  to  lose  a  battle  according  to  rule 
than  win  it  by  an  exception.  Such  men  find  it 
easy  to  transform  into  a  bugaboo  any  one  who  ap 
pears  to  them  to  be  acting  irregularly.  Stephens 
in  his  own  mind  had  so  transformed  the  Presi 
dent.  The  enormous  difficulties  and  the  wholly 


174     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

abnormal  circumstances  which  surrounded  Davis 
counted  with  Stephens  for  nothing  at  all,  and  he 
reasoned  about  the  Administration  as  if  it  were 
operating  in  a  vacuum.  Having  come  to  this  ex 
traordinary  position,  Stephens  passed  easily  into  u 
role  that  verged  upon  treason. * 

Peace  talk  was  now  in  the  air,  and  especially  was 
there  chatter  about  reconstruction.  The  illusion 
ists  seemed  unable  to  perceive  that  the  reelection 
of  Lincoln  had  robbed  them  of  their  last  card. 
These  dreamers  did  not  even  pause  to  wonder  why 

1  There  can  be  no  question  that  Stephens  never  did  anything  which 
in  his  own  mind  was  in  the  least  disloyal.  And  yet  it  was  Stephens 
who,  in  the  autumn  of  1864,  was  singled  out  by  artful  men  as  a  possible 
figurehead  in  the  conduct  of  a  separate  peace  negotiation  with  Sher 
man.  A  critic  very  hostile  to  Stephens  and  his  faction  might  here 
raise  the  question  as  to  what  was  at  bottom  the  motive  of  Governor 
Brown,  in  the  autumn  of  1864,  in  withdrawing  the  Georgia  militia 
from  Hood's  command.  Was  there  something  afoot  that  has  never 
quite  revealed  itself  on  the  broad  pages  of  history?  As  ordinarily 
told,  the  story  is  simply  that  certain  desperate  Georgians  asked 
Stephens  to  be  their  ambassador  to  Sherman  to  discuss  terms;  that 
Sherman  had  given  them  encouragement;  but  that  Stephens  avoided 
the  trap,  and  so  nothing  came  of  it.  The  recently  published  corre 
spondence  of  Toombs,  Stephens,  and  Cobb,  however,  contains  one 
passage  that  has  rather  a  startling  sound.  Brown,  writing  to  Stephens 
regarding  his  letter  refusing  to  meet  Sherman,  says,  "It  keeps  the 
door  open  and  1  think  this  is  wise."  At  the  same  time  he  made  a 
public  statement  that  "Georgia  has  power  to  act  independently  but 
her  faith  is  pledged  by  implication  to  her  Southern  sisters  .  .  .  will 
triumph  with  her  Southern  sisters  or  sink  with  them  in  common  ruin." 
It  is  still  to  be  discovered  what  "door"  Stephens  was  supposed  to  have 
kept  open. 


DISINTEGRATION  175 

after  the  terrible  successes  of  the  Federal  army  in 
Georgia,  Lincoln  should  be  expected  to  reverse  his 
policy  and  restore  the  Union  with  the  Southern 
States  on  the  old  footing.  The  peace  mania  also  in 
vaded  South  Carolina  and  was  espoused  by  one  of 
its  Congressmen,  Mr.  Boyce,  but  he  made  few  con 
verts  among  his  own  people.  The  Mercury  scouted 
the  idea;  clear-sighted  and  disillusioned,  it  saw 
the  only  alternatives  to  be  victory  or  subjugation. 
Boyce's  argument  was  that  the  South  had  already 
succumbed  to  military  despotism  and  would  have 
to  endure  it  forever  unless  it  accepted  the  terms  of 
the  invaders.  News  of  Boyce's  attitude  called 
forth  vigorous  protest  from  the  army  before  Peters 
burg,  and  even  went  so  far  afield  as  New  York, 
where  it  was  discussed  in  the  columns  of  the  Herald. 
In  the  midst  of  the  Northern  elections,  when 
Davis  was  hoping  great  things  from  the  anti- 
Lincoln  men,  Stephens  had  said  in  print  that  he 
believed  Davis  really  wished  the  Northern  peace 
party  defeated,  whereupon  Davis  had  written  to 
him  demanding  reasons  for  this  astounding  charge. 
To  the  letter,  which  had  missed  Stephens  at  his 
home  and  had  followed  him  late  in  the  year  to 
Richmond,  Stephens  wrote  in  the  middle  of  Decem 
ber  a  long  reply  which  is  one  of  the  most  curious 


176     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

documents  in  American  history.  He  justified 
himself  upon  two  grounds.  One  was  a  statement 
which  Davis  had  made  in  a  speech  at  Columbia,  in 
October,  indicating  that  he  was  averse  to  the 
scheme  of  certain  Northern  peace  men  for  a  con 
vention  of  all  the  States.  Stephens  insisted  that 
such  a  convention  would  have  ended  the  war  and 
secured  the  independence  of  the  South.  Davis 
cleared  himself  on  this  charge  by  saying  that  the 
speech  at  Columbia  "was  delivered  after  the  pub 
lication  of  McClellan's  letter  avowing  his  purpose 
to  force  reunion  by  war  if  we  declined  reconstruc 
tion  when  offered,  and  therefore  warned  the  people 
against  delusive  hopes  of  peace  from  any  other  in 
fluence  than  that  to  be  exerted  by  the  manifesta 
tion  of  an  unconquerable  spirit." 

As  Stephens  professed  to  have  independence 
and  not  reconstruction  for  his  aim,  he  had  missed 
his  mark  with  this  first  shot.  He  fared  still  worse 
with  the  second.  During  the  previous  spring  a 
Northern  soldier  captured  in  the  southeast  had 
appealed  for  parole  on  the  ground  that  he  was  a 
secret  emissary  to  the  President  from  the  peace 
men  of  the  North.  Davis,  who  did  not  take  him 
seriously,  gave  orders  to  have  the  case  investigated, 
but  Stephens,  whose  mentality  in  this  period  is  so 


DISINTEGRATION  177 

curiously  overcast,  swallowed  the  prisoner's  story 
without  hesitation.  He  and  Davis  had  a  consider 
able  amount  of  correspondence  on  the  subject.  In 
the  fierce  tension  of  the  summer  of  1864  the  War 
Department  went  so  far  as  to  have  the  man's 
character  investigated,  but  the  report  was  unsatis 
factory.  He  was  not  paroled  and  died  in  prison. 
This  episode  Stephens  now  brought  forward  as 
evidence  that  Davis  had  frustrated  an  attempt  of 
the  Northern  peace  party  to  negotiate.  Davis 
contented  himself  with  replying,  "I  make  no  com 
ment  on  this." 

The  next  step  in  the  peace  intrigue  took  place  at 
the  opening  of  the  next  year,  1865.  Stephens  at 
tempted  to  address  the  Senate  on  his  favorite  topic, 
the  wickedness  of  the  suspension  of  habeas  corpus; 
was  halted  by  a  point  of  parliamentary  law;  and 
when  the  Senate  sustained  an  appeal  from  his 
decision,  left  the  chamber  in  a  pique.  Hunter, 
now  a  Senator,  became  an  envoy  to  placate  him 
and  succeeded  in  bringing  him  back.  Thereupon 
Stephens  poured  out  his  soul  in  a  furious  attack 
upon  the  Administration.  He  ended  by  submitting 
resolutions  which  were  just  what  he  might  have 
submitted  four  years  earlier  before  a  gun  had  been 
fired,  so  entirely  had  his  mind  crystallized  in  the 

12 


178     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

stress  of  war!  These  resolutions,  besides  reassert 
ing  the  full  state  rights  theory,  assumed  the  readi 
ness  of  the  North  to  make  peace  and  called  for  a 
general  convention  of  all  the  States  to  draw  up 
some  new  arrangement  on  a  confessed  state  rights 
basis.  More  than  a  month  before,  Lincoln  had 
been  reflected  on  an  unequivocal  nationalistic 
platform.  And  yet  Stephens  continued  to  be 
lieve  that  the  Northerners  did  not  mean  what  they 
said  and  that  in  congregated  talking  lay  the  magic 
which  would  change  the  world  of  fact  into  the 
world  of  his  own  desire. 

At  this  point  in  the  peace  intrigue  the  ambigu 
ous  figure  of  Napoleon  the  Little  reappears,  though 
only  to  pass  ghostlike  across  the  back  of  the  stage. 
The  determination  of  Northern  leaders  to  oppose 
Napoleon  had  suggested  to  shrewd  politicians  a 
possible  change  of  front.  That  singular  member 
of  the  Confederate  Congress,  Henry  S.  Foote, 
thought  he  saw  in  the  Mexican  imbroglio  means 
to  bring  Lincoln  to  terms.  In  November  he  had 
introduced  into  the  House  resolutions  which  inti 
mated  that  "it  might  become  the  true  policy 
of  ...  the  Confederate  States  to  consent  to 
the  yielding  of  the  great  principle  embodied  in 
the  Monroe  Doctrine."  The  House  referred  his 


DISINTEGRATION  179 

resolutions  to  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs, 
and  there  they  slumbered  until  January. 

Meanwhile  a  Northern  politician  brought  on 
the  specter  of  Napoleon  for  a  different  purpose. 
Early  in  January,  1865,  Francis  P.  Blair  made 
a  journey  to  Richmond  and  proposed  to  Davis 
a  plan  of  reconciliation  involving  the  complete 
abandonment  of  slavery,  the  reunion  of  all  the 
States,  and  an  expedition  against  Mexico  in  which 
Davis  was  to  play  the  leading  role.  Davis  cau 
tiously  refrained  from  committing  himself,  though 
he  gave  Blair  a  letter  in  which  he  expressed  his 
willingness  to  enter  into  negotiations  for  peace 
between  "the  two  countries."  The  visit  of  Blair 
gave  new  impetus  to  the  peace  intrigue.  The 
Confederate  House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs 
reported  resolutions  favoring  an  attempt  to  nego 
tiate  with  the  United  States  so  as  to  "bring  into 
view"  the  possibility  of  cooperation  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Confederacy  to  maintain 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  same  day  saw  another 
singular  incident.  For  some  reason  that  has  never 
been  divulged  Foote  determined  to  counter 
balance  Blair's  visit  to  Richmond  by  a  visit  of 
his  own  to  Washington.  In  attempting  to  pass 
through  the  Confederate  lines  he  was  arrested  by 


180     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

the  military  authorities.     With  this  fiasco  Foote 
passes  from  the  stage  of  history. 

The  doings  of  Blair,  however,  continued  to  be  a 
topic  of  general  interest  throughout  January.  The 
military  intrigue  was  now  simmering  down  through 
the  creation  of  the  office  of  commanding  general. 
The  attempt  of  the  congressional  opposition  to 
drive  the  whole  Cabinet  from  office  reached  a 
compromise  in  the  single  retirement  of  the  Secre 
tary  of  War.  Before  the  end  of  the  month  the 
peace  question  was  the  paramount  one  before 
Congress  and  the  country.  Newspapers  discussed 
the  movements  of  Blair,  apparently  with  little 
knowledge,  and  some  of  the  papers  asserted  hope 
fully  that  peace  was  within  reach.  Cooler  heads, 
such  as  the  majority  of  the  Virginia  Legislature, 
rejected  this  idea  as  baseless.  The  Mercury  called 
the  peace  party  the  worst  enemy  of  the  South. 
Lee  was  reported  by  the  Richmond  correspondent 
of  the  Mercury  as  not  caring  a  fig  for  the  peace 
project.  Nevertheless  the  rumor  persisted  that 
Blair  had  offered  peace  on  terms  that  the  Con 
federacy  could  accept.  Late  in  the  month,  Davis 
appointed  Stephens,  Hunter,  and  John  A.  Camp 
bell  commissioners  to  confer  with  the  Northern 
authorities  with  regard  to  peace. 


DISINTEGRATION  181 

There  followed  the  famous  conference  of  Feb 
ruary  3,  1865,  in  the  cabin  of  a  steamer  at  Hamp 
ton  Roads,  with  Seward  and  Lincoln.  The  Con 
federate  commissioners  represented  two  points  of 
view:  that  of  the  Administration,  unwilling  to 
make  peace  without  independence;  and  that  of  the 
infatuated  Stephens  who  clung  to  the  idea  that 
Lincoln  did  not  mean  what  he  said,  and  who  now 
urged  "an  armistice  allowing  the  States  to  adjust 
themselves  as  suited  their  interests.  If  it  would  be 
to  their  interests  to  reunite,  they  would  do  so." 
The  refusal  of  Lincoln  to  consider  either  of  these 
points  of  view  —  the  refusal  so  clearly  foreseen  by 
Davis  —  put  an  end  to  the  career  of  Stephens. 
He  was  "hoist  with  his  own  petard." 

The  news  of  the  failure  of  the  conference  was 
variously  received.  The  Mercury  rejoiced  because 
there  was  now  no  doubt  how  things  stood.  Ste 
phens,  unwilling  to  cooperate  with  the  Administra 
tion,  left  the  capital  and  went  home  to  Georgia. 
At  Richmond,  though  the  snow  lay  thick  on  the 
ground,  a  great  public  meeting  was  held  on  the 
6th  of  February  in  the  precincts  of  the  African 
Church.  Here  Davis  made  an  address  which  has 
been  called  his  greatest  and  which  produced  a  pro 
found  impression.  A  wave  of  enthusiasm  swept 


182     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

over  Richmond,  and  for  a  moment  the  President 
appeared  once  more  to  be  master  of  the  situation. 
His  immense  audacity  carried  the  people  with  him 
when,  after  showing  what  might  be  done  by  more 
drastic  enforcement  of  the  conscription  laws,  he 
concluded :  "Let  us  then  unite  our  hands  and  our 
hearts,  lock  our  shields  together,  and  we  may  well 
believe  that  before  another  summer  solstice  falls 
upon  us,  it  will  be  the  enemy  that  will  be  asking  us 
for  conferences  and  occasions  in  which  to  make 
known  our  demands." 


CHAPTER  XI 

AN    ATTEMPTED    REVOLUTION 

ALMOST  from  the  moment  when  the  South  had 
declared  its  independence  voices  had  been  raised 
in  favor  of  arming  the  negroes.  The  rejection  of  a 
plan  to  accomplish  this  was  one  of  the  incidents 
of  Benjamin's  tenure  of  the  portfolio  of  the  War 
Department ;  but  it  was  not  until  the  early  days  of 
1864,  w^hen  the  forces  of  Johnston  lay  encamped  at 
Dalton,  Georgia,  that  the  arming  of  the  slaves  was 
seriously  discussed  by  a  council  of  officers.  Even 
then  the  proposal  had  its  determined  champions, 
though  there  were  others  among  Johnston's  officers 
who  regarded  it  as  "contrary  to  all  true  principles 
of  chivalric  warfare, "  and  their  votes  prevailed  in 
the  council  by  a  large  majority. 

From  that  time  forward  the  question  of  arming 
the  slaves  hung  like  a  heavy  cloud  over  all  Con 
federate  thought  of  the  war.  It  was  discussed  in 
the  army  and  at  home  around  troubled  firesides. 

183 


184     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

Letters  written  from  the  trenches  at  Petersburg 
show  that  it  was  debated  by  the  soldiers,  and  the 
intense  repugnance  which  the  idea  inspired  in  som  e 
minds  was  shown  by  threats  to  leave  the  ranks  if 
the  slaves  were  given  arms. 

Amid  the  pressing,  obvious  issues  of  1864,  this 
project  hardly  appears  upon  the  face  of  the  record 
until  it  was  alluded  to  in  Davis's  message  to  Con 
gress  in  November,  1864,  and  in  the  annual  report 
of  the  Secretary  of  War.  The  President  did  not  as 
yet  ask  for  slave  soldiers.  He  did,  however,  ask 
for  the  privilege  of  buying  slaves  for  government 
use  —  not  merely  hiring  them  from  their  owners  as 
had  hitherto  been  done  —  and  for  permission,  if 
the  Government  so  desired,  to  emancipate  them 
at  the  end  of  their  service.  The  Secretary  of  War 
went  farther,  however,  and  advocated  negro  sol 
diers,  and  he  too  suggested  their  emancipation  at 
the  end  of  service. 

This  feeling  of  the  temper  of  the  country,  so  to 
speak,  produced  an  immediate  response.  It  drew 
Rhett  from  his  retirement  and  inspired  a  letter  in 
which  he  took  the  Government  severely  to  task  for 
designing  to  remove  from  state  control  this  matter 
of  fundamental  importance.  Coinciding  with  the 
cry  for  more  troops  with  which  to  confront  Sher- 


AN  ATTEMPTED  REVOLUTION         185 

man,  the  topic  of  negro  soldiers  became  at  once  one 
of  the  questions  of  the  hour.  It  helped  to  focus 
that  violent  anti-Davis  movement  which  is  the 
conspicuous  event  of  December,  1864,  and  Janu 
ary,  1865.  Those  who  believed  the  President  un 
scrupulous  trembled  at  the  thought  of  putting  into 
his  hands  a  great  army  of  hardy  barbarians  trained 
to  absolute  obedience.  The  prospect  of  such  a 
weapon  held  in  one  firm  hand  at  Richmond  seemed 
to  those  opponents  of  the  President  a  greater 
menace  to  their  liberties  than  even  the  armies  of 
the  invaders.  It  is  quite  likely  that  distrust  of 
Davis  and  dread  of  the  use  he  might  make  of  such 
a  weapon  was  increased  by  a  letter  from  Benjamin 
to  Frederick  A.  Porcher  of  Charleston,  a  supporter 
of  the  Government,  who  had  made  rash  suggestions 
as  to  the  extraconstitutional  power  that  the  Ad 
ministration  might  be  justified  by  circumstances  in 
assuming.  Benjamin  deprecated  such  suggestions 
but  concluded  with  the  unfortunate  remark:  "If 
the  Constitution  is  not  to  be  our  guide  I  would 
prefer  to  see  it  suppressed  by  a  revolution  which 
should  declare  a  dictatorship  during  the  war,  after 
the  manner  of  ancient  Rome,  leaving  to  the  future 
the  care  of  reestablishing  firm  and  regular  gov 
ernment." 


186     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

In  the  State  of  Virginia,  indeed,  the  revolution 
ary  suggestions  of  the  President's  message  and  the 
Secretary's  report  were  promptly  taken  up  and 
made  the  basis  of  a  political  program,  which  Gov 
ernor  Smith  embodied  in  his  message  to  the  Legis 
lature  —  a  document  that  will  eventually  take  i  ts 
place  among  the  most  interesting  state  papers  of 
the  Confederacy.  It  should  be  noted  that  the 
suggestions  thrown  out  in  this  way  by  the  Admin 
istration  to  test  public  feeling  involved  three  dis 
tinct  questions:  Should  the  slaves  be  given  arms? 
Should  they,  if  employed  as  soldiers,  be  given  their 
freedom?  Should  this  revolutionary  scheme,  if  ac 
cepted  at  all,  be  handled  by  the  general  Govern 
ment  or  left  to  the  several  States?  On  the  last  of 
the  three  questions  the  Governor  of  Virginia  was 
silent;  by  implication  he  treated  the  matter  as  a 
concern  of  the  States.  Upon  the  first  and  second 
questions,  however,  he  was  explicit  and  advised 
arming  the  slaves.  He  then  added: 

Even  if  the  result  were  to  emancipate  our  slaves,  there 
is  not  a  man  who  would  not  cheerfully  put  the  negro 
into  the  Army  rather  than  become  a  slave  himself  to  our 
hated  and  vindictive  foe.  It  is,  then,  simply  a  question 
of  time.  Has  the  time  arrived  when  this  issue  is  fairly 
before  us?  ...  For  my  part  standing  before  God 
and  my  country,  I  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  I  would 


AN  ATTEMPTED  REVOLUTION         187 

arm  such  portion  of  our  able-bodied  slave  population 
as  may  be  necessary,  and  put  them  in  the  field,  so  as  to 
have  them  ready  for  the  spring  campaign,  even  if  it 
resulted  in  the  freedom  of  those  thus  organized.  Will  I 
not  employ  them  to  fight  the  negro  force  of  the  enemy? 
Aye,  the  Yankees  themselves,  who  already  boast  that 
they  have  200,000  of  our  slaves  in  arms  against  us. 
Can  we  hesitate,  can  we  doubt,  when  the  question  is, 
whether  the  enemy  shall  use  our  slaves  against  us  or  we 
use  them  against  him;  when  the  question  may  be  be 
tween  liberty  and  independence  on  the  one  hand,  or 
our  subjugation  and  utter  ruin  on  the  other? 

With  their  Governor  as  leader  for  the  Adminis 
tration,  the  Virginians  found  this  issue  the  absorb 
ing  topic  of  the  hour.  And  now  the  great  figure 
of  Lee  takes  its  rightful  place  at  the  very  center  of 
Confederate  history,  not  only  military  but  civil, 
for  to  Lee  the  Virginia  politicians  turned  for 
advice. x  In  a  letter  to  a  State  Senator  of  Virginia 
who  had  asked  for  a  public  expression  of  Lee's 

1  Lee  now  revealed  himself  in  his  previously  overlooked  capacity 
of  statesman.  Whether  his  abilities  in  this  respect  equaled  his  abilities 
as  a  soldier  need  not  here  be  considered;  it  is  said  that  he  himself  had 
no  high  opinion  of  them.  However,  in  the  advice  which  he  gave  at 
this  final  moment  of  crisis,  he  expressed  a  definite  conception  of  the 
articulation  of  civil  forces  in  such  a  system  as  that  of  the  Confederacy. 
He  held  that  all  initiative  upon  basal  matters  should  remain  with  the 
separate  States,  that  the  function  of  the  general  Government  was  to 
administer,  not  to  create  conditions,  and  that  the  proper  power  to 
constrain  the  State  Legislatures  was  the  flexible,  extra-legal  power  of 
public  opinion. 


188     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

views  because  "a  mountain  of  prejudices,  growing 
out  of  our  ancient  modes  of  regarding  the  institu 
tion  of  Southern  slavery  will  have  to  be  met  and 
overcome"  in  order  to  attain  unanimity,  Lee  dis 
cussed  both  the  institution  of  slavery  and  the 
situation  of  the  moment.  He  plainly  intimated 
that  slavery  should  be  placed  under  state  control; 
and,  assuming  such  control,  he  considered  "the 
relation  of  master  and  slave  .  .  .  the  best  that  can 
exist  between  the  black  and  white  races  while 
intermingled  as  at  present  in  this  country."  He 
went  on  to  show,  however,  that  military  necessity 
now  compelled  a  revolution  in  sentiment  on  this 
subject,  and  he  came  at  last  to  this  momentous 
conclusion : 

Should  the  war  continue  under  existing  circumstances, 
the  enemy  may  in  course  of  time  penetrate  our  country 
and  get  access  to  a  large  part  of  our  negro  population. 
It  is  his  avowed  policy  to  convert  the  able-bodied  men 
among  them  into  soldiers,  and  to  emancipate  all.  .  .  . 
His  progress  will  thus  add  to  his  numbers,  and  at  the 
same  time  destroy  slavery  in  a  manner  most  pernicious 
to  the  welfare  of  our  people.  Their  negroes  will  be  used 
to  hold  them  in  subjection,  leaving  the  remaining  force 
of  the  enemy  free  to  extend  his  conquest.  Whatever 
may  be  the  effect  of  our  employing  negro  troops,  it 
cannot  be  as  mischievous  as  this.  If  it  end  in  subverting 
slavery  it  will  be  accomplished  by  ourselves,  and  we  can 


AN  ATTEMPTED  REVOLUTION         189 

devise  the  means  of  alleviating  the  evil  consequences  to 
both  races.  I  think,  therefore,  we  must  decide  whether 
slavery  shall  be  extinguished  by  our  enemies  and  the 
slaves  be  used  against  us,  or  use  them  ourselves  at  the 
risk  of  the  effects  which  may  be  produced  upon  our 
social  institutions.  .  .  . 

The  reasons  that  induce  me  to  recommend  the  em 
ployment  of  negro  troops  at  all  render  the  effect  of  the 
measures  .  .  .  upon  slavery  immaterial,  and  in  my 
opinion  the  best  means  of  securing  the  efficiency  and 
fidelity  of  this  auxiliary  force  would  be  to  accompany 
the  measure  with  a  well-digested  plan  of  gradual  and 
general  emancipation.  As  that  will  be  the  result  of  the 
continuance  of  the  war,  and  will  certainly  occur  if  the 
enemy  succeed,  it  seems  to  me  most  advisable  to  adopt 
it  at  once,  and  thereby  obtain  all  the  benefits  that  will 
accrue  to  our  cause.  .  .  . 

I  can  only  say  in  conclusion,  that  whatever  measures 
are  to  be  adopted  should  be  adopted  at  once.  Every 
day's  delay  increases  the  difficulty.  Much  time  will  be 
required  to  organize  and  discipline  the  men,  and  action 
may  be  deferred  until  it  is  too  late. 

Lee  wrote  these  words  on  January  11,  1865.  At 
that  time  a  fresh  wave  of  despondency  had  gone 
over  the  South  because  of  Hood's  rout  at  Nash 
ville;  Congress  was  debating  intermittently  the 
possible  arming  of  the  slaves;  and  the  newspapers 
were  prophesying  that  the  Administration  would 
presently  force  the  issue.  It  is  to  be  observed  that 
Lee  did  not  advise  Virginia  to  wait  for  Confederate 


190     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

action.  He  advocated  emancipation  by  the  State. 
After  all,  to  both  Lee  and  Smith,  Virginia  was  their 
"country." 

During  the  next  sixty  days  Lee  rejected  two 
great  opportunities  —  or,  if  you  will,  put  aside  two 
great  temptations.  /  If  tradition  is  to  be  trusted, 
it  was  during  January  that  Lee  refused  to  play  the 
role  of  Cromwell  by  declining  to  intervene  directly 
in  general  Confederate  politics.  But  there  re 
mained  open  the  possibility  of  his  intervention  in 
Virginia  politics,  and  the  local  crisis  was  in  its  own 
way  as  momentous  as  the  general  crisis.  What  if 
Virginia  had  accepted  the  views  of  Lee  and  in 
sisted  upon  the  immediate  arming  of  the  slaves? 
Virginia,  however,  did  not  do  so;  and  Lee,  hav 
ing  made  public  his  position,^  refrained  From 
further  participation.  Politically  speaking,  he 
maintained  a  splendid  isolation  at  the-  head  of 
the  armies. 

Through  January  and  February  the  Virginia 
crisis  continued  undetermined.  In  this  period  of 
fateful  hesitation,  the  "mountains  of  prejudice" 
proved  too  great  to  be  undermined  even  by  the 
influence  of  Lee.  When  at  last  Virginia  enacted  a 
law  permitting  the  arming  of  her  slaves,  no  pro 
vision  was  made  for  their  manumission. 


AN  ATTEMPTED  REVOLUTION         191 

Long  before  the  passage  of  this  act  in  Virginia, 
Congress  had  become  the  center  of  the  controversy. 
Davis  had  come  to  the  point  where  no  tradition 
however  cherished  would  stand,  in  his  mind, 
against  the  needs  of  the  moment.  To  reinforce 
the  army  in  great  strength  was  now  his  supreme 
concern,  and  he  saw  but  one  way  to  do  it.  As  a 
last  resort  he  was  prepared  to  embrace  the  bold 
plan  which  so  many  people  still  regarded  with 
horror  and  which  as  late  as  the  previous  Novem 
ber  he  himself  had  opposed.  He  would  arm  the 
slaves.  On  February  10,  1865,  bills  providing  for 
the  arming  of  the  slaves  were  introduced  both  in 
the  House  and  in  the  Senate. 

On  this  issue  all  the  forces  both  of  the  Govern 
ment  and  the  opposition  fought  their  concluding 
duel  in  which  were  involved  all  the  other  basal 
issues  that  had  distracted  the  country  since  1862. 
Naturally  there  was  a  bewildering  criss-cross  of 
political  motives.  There  were  men  who,  like 
Smith  and  Lee,  would  go  along  with  the  Govern 
ment  on  emancipation,  provided  it  was  to  be 
carried  out  by  the  free  will  of  the  States.  There 
were  others  who  preferred  subjugation  to  the 
arming  of  the  slaves;  and  among  these  there  were 
clashings  of  motive.  Then,  too,  there  were  those 


192     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

who  were  willing  to  arm  the  slaves  but  were  re 
solved  not  to  give  them  their  freedom. 

The  debate  brings  to  the  front  of  the  political 
stage  the  figure  of  R.  M.  T.  Hunter.  Hitherto  his 
part  has  not  been  conspicuous  either  as  Secretary 
of  State  or  as  Senator  from  Virginia.  He  now 
becomes,  in  the  words  of  Davis,  "a  chief  obstacle" 
to  the  passage  of  the  Senate  bill  which  would  have 
authorized  a  levy  of  negro  troops  and  provided  for 
their  manumission  by  the  War  Department  with 
the  consent  of  the  State  in  which  they  should  be 
at  the  time  of  the  proposed  manumission.  After 
long  discussion,  this  bill  was  indefinitely  postponed. 
Meanwhile  a  very  different  bill  had  dragged 
through  the  House.  While  it  was  under  debate, 
another  appeal  was  made  to  Lee.  Barksdale,  who 
came  as  near  as  any  one  to  being  the  leader  of 
the  Administration,  sought  Lee's  aid.  Again  the 
General  urged  the  enrollment  of  negro  soldiers  and 
their  eventual  manumission,  but  added  this  im 
mensely  significant  proviso: 

I  have  no  doubt  that  if  Congress  would  authorize  their 
[the  negroes']  reception  into  service,  and  empower  the 
President  to  call  upon  individuals  or  States  for  such  as 
they  are  willing  to  contribute,  with  the  condition  of 
emancipation  to  all  enrolled,  a  sufficient  number  would 


AN  ATTEMPTED  REVOLUTION         193 

be  forthcoming  to  enable  us  to  try  the  experiment  [of 
determining  whether  the  slaves  would  make  good  sol 
diers].  If  it  proved  successful,  most  of  the  objections 
to  the  measure  would  disappear,  and  if  individuals  still 
remained  unwilling  to  send  their  negroes  to  the  army, 
the  force  of  public  opinion  in  the  States  would  soon 
bring  about  such  legislation  as  would  remove  all  ob- 
stacles.  I  think  the  matter  shouIdTbe  left,  as  far  as 
possible,  to  the^  people  and^to  the_States,  which  alone 
can  legislate  as  tEe  necessities  of  this  particular  service 
may  require. 

The  fact  that  Congress  had  before  it  this  advice 
from  Lee  explains  why  all  factions  accepted  a 
compromise  bill,  passed  on  the  9th  of  March, 
approved  by  the  President  on  the  13th  of  March, 
and  issued  to  the  country  in  a  general  order  on  the 
23d  of  March .  It  empowered  the  President  to ' '  ask 
for  and  accept  from  the  owners  of  slaves"  the 
service  of  such  number  of  negroes  as  he  saw  fit,  and 
if  sufficient  number  were  not  offered  to  "call  on 
each  State  ...  for  her  quota  of  300,000  troops 
...  to  be  raised  from  such  classes  of  the  popula 
tion,  irrespective  of  color,  in  each  State  as  the 
proper  authorities  thereof  may  determine."  How 
ever,  "nothing  in  this  act  shall  be  construed  to 
authorize  a  change  in  the  relation  which  the  said 
slaves  shall  bear  toward  their  owners,  except  by 
consent  of  the  owners  and  of  the  States  in  which 
13 


194     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

they  may  reside  and  in  pursuance  of  the  laws 
thereof." 

The  results  of  this  act  were  negligible.  Its 
failure  to  offer  the  slave-soldier  his  freedom  was  at 
once  seized  upon  by  critics  as  evidence  of  the  futil 
ity  of  the  course  of  the  Administration.  The  sneer 
went  round  that  the  negro  was  to  be  made  to  fight 
for  his  own  captivity.  Pollard  —  whose  words, 
.  however,  must  be  taken  with  a  grain  of  salt  —  has 
left  this  account  of  recruiting  under  the  new  act : 
"Two  companies  of  blacks,  organized  from  some 
negro  vagabonds  in  Richmond,  were  allowed  to 
give  balls  at  the  Libby  Prison  and  were  exhibited 
in  fine  fresh  uniforms  on  Capitol  Square  as  decoys 
to  obtain  recruits.  But  the  mass  of  their  colored 
brethren  looked  on  the  parade  with  unenvious  eyes, 
and  little  boys  exhibited  the  early  prejudices  of 
race  by  pelting  the  fine  uniforms  with  mud." 

Nevertheless  both  Davis  and  Lee  busied  them 
selves  in  the  endeavor  to  raise  black  troops.  Gov 
ernor  Smith  cooperated  with  them.  And  in  the 
mind  of  the  President  there  was  no  abandonment 
of  the  program  of  emancipation,  wThich  was  now 
his  cardinal  policy.  Soon  after  the  passage  of  the 
act,  he  wrote  to  Smith:  "I  am  happy  to  receive 
your  assurance  of  success  [in  raising  black  troops], 


AN  ATTEMPTED  REVOLUTION         195 

as  well  as  your  promise  to  seek  legislation  to  secure 
unmistakable  freedom  to  the  slave  who  shall  enter 
the  Army,  with  a  right  to  return  to  his  old  home, 
when  he  shall  have  been  honorably  discharged 
from  military  service." 

While  this  final  controversy  was  being  fought  out 
in  Congress,  the  enthusiasm  for  the  Administra 
tion  had  again  ebbed.  Its  recovery  of  prestige  had 
run  a  brief  course  and  was  gone,  and  now  in  the 
midst  of  the  discussion  over  the  negro  soldiers'  bills, 
the  opposition  once  more  attacked  the  Cabinet, 
with  its  old  enemy,  Benjamin,  as  the  target. 
Resolutions  were  introduced  into  the  Senate  declar 
ing  that  "the  retirement  of  the  Honorable  Judah 
P.  Benjamin  from  the  State  Department  will  be 
subservient  of  the  public  interests";  in  the  House 
resolutions  were  offered  describing  his  public 
utterances  as  "derogatory  to  his  position  as  a 
high  public  functionary  of  the  Confederate  Gov 
ernment,  a  reflection  on  the  motives  of  Congress 
as  a  deliberative  body,  and  an  insult  to  public 
opinion." 

So  Congress  wrangled  and  delayed  while  the 
wave  of  fire  that  was  Sherman's  advance  moved 
northward  through  the  Carolinas.  Columbia  had 
gone  up  in  smoke  while  the  Senate  debated  day 


196     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

after  day  —  fifteen  in  all  —  what  to  do  with  the 
compromise  bill  sent  up  to  it  from  the  House.  It 
was  during  this  period  that  a  new  complication 
appears  to  have  been  added  to  a  situation  which 
was  already  so  hopelessly  entangled,  for  this  was 
the  time  when  Governor  Magrath  made  a  proposal 
to  Governor  Vance  for  a  league  within  the  Con 
federacy,  giving  as  his  chief  reason  that  Virginia's 
interests  were  parting  company  with  those  of  the 
lower  South.  The  same  doubt  of  the  upper  South 
appears  at  various  times  in  the  Mercury.  And 
through  all  the  tactics  of  the  opposition  runs  the 
constant  effort  to  discredit  Davis.  The  Mercury 
scoffed  at  the  agitation  for  negro  soldiers  as  a  mad 
attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Administration  to 
remedy  its  "myriad  previous  blunders." 

In  these  terrible  days,  the  mind  of  Davis  hard 
ened.  He  became  possessed  by  a  lofty  and  in 
tolerant  confidence,  an  absolute  conviction  that, 
in  spite  of  all  appearances,  he  was  on  the  threshold 
of  success.  We  may  safely  ascribe  to  him  in  these 
days  that  illusory  state  of  mind  which  has  charac 
terized  some  of  the  greatest  of  men  in  their  over 
strained,  concluding  periods.  His  extraordinary 
promises  in  his  later  messages,  a  series  of  vain 
prophecies  beginning  with  his  speech  at  the  African 


AN  ATTEMPTED  REVOLUTION         197 

Church,  remind  one  of  Napoleon  after  Leipzig 
refusing  the  Rhine  as  a  boundary.  His  nerves, 
too,  were  all  but  at  the  breaking-point.  He  sent 
the  Senate  a  scolding  message  because  of  its  delay 
in  passing  the  Negro  Soldiers'  Bill.  The  Senate 
answered  in  a  report  that  was  sharply  critical  of 
his  own  course.  Shortly  afterward  Congress  ad 
journed  refusing  his  request  for  another  suspension 
of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus. 

Davis  had  hinted  at  important  matters  he  hoped 
soon  to  be  able  to  submit  to  Congress.  What  he 
had  in  mind  was  the  last,  the  boldest,  stroke  of  this 
period  of  desperation.  The  policy  of  emancipation 
he  and  Benjamin  had  accepted  without  reserve. 
They  had  at  last  perceived,  too  late,  the  power  of 
the  anti-slavery  movement  in  Europe.  Though 
they  had  already  failed  to  coerce  England  through 
cotton  and  had  been  played  with  and  abandoned 
by  Napoleon,  they  persisted  in  thinking  that  there 
was  still  a  chance  for  a  third  chapter  in  their  foreign 
affairs . 

The  agitation  to  arm  the  slaves,  with  the  promise 
of  freedom,  had  another  motive  besides  the  rein 
forcement  of  Lee's  army:  it  was  intended  to  serve 
as  a  basis  for  negotiations  with  England  and  France. 
To  that  end  D.  J.  Kenner  was  dispatched  to  Europe 


198     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

early  in  1865.  Passing  through  New  York  in  dis 
guise,  he  carried  word  of  this  revolutionary  pro 
gram  to  the  Confederate  commissioners  abroad. 
A  conference  at  Paris  was  held  by  Kenner,  Mason, 
and  Slidell.  Mason,  who  had  gone  over  to  England 
to  sound  Palmerston  with  regard  to  this  last  Con 
federate  hope,  was  received  on  the  14th  of  March. 
On  the  previous  day,  Davis  had  accepted  tem 
porary  defeat,  by  signing  the  compromise  bill  which 
omitted  emancipation.  But  as  there  was  no  cable 
operating  at  the  time,  Mason  was  not  aware  of  this 
rebuff.  In  his  own  words,  he  "urged  upon  Lord  P. 
that  if  the  President  was  right  in  his  impression 
that  there  was  some  latent,  undisclosed  obstacle 
on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  to  recognition,  it 
should  be  frankly  stated,  and  we  might,  if  in  our 
power  to  do  so,  consent  to  remove  it."  Palmerston, 
though  his  manner  was  "conciliatory  and  kind," 
insisted  that  there  was  nothing  "underlying"  his 
previous  statements,  and  that  he  could  not,  in 
view  of  the  facts  then  existing,  regard  the  Con 
federacy  in  the  light  of  an  independent  power. 
Mason  parted  from  him  convinced  that  "the  most 
ample  concessions  on  our  part  in  the  matter  re 
ferred  to  would  have  produced  no  change  in  the 
course  determined  on  by  the  British  Government 


AN  ATTEMPTED  REVOLUTION         199 

with  regard  to  recognition."  In  a  subsequent  in 
terview  with  Lord  Donoughmore,  he  was  frankly 
told  that  the  offer  of  emancipation  had  come  too 
late. 

The  dispatch  in  which  Mason  reported  the  atti 
tude  of  the  British  Government  never  reached  the 
Confederate  authorities.  It  was  dated  the  31st  of 
March.  Two  days  later  Richmond  was  evacuated 
by  the  Confederate  Government. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE   LAST   WORD 

THE  evacuation  of  Richmond  broke  the  back  of 
the  Confederate  defense.  Congress  had  adjourned. 
The  legislative  history  of  the  Confederacy  was 
at  an  end.  The  executive  history  still  had  a  few 
days  to  run.  After  destroying  great  quantities  of 
records,  the  government  officials  had  packed  the 
remainder  on  a  long  train  that  conveyed  the  Presi 
dent  and  what  was  left  of  the  civil  service  to  Dan 
ville.  During  a  few  days,  Danville  was  the  Con 
federate  capital.  There,  Davis,  still  unable  to 
conceive  defeat,  issued  his  pathetic  last  Address  to 
the  People  of  the  Confederate  States.  His  mind  was 
crystallized.  He  was  no  longer  capable  of  judg 
ing  facts.  In  as  confident  tones  as  ever  he  promised 
his  people  that  they  should  yet  prevail;  he  assured 
Virginians  that  even  if  the  Confederate  army 
should  withdraw  further  south  the  withdrawal 
would  be  but  temporary,  and  that  "again  and 

200 


THE  LAST  WORD  201 

again  will  we  return  until  the  baffled  and  exhausted 
enemy  shall  abandon  in  despair  his  endless  and 
impossible  task  of  making  slaves  of  a  people  re 
solved  to  be  free." 

The  surrender  at  Appomattox  on  April  9,  1865, 
compelled  another  migration  of  the  dwindling  ex 
ecutive  company.  General  Johnston  had  not  yet 
surrendered.  A  conference  which  he  had  with  the 
President  and  the  Cabinet  at  Greensboro  ended 
in  giving  him  permission  to  negotiate  with  Sher 
man.  Even  then  Davis  was  still  bent  on  keeping 
up  the  fight;  yet,  though  he  believed  that  Sherman 
would  reject  Johnston's  overtures,  he  was  over 
taken  at  Charlotte  on  his  way  South  by  the  crush 
ing  news  of  Johnston's  surrender.  There  the  ex 
ecutive  history  of  the  Confederacy  came  to  an  end 
in  a  final  Cabinet  meeting.  Davis,  still  blindly 
resolute  to  continue  the  struggle,  was  deeply  dis 
tressed  by  the  determination  of  his  advisers  to 
abandon  it.  In  imminent  danger  of  capture,  the 
President's  party  made  its  way  to  Abbeville,  where 
it  broke  up,  and  each  member  sought  safety  as  best 
he  could.  Davis  with  a  few  faithful  men  rode  to 
Irwinsville,  Georgia,  where,  in  the  early  morning 
of  the  10th  of  May,  he  was  surprised  and  captured. 
But  the  history  of  the  Confederacy  was  not  quite 


202     THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY 

at  an  end.  The  last  gunshots  were  still  to  be  fired 
far  away  in  Texas  on  the  13th  of  May.  The  sur 
render  of  the  forces  of  the  Trans-Mississippi  on 
May  26,  1865,  brought  the  war  to  a  definite  con 
clusion. 

There  remains  one  incident  of  these  closing  days, 
the  significance  of  which  was  not  perceived  until 
long  afterward,  when  it  immediately  took  its  right 
ful  place  among  the  determining  events  of  Ameri 
can  history.  The  unconquerable  spirit  of  the  Army 
of  Northern  Virginia  found  its  last  expression  in  a 
proposal  which  was  made  to  Lee  by  his  officers. 
If  he  would  give  the  word,  they  would  make  the 
war  a  duel  to  the  death;  it  should  drag  out  in  re 
lentless  guerrilla  struggles;  and  there  should  be  no 
pacification  of  the  South  until  the  fighting  classes 
had  been  exterminated.  Considering  what  those 
classes  were,  considering  the  qualities  that  could 
be  handed  on  to  their  posterity,  one  realizes  that 
this  suicide  of  a  whole  people,  of  a  noble  fighting 
people,  would  have  maimed  incalculably  the  Amer 
ica  of  the  future.  But  though  the  heroism  of  this 
proposal  of  his  men  to  die  on  their  shields  had  its 
stern  charm  for  so  brave  a  man  as  Lee,  he  refused 
to  consider  it.  He  would  not  admit  that  he  and  his 
people  had  a  right  thus  to  extinguish  their  power 


THE  LAST  WORD  203 

to  help  mold  the  future,  no  matter  whether  it  be 
the  future  they  desired  or  not.  The  result  of  battle 
must  be  accepted.  The  Southern  spirit  must  not 
perish,  luxuriating  blindly  in  despair,  but  must 
find  a  new  form  of  expression,  must  become  part  of 
the  new  world  that  was  to  be,  must  look  to  a  new 
birth  under  new  conditions.  In  this  spirit  he 
issued  to  his  army  his  last  address : 

After  four  years  of  arduous  service,  marked  by  unsur 
passed  courage  and  fortitude,  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  has  been  compelled  to  yield  to  overwhelming 
numbers  and  resources.  I  need  not  tell  the  survivors 
of  so  many  hard-fought  battles,  who  have  remained 
steadfast  to  the  last,  that  I  have  consented  to  the  result 
from  no  distrust  of  them;  but  feeling  that  valor  and 
devotion  could  accomplish  nothing  that  could  compen 
sate  for  the  loss  that  would  have  attended  the  continua 
tion  of  the  contest,  I  determined  to  avoid  the  useless 
sacrifice  of  those  whose  past  services  have  endeared 
them  to  their  countrymen.  ...  I  bid  you  an  affec 
tionate  farewell. 

How  inevitably  one  calls  to  mind,  in  view  of  the 
indomitable  valor  of  Lee's  final  decision,  those 
great  lines  from  Tennyson: 

Tho'  much  is  taken,  much  abides;  and  tho' 

We  are  not  now  that  strength  which  in  old  days 

Moved  earth  and  heaven;  that  which  we  are,  we  are; 

One  equal  temper  of  heroic  hearts, 

Made  weak  by  time  and  fate,  but  strong  in  will. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

THERE  is  no  adequate  history  of  the  Confederacy.  It  is 
rumored  that  a  distinguished  scholar  has  a  great  work 
approaching  completion.  It  is  also  rumored  that 
another  scholar,  well  equipped  to  do  so,  will  soon  bring 
out  a  monumental  life  of  Davis.  But  the  fact  remains 
that  as  yet  we  lack  a  comprehensive  review  of  the  Con 
federate  episode  set  in  proper  perspective.  Standard 
works  such  as  the  History  of  the  United  States  from  the 
Compromise  of  1850,  by  J.  F.  Rhodes  (7  vols.,  1893- 
1906),  even  when  otherwise  as  near  a  classic  as  is  the 
work  of  Mr.  Rhodes,  treat  the  Confederacy  so  externally 
as  to  have  in  this  respect  little  value.  The  one  search 
ing  study  of  the  subject,  The  Confederate  States  of 
America,  by  J.  C.  Schwab  (1901),  though  admirable  in 
its  way,  is  wholly  overshadowed  by  the  point  of  view 
of  the  economist.  The  same  is  to  be  said  of  the  article 
by  Professor  Schwab  in  the  llth  edition  of  The  Encyclo 
pedia  Britannica. 

Two  famous  discussions  of  the  episode  by  partici 
pants  are:  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment,  by  the  President  of  the  Confederacy  (£  vols., 
1881),  and  A  Constitutional  View  of  the  Late  War  Be 
tween  the  States,  by  Alexander  H.  Stephens  (2  vols., 
1870).  Both  works,  though  invaluable  to  the  student, 
are  tinged  with  controversy,  each  of  the  eminent 

205 


206  BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

authors  aiming  to  refute  the  arguments  of  political 
antagonists. 

The  military  history  of  the  time  has  so  overshadowed 
the  civil,  in  the  minds  of  most  students,  that  we  are  still 
sadly  in  need  of  careful,  disinterested  studies  of  the 
great  figures  of  Confederate  civil  affairs.  Jeffer.ion 
Davis,  by  William  E.  Dodd  (American  Crisis  Biog 
raphies,  1907),  is  the  standard  life  of  the  President, 
superseding  older  ones.  Not  so  satisfactory  in  the  same 
series  is  Judah  P.  Benjamin,  by  Pierce  Butler  (1907),  and 
Alexander  H.  Stephens,  by  Louis  Pendleton  (1907). 
Older  works  which  are  valuable  for  the  material  they 
contain  are:  Memoir  of  Jefferson  Davis,  by  his  Wife 
(1890);  The  Life  and  Times  of  Alexander  H.  Stephens, 
by  R.  M.  Johnston  and  W.  M.  Browne  (1878) ;  The  Life 
and  Times  of  William  Lowndes  Yancey,  by  J.  W.  Du 
Bose  (1892) ;  The  Life,  Times,  and  Speeches  of  Joseph 
E.  Brown,  by  Herbert  Fielder  (1883);  Public  Life  and 
Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  James  M.  Mason,  by  his 
Daughter  (1903);  The  Life  and  Time  of  C.  G.  Memmin- 
ger,  by  H.  D.  Capers  (1893).  The  writings  of  E.  A. 
Pollard  cannot  be  disregarded,  but  must  be  taken  as  the 
violent  expression  of  an  extreme  partizan.  They  include 
a  Life  of  Jefferson  Davis  (1869)  and  The  Lost  Cause 
(1867).  A  charming  series  of  essays  is  Confederate 
Portraits,  by  Gamaliel  Bradford  (1914).  Among  books 
on  special  topics  that  are  to  be  recommended  are :  The 
Diplomatic  History  of  the  Southern  Confederacy  by  J.  M. 
Callahan  (1901);  France  and  the  Confederate  Navy,  by 
John  Bigelow  (1888);  and  The  Secret  Service  of  the  Con 
federate  States  in  Europe,  by  J.  D.  Bulloch  (2  vols., 
1884).  There  is  a  large  number  of  contemporary 
accounts  of  life  in  the  Confederacy.  Historians  have 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE  207 

generally  given  excessive  attention  to  A  Rebel  War 
Clerk's  Diary  at  the  Confederate  States  Capital,  by  J.  B. 
Jones  (2  vols.,  1866)  which  has  really  neither  more  nor 
less  value  than  a  Richmond  newspaper.  Conspicuous 
among  writings  of  this  type  is  the  delightful  Diary  from 
Dixie,  by  Mrs.  Mary  B.  Chestnut  (1905)  and  My  Diary, 
North  and  South,  by  W.  H.  Russell  (1862). 

The  documents  of  the  civil  history,  so  far  as  they  are 
accessible  to  the  general  reader,  are  to  be  found  in  the 
three  volumes  forming  the  fourth  series  of  the  Official 
Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Armies  (128  vols., 
1880-1901);  the  Journals  of  the  Congress  of  the  Con 
federate  States  (8  vols.,  1904)  and  Messages  and  Papers 
of  the  Confederacy,  edited  by  J.  D.  Richardson  (2  vols., 
1905).  Four  newspapers  are  of  first  importance:  the 
famous  opposition  organs,  the  Richmond  Examiner  and 
the  Charleston  Mercury,  which  should  be  offset  by  the 
two  leading  organs  of  the  Government,  the  Courier  of 
Charleston  and  the  Enquirer  of  Richmond.  The  Stat 
utes  of  the  Confederacy  have  been  collected  and  pub 
lished;  most  of  them  are  also  to  be  found  in  the  fourth 
series  of  the  Official  Records. 

Additional  bibliographical  references  will  be  found 
appended  to  the  articles  on  the  Confederate  States  of 
America,  Secession,  and  Jefferson  Davis,  in  The  En- 
cyclopedia  Britannica,  llth  edition. 


INDEX 


Alabama,  represented  at  South 
Carolina    convention,    3;    se 
cedes,  7;  convention,  8;  situa 
tion  in,  74,  114-20;   iron  for 
munitions  from,  106;  questions 
of  state  sovereignty  in,  116-19 
Alabama,  The  (ship),  53, 135,  139 
Anderson,  Major  Robert,  trans 
fers   garrison    to    Sumter,    6; 
refuses  Beauregard's  demands, 
15-16;  see  also  Sumter 
Antietam  campaign,  53,  58 
Appomattox,  surrender  at,  201 
Arkansas,  14,  74,  112,  113,  114 
Annan,  shipbuilder  of  Bordeaux, 

132,  133,  135,  140,  143-44 
Army,  composition  and  size  of, 
36-37;    state   armies,    38,  72; 
difficulty  of  enlisting,  76;  lack 
of  shoes  for,  77-78;  desertion, 
110,  120,  162,  166;  surrenders, 
201-02;  see  also  Conscription, 
Military  policy. 
Ayer,  L.  M.,  of  South  Carolina, 


Baldwin,  of  Virginia,  tells  of 
martial  law,  84 

Barksdale,  Ethelbert,  of  Missis 
sippi,  82,  84-85,  192 

Beauregard,  General  P.  G.  T., 
and  the  surrender  of  Fort 
Sumter,  15-24;  in  Georgia, 
148,  149 

Benjamin,  J.  P.,  signs  To  Our 
Constituents,  3;  Attorney-Gen 
eral,  27;  Secretary  of  War,  34, 
79  (note);  Secretary  of  State, 


34,  40;  complaints  against, 
40,  63-64;  life  and  character, 
69-71;  denounces  Napoleon, 
144;  on  extraconstitutional 
power,  185;  attacked  by  Con 
gress,  195;  accepts  policy  of 
emancipation,  197 

Blair,  F.  P.,  plan  of  reconcilia 
tion,  179-80 

Blockade,  51,  56,  77,  105 

Bocock,  T.  S.,  Speaker  of  House, 
156 

Bonds,  see  Finance 

Boyce,  of  South  Carolina,  argu 
ment  for  peace,  175 

Bragg,  General  Braxton,  plan  to 
invade  Kentucky,  44;  attitude 
toward  press,  59;  Da  vis's 
confidence  in,  69;  army  condi 
tions  under,  96;  resigns  com 
mand,  113-14 

Breckinridge,  General  J.  C., 
Secretary  of  War,  79  (note) 

Brown,  J.  E.,  Governor  of  Geor 
gia,  on  secession,  5,  6-7;  on 
conscription,  65-66,  75-76; 
opponent  of  Administration, 
145-49;  motives,  174  (note) 

Bull  Run,  Battle  of,  see  Ma- 
nassas 

Bullock,  Captain  James,  135-36 

Butler,  A.  P..  of  South  Carolina, 
4 

Cabinet,  14-15,  27,  34,  40,  69 
Campbell,    J.    A.,    Confederate 

commissioner      at     Hampton 

Roads,  180 


209 


210 


INDEX 


Canada,  Confederate  agents  in, 
126-27 

Chancellorsville,  89 

Charleston,  15  et  seq.,  97 

Charleston  Courier,  18,  21-22, 
61-62,  94,  95,  97 

Charleston  Mercury,  describes 
siege  of  Sumter,  20;  opposes 
Administration,  33,  39,  43, 
61-62,  95,  151,  152,  154;  on 
conscription,  64;  on  Seddon's 
appointment,  79;  on  Impress 
ment  Act,  80;  on  Tax  Act,  81; 
on  suspension  of  habeas  corpus, 
82-83,  85-86;  issue  of  conduct 
of  war,  89,  90;  account  of 
President's  visit  to  Charleston, 
97;  on  peace,  175,  180;  doubts 
upper  South,  196;  on  negro 
soldiers,  196 

Chattanooga,  113 

Chestnut,  James,  18  (note) 

Chevalier,  Michel,  138 

Chickamauga  campaign,  96,  113 

Clay,  C.  C.,  127 

Cobb,  Howell,  146,  154-55 

Cold  Harbor,  126 

Columbia  and  Augusta  Rail 
road  Company,  152-53 

"Confederate  Societies,"  95 

Confederate  States,  provisional 
government  organized,  10-11; 
status  of  belligerent  accorded 
by  England,  35;  clash  with 
state  authority,  38-40;  ar 
chives  threatened,  42;  period  of 
elation,  43-44;  foreign  affairs, 
46  et  seq.',  130  et  seq.;  secrecy 
of  government,  59,  60,  65,  66; 
divided  into  separate  units, 
74;  impotence  of  government, 
160;  anti-war  factions  in,  165- 
167;  war  ended,  202;  see  also 
Davis,  South 

Congress,  Confederate,  9-11 

Congress,  U.  S.,  House  com 
mittee  of  thirty- three,  2,  13 

Conscription,  adopted,  37-38; 
constitutionality  attacked,  39; 


Pollard's  criticism  of  enforce 
ment,  64;  correspondence  of 
Davis  and  Brown  on,  65-56; 
Rhett's  opinion  of,  73;  op 
position  to,  75-77;  exenp- 
tions,  102,  123-24;  hiring  of 
substitutes,  103;  failure  of 
State  and  Confederate  gov 
ernments  to  cooperate,  116, 
151;  age  limits,  122-23 

Constitution,  Confederate,  i  0- 
11 

Corinth,  53 

Cotton,  to  solve  financial  prob 
lem,  45-46;  necessary  to  Eng 
lish,  46;  effect  of  blockade, 
51-57;  powerless  to  coerce  E  ng- 
land,  56 

Danville,  Confederate  capil  al, 
200 

Davis,  Jefferson,  signs  To  Our 
Constituents,  3;  elected  Presi 
dent  in  provisional  Govern 
ment,  11;  as  President,  15,  24 
et  seq.;  from  Mississippi,  29;  ' 
born  in  Kentucky,  30;  early 
life,  31-32;  personal  char 
acteristics,  32;  military  activi 
ties,  33;  criticism  of,  33-34, 
43,  61-65,  89-90,  159-60,  175; 
President  at  first  regular  elec 
tion,  34;  inauguration,  35- 
36;  message  to  Congress 
(1862),  36;  proposes  con 
scription,  37;  vetoes  Texas 
Regiment  Bill,  38;  clash  with 
state  authority,  38-40;  use  of 
martial  law,  40-42;  at  height  of 
powers,  43;  shortcomings,  67- 
69;  relations  with  Lee,  68; 
Cabinet,  69;  personal  loyalty, 
70;  statecraft,  71;  endorses 
"Confederate  Societies,"  95; 
journeys  during  Administra 
tion,  96-97;  message  to  Con 
gress  (1863),  114;  message  to 
Congress  (1864),  119-20;  in 
Georgia,  144,  148-49;  forced  to 


INDEX 


Davis,  Jefferson — Continued 
reorganize  army,  163-64;  con 
fident  of  Confederate  success, 
182,  196-97;  signs  compromise 
bill,  198;  Address  to  the  People 
of  the  Confederate  States,  200- 
201;  resolute  to  continue  strug 
gle,    201;    capture    at    Irwins- 
ville,  Ga.,  201 
Davis,   Mrs.    Jefferson,   quoted, 

67-68,  163 

Davis,  Reuben,  quoted,  67 
Deserters,  110,  120,  162,  166 
Desperadoes,  111,  166-67 
Donelson,  Fort,  36,  40,  58 
Donoughmore,  Lord,  Mason  in 
terviews,  199 
Draft,  see  Conscription 

Egypt  enters  cotton  competition, 
56-57 

Elmore,  of  Alabama,  addresses 
South  Carolina  convention, 
3 

Emancipation,  184,  197,  198; 
Proclamation,  53,  77 

England,  attitude  toward  Con 
federacy,  35, 46-47, 54, 56, 198- 
199;  mission  to,  46;  effort  to 
coerce,  51-52;  Mason  in,  52- 
53;  cotton  famine  in,  53;  bit 
terness  against,  77,  137-38; 
"Southern  party,"  135,  136; 
shipbuilding  investigations, 
135-36;  decides  France's  atti 
tude,  142 

Erlanger,  Emile,  54-56,  131,  133 

Exemptions,  102,  123-24 

Finance,  45,  48;  specie  seized, 
49;  "fifteen  million  loan,"  49; 
war  tax,  49-50;  loans,  50; 
note  issues,  50;  "hundred 
million  loan,"  51;  "Erlanger 
bonds, "  54-56;  price  fixing,  78, 
79,  80,  90-91,  95;  Impressment 
Act,  80;  tax  in  kind,  80-81,  91, 
92,  125;  licensing  of  occupa 
tions,  81,  91;  income  tax,  81, 


91;  property  tax,  81;  Funding 
Act,  81  (note),  125;  financial 
breakdown,  157-58 

Florida,  7,  74 

Florida,  The,  Confederate  cruis 
er,  139 

Floyd,  J.  B.,  U.  S.  Secretary  of 
War,  resignation,  5,  6 

Food  situation,  77,  108-09,  160- 
161 

Foote,  H.  S.,  29,  84,  178,  179- 
180 

Forey,  General,  dispatched  to 
Mexico,  132 

France,  see  Napoleon 

France,  Mexico,  and  the  Con 
federate  States,  138 

Georgia,  74;    secession  issue  in, 
4-8;  state  sovereignty  in,  65- 
66,  75-76;  unrest  in,  94,  158, 
172;  invaded,  127-29;  145-50 
Gettysburg,  Battle  of,  88,  89 
Grant,    General    U.    S.,    crosses 
Rapidan,  126;  at  Cold  Harbor, 
126 

Habeas  corpus  acts,  41,  59,  82- 

86,  116-18,  119-20,  122,  197 
"Heroes  of  America,"  120-21 
Hindman,  General  T.  C.,  84 
Holden,  W.  W.,  of  North  Caro 
lina,  93,  170-71 
Hood,  General  J.  B.,  129,  147 
Hooker,  of  Mississippi,  3 
Houston,     Sam,     Governor     of 

Texas,  8-9 

Hunter,  R.  M.  T.,  Secretary  of 
State,  34,  69;  in  Senate,  177; 
Confederate  commissioner  at 
Hampton  Roads,  180;  opposes 
levy  of  negro  troops,  192 
Huntsville  (Ala.),  118-19 

Impressment  Act,  80,  90-91,  159 
Index,  The,  Confederate  foreign 

organ,  62  (note) 
India  begins  to  export  cotton, 

56 


INDEX 


Industries   in   the    South,    105- 

107 
Ismail  Pasha,  56-57 

Johnson,  H.  V.,  172 

Johnston,  A.  S.,  42-43 

Johnston,  General  J.  E.,  69;  suc 
ceeds  Bragg  in  command,  114; 
lower  South  demands  removal 
of,  128;  superseded  by  Hood, 
129;  appeals  for  restoration  of, 
154, 156;  restored  to  command, 
164;  surrenders,  201 

Johnston,  Fort,  17,  20 

Kenesaw  Mountain,  127 

Kenner,  D.  J.,  dispatched  to 
Europe,  197-98 

Kentucky,  63;  plan  of  Confeder 
acy  to  win,  44 

Labor,  100-02,  152-53 

Laird  rams  controversy,  135- 
136,  137 

Lee,  General  R.  E.,  inspires 
army,  43-44;  to  invade  Mary 
land,  44;  and  Davis,  68-69; 
demand  of  full  command  for, 
154,  156;  conspiracy  to  set  up 
as  dictator,  155;  made  com 
manding  general,  163;  opinion 
of  peace  project,  180;  as 
statesman,  187-90;  officers 
propose  to  continue  fighting, 
202-03;  address  to  army,  203 

Lee,  Stephen,  18  (note) 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  reelection, 
175,  178;  conference  at  Hamp 
ton  Roads,  181 

Louisiana,  7,  42,  74,  112,  113, 
114 

McClellan,  General  G.  B.,  42, 127 
Magrath,    A.    G.,    Governor   of 

South   Carolina,   152,   153-54, 

196 
Manassas,  Battle  of,  33;  Second, 

43,  59 
Mann,  A.  D.,  Confederate  com 


missioner  at  Brussels,  46,  132- 
133.  142 

Martial  law,  see  Habeas  corpus 
Maryland,  plan  of  Confederate 

States  to  win,  44 
Mason,  J.  M.,  capture  of,    46; 
replaces      Yancey     as     com 
missioner,  47;  in  England,  52- 

53,  55,  198-99;  in  Paris,  i37- 
138,  198 

Memminger,  C.  G.,  Secretary  of 
Treasury,  attempts  to  estab 
lish  foreign  credit,  48;  resigns, 
157;  see  also  Finance 

Mexico,  114;  Napoleon  III  ;md, 
131,  132-33,  134,  138,  139; 
Confederate  negotiations  vith, 
139-40,  144;  project  con 
demned  by  French  people,  143; 
expedition  suggested,  179 

Military  policy,  33,  43-44 

Mississippi,  represented  in  South 
Carolina  convention,  3;  se 
cedes,  7;  typical  of  new  order 
in  South,  29-31 ;  sense  of  South-, 
era  nationality,  31;  status  of, 
74,  114-15 

Mobile  Bay,  capture  of,  129 

Montgomery  (Ala.),  general  Con 
gress  of  seceding  States  at, 
9-11 

Montgomery  Mail,  162 

Moultrie,  Fort,  6,  20 

Munitions,  33,  48,  61,  65,  105-06 

Napoleon  III,  offers  mediation, 

54,  77;     intrigues  with   Con 
federacy,  130  et  seq.;   Italian 
policy,  134,   143;    purpose  ex 
posed,  142;  influence  in  Mexi 
can  policy  of  the  South,  178 

New  Orleans,  loss  of,  42,  74 

New  York  Herald,  175 

Niter  and  Mining  Bureau  sup 
plies  powder  for  South,  106 

North  Carolina,  resolutions  con 
cerning  Congress  of  seceding 
States,  9-10;  against  secession, 
12;  secedes,  14;  state  rights, 


INDEX 


213 


North  Carolina — Continued 
12,  39;  political  life  in,  74; 
protests  tithes,  92;  disorder 
in,  93-94;  anti-Davis  tend 
encies  in,  94;  peace  illusion 
in,  169-70;  see  also  Vance 

North  Carolina  Standard,  93 

Palmerston,  Lord,  British  Prime 

Minister,    Mason    interviews, 

198 
Peace,  93,  120,  121-22,  126-27, 

169-70,  175-82,  202 
Peace  Convention,  13 
"Peace  Society,"  121-22 
Peninsular  campaign,  42,  59 
Perry ville,  Battle  of,  53 
Petersburg  (Va.),  107-08 
Pierce,  Bishop,  quoted,  109 
Pike,  General  Albert,  84 
Pollard,  E.  A.,  62,  66,  69,  87; 

The  First  Year  of  the  War,  62- 

64 

Porcher,  F.  A.,  185 
Prentiss,  S.  S.,  29 
Press,  Freedom  of,  59 
Preston,  General  J.  S.,  151 
Preston,   General   William,   140, 

144 

Price-fixing,  see  Finance 
Profiteering,  78-79,  95,  108-09, 

161-62 

Pryor,  R.  A.,  13,  17-18  (note) 
Pulaski,  Fort,  seized,  6 

Quitman,  J.  A.,  29 

Raleigh  Progress,  93 

Ramsdell,  C.  W.,  The  Confeder 
ate  Government  and  the  Rail 
roads,  cited,  108  (note) 

Randolph,  G.  W.,  Secretary  of 
War,  79  (note) 

Refugees,  110-11 

Rhett,  R.  B.,  leader  of  secession 
movement  of  1850-51,  4; 
candidate  for  President  of 
Confederate  States,  24;  dis 
appointment,  25,  26;  on  state 


army,  72-73;  retires,  87,  88- 

89;    on    arming    the   negroes, 

184 
Rhodes,    J.    F.,    History   of  the 

United  States,  cited,  6  (note) 
Richmond     (Va.),     capital     of 

Confederacy,    34-35;    martial 

law  in,  41-42,  85;  evacuated, 

199 
Richmond  Enquirer,  government 

organ,  62,  82-83,  94,  95 
Richmond  Examiner,  opposition 

newspaper,  43,  62,  64-65,  80 
Richmond  Sentinel,  government 

organ,  94,  95,  161 
Richmond  Whig,  80 
Rives,  W.  C.,  155 
Roanoke  Island,  36,  40,  63 
Roebuck,  J.  A.,  136-37 
Rost,  Confederate  commissioner 

to  Europe,  46 

Secession  movement,  1  et  seq.\  of 
1850-51,  3-4 

Secrecy  of  Administration,  59, 
60,  65,  66 

Seddon,  J.  A.,  Secretary  of  War, 
79,  112,  113,  147;  resigns, 
163,  180 

Selma  (Ala.),  foundry  at,  105 

Seven  Pines  (Va.),  59 

Seward,  W.  H.,  at  Hampton 
Roads  conference,  181 

Sherman,  General  W.  T.,  Georgia 
campaign,  126,  127-29,  150 

Slaves,  53,  167:  not  directly 
taxed,  91,  125;  relation  of 
Government  to,  99-102;  "Fif 
teen  Slave"  Law,  102-03; 
arming  of,  183  et  seq.\  see  also 
Emancipation 

Slave-trade,  African,  prohibited, 
11  (note),  99-100 

Slidell,  John,  capture  of,  46; 
Confederate  commissioner  at 
Paris,  54;  and  Napoleon^  130 
et  seq.;  conference  at  Paris, 
198 

Smith,  G.  W.,  79  (note) 


214 


INDEX 


Smith,  William,  Governor  of 
Virginia,  161,  186-87 

South,  division  in,  28  et  seq.;  life 
in,  99  et  seq. 

South  Carolina,  convention 
(1860),  2-4;  secedes,  4;  com 
munity  of  aristocratic  class, 
28-29;  question  of  state  sov 
ereignty  in,  72;  political  life 
in,  73-75;  anti-Davis,  88;  situ 
ation  in  1864,  150-52;  passes 
State  Conscription  Act,  151 

Southern  Advertiser,  117 

State  sovereignty,  8,  12,  39,  56, 
65-66,  71  et  seq.,  116-18,  169 

Stephens,  A.  H.,  leads  opposi 
tion  to  secession,  7;  on  state 
sovereignty,  8;  Vice- "resident 
in  provisional  Government, 
11;  a  conservative,  27;  elected 
Vice-President  at  first  regular 
election,  34;  as  central  figure 
in  South,  172-74;  on  question 
of  peace,  175-78;  commissioner 
at  Hampton  Roads  conference, 
180,  181 

Stephens,  Linton,  76 

Substitutes,  Hiring,  92,  103 

Sumter,  Fort,  6;  attack  on,  14- 
23 

Taxation,  see  Finance 

Tennessee,  14,  74 

Texas,  secedes,  7;  secession  issue 
in,  9;  proposes  regiment  for 
home  defense,  38;  last  gun 
shots  of  war  in,  202;  see  also 
Trans-Mississippi 

Thompson,  Jacob,  29,  127 

To  Our  Constituents,  2-3 

Toombs,  Robert,  gives  infor 
mation  about  Fort  Pulaski,  6; 


a  secessionist,  7;  Secretary  of 
State,  14,  27,  69;  and  Su  nter, 
14-15;  candidate  for  President, 
24;  leaves  Cabinet,  34 

Trans-Mississippi,  74,  112,  113, 
114 

Transportation,  107-08 

Tredegar  Iron  Works,  105 

Trenholm,  G.  A.,  157 

Vance,  Z.  B.,  Governor  of  North 
Carolina,  on  military  arrange 
ments,  76-77;  seeks  to  regu 
late  prices,  78;  proclamation 
to  urge  order,  93-94;  urges 
political  changes,  154;  reelec 
tion,  170-71;  policy,  171-72 

Van  Dorn,  General  Earl,  44, 
59 

Vicksburg  (Miss.),  89-90,  96, 
112-13 

Virginia,  and  secession,  11-14; 
calls  Peace  Convention,  13; 
political  life  in,  74-75,  161, 
186-87;  see  also  Richmond 

Voruz,  shipbuilder  of  Nantes, 
140 

Walker,  L.  P.,  34,  79  (note) 

Walker,  R.  J.,  29 

Wheeler,  Joseph,  118 

Winder,  J.  H.,  41 

Women,  position  in  Confederacy, 

104-05,  110-11 
Worth,  Jonathan,  93,  169 

Yancey,  Wr.  L.,  influence  of,  25- 
26,  commissioner  to  England, 
25,  46,  47;  relieved  by  Mason, 
47;  incident  at  Havana,  47; 
attempts  to  abolish  secrecy  of 
Government,  59-60;  death,  87 


AN  OUTLINE  OF  THE  PLAN  OF 
THE  CHRONICLES  OF  AMERICA 


The  fifty  titles  of  the  Series  fall  into  eight  topical  sequences  or  groups, 
each  with  a  dominant  theme  of  its  own — 

I.   'The  Morning  of  America 
TIME:  1492-1763 

THE  theme  of  the  first  sequence  is  the  struggle  of  nations  for  tne 
possession  of  the  New  World.  The  mariners  of  four  European  king 
doms — Spain,  Portugal,  France,  and  England — are  intent  upon  the 
discovery  of  a  new  route  to  Asia.  They  come  upon  the  American  continent 
which  blocks  the  way.  Spain  plants  colonies  in  the  south,  lured  by  gold. 
France,  in  pursuit  of  the  fur  trade,  plants  colonies  in  the  north.  Englishmen, 
in  search  of  homes  and  of  a  wider  freedom,  occupy  the  Atlantic  seaboard. 
These  Englishmen  come  in  time  to  need  the  land  into  which  the  French 
have  penetrated  by  way  of  the  St.  Lawrence  and  the  Great  Lakes,  and  a 
mighty  struggle  between  the  two  nations  takes  place  in  the  wilderness, 
ending  in  the  expulsion  of  the  French.  This  sequence  comprises  ten  volumes: 

1.  THE  RED  MAN'S  CONTINENT,  by  Ellsworth  Huntington 

2.  THE  SPANISH  CONQUERORS,  by  Irving  Berdine  Richman 

3.  ELIZABETHAN  SEA-DOGS,  by  William  Wood 

4.  CRUSADERS  OF  NEW  FRANCE,  by  William  Bennett  Munro 

5.  PIONEERS  OF  THE  OLD  SOUTH,  by  Mary  Johnston 

6.  THE  FATHERS  OF  NEW  ENGLAND,  by  Charles  M.  Andreus 

7.  DUTCH  AND  ENGLISH  ON  THE  HUDSON,  by  Maud  Wilder  Goodwin 

8.  THE  QUAKER  COLONIES,  by  Sydney  G.  Fisher 

9.  COLONIAL  FOLKWAYS,  by  Charles  M.  Andrews 

IO.  THE  CONQUEST  OF  NEW  FRANCE,  by  George  M.  Wrong 


II.   The  W^inning  of  Independence 
TIME:  1763-1815 

The  French  peril  has  passed,  and  the  great  territory  between  the  Alle- 
ghanies  and  the  Mississippi  is  now  open  to  the  Englishmen  on  the  seaboard, 
with  no  enemy  to  contest  their  right  of  way  except  the  Indian.  Btt  the 
question  arises  whether  these  Englishmen  in  the  New  World  shall  submit 
to  political  dictation  from  the  King  and  Parliament  of  England.  To  cecide 
this  question  the  War  of  the  Revolution  is  fought;  the  Union  is  born: 
and  the  second  war  with  England  follows.  Seven  volumes. 

11.  THE  EVE  OF  THE  REVOLUTION,  by  Carl  Becker 

12.  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COMRADES  IN  ARMS,  by  George  M,  Wronj, 

13.  THE  FATHERS  OF  THE  CONSTITUTION,  by  Max  Farrand 

14.  WASHINGTON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES,  by  Henry  Jones  Ford 

15.  JEFFERSON  AND  HIS  COLLEAGUES,  by  Allen  Johnson 

16.  JOHN  MARSHALL  AND  THE  CONSTITUTION,  by  Edward  S.  Corwir, 

17.  THE  FIGHT  FOR  A  FREE  SEA,  by  Ralph  D.  Paine 

III.    The  Fision  of  the  West 
TIME:  1750-1890 

The  theme  of  the  third  sequence  is  the  American  frontier — the  conquest 
of  the  continent  from  the  Alleghanies  to  the  Pacific  Ocean.  The  story  covers 
nearly  a  century  and  a  half,  from  the  first  crossing  of  the  Alleghanies  by 
the  backwoodsmen  of  Pennsylvania,  Virginia,  and  the  Carolinas  (about 
1750)  to  the  heyday  of  the  cowboy  on  the  Great  Plains  in  the  latter  part 
of  the  nineteenth  century.  This  is  the  marvelous  tale  of  the  greatest  migra 
tions  in  history,  told  in  nine  volumes  as  follows: 

1 8.  PIONEERS  OF  THE  OLD  SOUTHWEST,  by  Constance  Lindsay  Skinner 

19.  THE  OLD  NORTHWEST,  by  Frederic  Austin  Ogg 

20.  THE  REIGN  OF  ANDREW  JACKSON,  by  Frederic  Austin  Ogg 

21.  THE  PATHS  OF  INLAND  COMMERCE,  by  Archer  B.  Hulbert 

22.  ADVENTURERS  OF  OREGON,  by  Constance  Lindsay  Skinner 

23.  THE  SPANISH  BORDERLANDS,  by  Herbert  E.  Bo/ton 

24.  TEXAS  AND  THE  MEXICAN  WAR,  by  Nathaniel  W.  Stephenson 

25.  THE  FORTY-NINERS,  by  Stewart  Edward  White 

26    THE  PASSING  OF  THE  FRONTIER,  by  Emerson  Hough 


IV.   The  Storm  of  Secession 
TIME:  1830-1876 

The  curtain  rises  on  the  gathering  storm  of  secession.  The  theme  of  the 
fourth  sequence  is  the  preservation  of  the  Union,  which  carries  with  it  the 
extermination  of  slavery.  Six  volumes  as  follows: 

27.  THE  COTTON  KINGDOM,  by  William  E.  Dodd 

28.  THE  ANTI-SLAVERY  CRUSADE,  by  JeSSC  Macy 

29.  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN  AND  THE  UNION,  by  Nathaniel  W.  Stephenson 

30.  THE  DAY  OF  THE  CONFEDERACY,  by  Nathaniel  W.  Stephenson 

31.  CAPTAINS  OF  THE  ^  iviL  WAR,  by  William  Wood 

32.  THE  SEQUEL  OF  APPOMATTOX,  by  Walter  Lynwood  Fleming 

V.   The  Intellectual  Life 

Two  volumes  follow  on  the  higher  national  life,  telling  of  the  nation's  great 
teachers  and  interpreters: 

33.  THE  AMERICAN  SPIRIT  IN  EDUCATION,  by  Edwin  E.  Slosson 

34.  THE  AMERICAN  SPIRIT  IN  LITERATURE,  by  BllSS  Perry 

VI .   The  Epic  of  Commerce  and  Industry 

The  sixth  sequence  is  devoted  to  the  romance  of  industry  and  business, 
and  the  dominant  theme  is  the  transformation  caused  by  the  inflow  of 
immigrants  and  the  development  and  utilization  of  mechanics  on  a  great 
scale.  The  long  age  of  muscular  power  has  passed,  and  the  era  of  mechanical 
power  has  brought  with  it  a  new  kind  of  civilization.  Eight  volumes: 

35.  OUR  FOREIGNERS,  by  Samuel  P.  Orth 

36.  THE  OLD  MERCHANT  MARINE,  by  Ralph  D.  Patrtf 

37.  THE  AGE  OF  INVENTION,  by  Holland  Thompson 

38.  THE  RAILROAD  BUILDERS,  by  John  Moody 

39.  THE  AGE  OF  BIG  BUSINESS,  by  Burton  J.  Hcndrick 

40.  THE  ARMIES  OF  LABOR,  by  Samuel  P.  Orth 

41.  THE  MASTERS  OF  CAPITAL,  by  John  Moody 

42.  THE  NEW  SOUTH,  by  Holland  Thompson 


VII.   The  Era  of  World  Power 

The  seventh  sequence  carries  on  the  story  of  government  and  diplomacy 
and  political  expansion  from  the  Reconstruction  (1876)  to  the  present  day, 
in  six  volumes: 

43.  THE  BOSS  AND  THE  MACHINE,  by  SamuelP.  Orth 

44.  THE  CLEVELAND  ERA,  by  Henry  Jones  Ford 

45.  THE  AGRARIAN  CRUSADE,  by  Solon  J.  Buck 

46.  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE,  by  Carl  Russell  Fish 

47.  THEODORE  ROOSEVELT  AND  HIS  TIMES,  by  Harold  Howland 

48.  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  THE  WORLD  WAR,  by  Charles  Seymour 

VIII.   Our  Neighbors 

Now  to  round  out  the  story  of  the  continent,  the  Hispanic  peoples  on 
the  south  and  the  Canadians  on  the  north  are  taken  up  where  they  were 
dropped  further  back  in  the  Series,  and  these  peoples  are  followed  cown 
to  the  present  day: 

49.  THE  CANADIAN  DOMINION,  by  Oscar  D.  Skelton 

50.  TKE  HISPANIC  NATIONS  OF  THE  NEW  WORLD,  by  William  R.  Shepherd 

The  Chronicles  of  America  is  thus  a  great  synthesis,  giving  a  new  projec 
tion  and  a  new  interpretation  of  American  History.  These  narratives  are 
works  of  real  scholarship,  for  every  one  is  written  after  an  exhaustive 
examination  of  the  sources.  Many  of  them  contain  new  facts;  some  of  them 
— such  as  those  by  Howland,  Seymour,  and  Hough — are  founded  on  inti 
mate  personal  knowledge.  But  the  originality  of  the  Series  lies,  not  chiefly 
in  new  facts,  but  rather  in  new  ideas  and  new  combinations  of  old  facts. 

The  General  Editor  of  the  Series  is  Dr.  Allen  Johnson,  Chairman  of  the 
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